Publications

June 2008
Case

Kidney Matchmakers

By: Brian J. Hall and Nicole Bennett

In this case we look at the design and development of an unconventional market, where neither money nor traditional "goods" are exchanged. Kidney exchange is an idea pioneered by HBS professor and market designer Alvin Roth and a small group of innovative doctors. This... View Details

Keywords: Moral Sensibility; Disruptive Innovation; Market Design; Market Transactions; Value Creation; Health Industry

June 2008
Article

Current State of Fellowship Hiring: Is a Universal Match Necessary? Is It Possible?

By: Christopher D. Harner, Anil S. Ranawat, Muriel Niederle, Alvin E. Roth, Peter J. Stern, Shepard R. Hurwitz, William Levine, G. Paul DeRosa and Serena S. Hu

Currently, approximately ninety percent of the six hundred twenty graduating orthopaedic residents are planning on entering a post-graduate fellowship. Since January of 2005, two of the largest fellowship match programs, Sports Medicine and Spine Surgery, were... View Details

Keywords: Medical Specialties; Recruitment; Selection and Staffing; Employment; Market Timing; Marketplace Matching; Health Industry

March 2008
Article

Deferred Acceptance Algorithms: History, Theory, Practice, and Open Questions

The deferred acceptance algorithm proposed by Gale and Shapley (1962) has had a profound influence on market design, both directly, by being adapted into practical matching mechanisms, and, indirectly, by raising new theoretical questions. Deferred acceptance... View Details

Keywords: History; Market Design; Labor; System; Practice; Performance; Theory; Boston; New York (city, NY)

March 2008
Article

What Have We Learned from Market Design?

This essay discusses some things we have learned about markets, in the process of designing marketplaces to fix market failures. To work well, marketplaces have to provide thickness, i.e. they need to attract a large enough proportion of the potential participants in... View Details

Keywords: Risk Management; Market Design; Market Participation; Market Transactions; Failure; Safety

2008
Chapter

Matching and Market Design

By: Muriel Niederle, Alvin E. Roth and Tayfun Sonmez

Matching is the part of economics concerned with who transacts with whom and how. Models of matching, starting with the Gale-Shapley deferred acceptance algorithm, have been particularly useful in studying labour markets and in helping design clearinghouses to fix... View Details

Keywords: Market Design; Marketplace Matching; Outcome or Result; Mathematical Methods

winter 2007
Article

Unraveling Yields Inefficient Matchings: Evidence from Post-Season College Football Bowls

By: Guillaume R. Frechette, Alvin E. Roth and M. Utku Unver

Keywords: Entertainment; Sports Industry

October 2007
Article

The Art of Designing Markets

Traditionally, markets have been viewed as simply the confluence of supply and demand. But to function properly, they must be able to attract a sufficient number of buyers and sellers, induce participants to make their preferences clear, and overcome congestion by... View Details

Keywords: Market Design; Market Participation; Market Transactions; Information Technology; Internet and the Web

2007
Working Paper

The Effects of a Centralized Clearinghouse on Job Placement, Wages, and Hiring Practices

By: Muriel Niederle and Alvin E. Roth

New gastroenterologists participated in a labor market clearinghouse (a "match") from 1986 through the late 1990's, after which the match was abandoned. This provides an opportunity to study the effects of a match, by observing the differences in the outcomes and... View Details

Keywords: Health; Employment; Marketplace Matching; Selection and Staffing; Job Offer; Compensation and Benefits; Health Industry

2007
Working Paper

What Have We Learned From Market Design?

This essay discusses some things we have learned about markets, in the process of designing marketplaces to fix market failures. To work well, marketplaces have to provide thickness, i.e. they need to attract a large enough proportion of the potential participants in... View Details

Keywords: Market Design; Market Participation; Market Transactions; Risk and Uncertainty; Safety

2007
Working Paper

Deferred Acceptance Algorithms: History, Theory, Practice, and Open Questions

The deferred acceptance algorithm proposed by Gale and Shapley (1962) has had a profound influence on market design, both directly, by being adapted into practical matching mechanisms, and, indirectly, by raising new theoretical questions. Deferred acceptance... View Details

Keywords: Education; Marketplace Matching; Market Design; Mathematical Methods; Theory; Practice

2007
Working Paper

The New Market for Federal Judicial Law Clerks

By: Christopher Avery, Christine Jolls, Richard Posner and Alvin E. Roth

In the past, judges have often hired applicants for judicial clerkships as early as the beginning of the second year of law school for positions commencing approximately two years down the road. In the new hiring regime for federal judicial law clerks, by contrast,... View Details

Keywords: Law; Education; Employment; Selection and Staffing; Marketplace Matching

May 2007
Article

Multi-agent Learning and the Descriptive Value of Simple Models

By: Ido Erev and Alvin E. Roth

Keywords: Value

2007
Working Paper

Repugnance As a Constraint on Markets

2007
Working Paper

Strategy-proofness versus Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences: Redesigning the NYC High School Match

By: Atila Abdulkadiroglu and Alvin E. Roth

Article

The New Market for Federal Judicial Law Clerks

By: Christopher Avery, Christine Jolls, Richard A. Posner and Alvin E. Roth

Keywords: Markets; Jobs and Positions; Law

September 2006
Article

Learning in Noisy Games: Partial Reinforcement and the Sustainability of Cooperation

By: Yoella Bereby-Meyer and Alvin E. Roth

Keywords: Cooperation; Learning; Games, Gaming, and Gambling