Filter Results:
(1,151)
Show Results For
- All HBS Web
(1,593)
- People (1)
- News (221)
- Research (1,151)
- Events (6)
- Multimedia (6)
- Faculty Publications (740)
Show Results For
- All HBS Web
(1,593)
- People (1)
- News (221)
- Research (1,151)
- Events (6)
- Multimedia (6)
- Faculty Publications (740)
Sort by
- September – October 1999
- Article
Betting on the Future: The Virtues of Contingent Contracts
By: M. H. Bazerman and J. J. Gillespie
Keywords: Contracts
Bazerman, M. H., and J. J. Gillespie. "Betting on the Future: The Virtues of Contingent Contracts." Harvard Business Review 77, no. 5 (September–October 1999): 155–160.
- November 2006
- Background Note
Technical Game Theory Note #4: Contracting and Strategic Alliances
By: Dennis A. Yao
Provides a game theory-based interpretation of contracting and strategic alliances and introduces the problem of moral hazard. View Details
- 2021
- Other Unpublished Work
Obsolescence of the Obsolescing Bargain: Why Governments Must Get Investor-State Contracts Right
By: Louis T. Wells and Karl P. Sauvant
Gone are the days when governments could easily renegotiate natural resource and other investment contracts if foreign investors, e.g., reaped bonanzas from rising resource prices, surprisingly rich discoveries, or terms that were too favorable. Today, international... View Details
Wells, Louis T., and Karl P. Sauvant. "Obsolescence of the Obsolescing Bargain: Why Governments Must Get Investor-State Contracts Right." Columbia FDI Perspectives, No. 298, Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment, February 2021.
- September 1982
- Article
Risk Aversion and the Negotiation of Insurance Contracts
By: R. Kihlstrom and A. E. Roth
Kihlstrom, R., and A. E. Roth. "Risk Aversion and the Negotiation of Insurance Contracts." Journal of Risk and Insurance 49 (September 1982): 372–387.
- May 2000
- Article
The Use of Performance Measures in Incentive Contracting
By: George P. Baker
Baker, George P. "The Use of Performance Measures in Incentive Contracting." American Economic Review 90, no. 2 (May 2000).
- October 2023 (Revised May 2024)
- Case
Thermo Fisher Scientific: Foray into Contract Research
By: Satish Tadikonda, William Marks and Kevin Emancipator
After publicly declaring that they would not enter the contract research organization (CRO) business in 2017, Thermo Fisher purchased Pharmaceutical Product Development (PPD), one of the biggest players in the CRO space, in 2021. Much had changed in the intervening... View Details
Keywords: Mergers and Acquisitions; Customer Focus and Relationships; Corporate Strategy; Organizational Change and Adaptation; Biotechnology Industry
Tadikonda, Satish, William Marks, and Kevin Emancipator. "Thermo Fisher Scientific: Foray into Contract Research." Harvard Business School Case 824-073, October 2023. (Revised May 2024.)
- January 2013 (Revised April 2013)
- Technical Note
Relational Contracts and the Roots of Sustained Competitive Advantage
This note focuses on organizational "competencies" or "capabilities" as a potential source of sustained competitive advantage. Research in this area hypothesizes that some firms outperform their competition because they can do things that their rivals cannot. View Details
Henderson, Rebecca M. "Relational Contracts and the Roots of Sustained Competitive Advantage." Harvard Business School Technical Note 313-105, January 2013. (Revised April 2013.)
- 2014
- Working Paper
Management Practices, Relational Contracts and the Decline of General Motors
By: Susan Helper and Rebecca Henderson
General Motors was once regarded as one of the best managed and most successful firms in the world, but between 1980 and 2009 its share of the US market fell from 62.6 to 19.8 percent, and in 2009 the firm went bankrupt. In this paper we argue that the conventional... View Details
Keywords: Organizational Change and Adaptation; Management Practices and Processes; Organizational Structure; Decision Making; Insolvency and Bankruptcy; Manufacturing Industry; Auto Industry
Helper, Susan, and Rebecca Henderson. "Management Practices, Relational Contracts and the Decline of General Motors." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 14-062, January 2014. (NBER Working Paper Series, No. 19867, January 2014.)
- 1977
- Chapter
The Debasement of Contracts and the Decline of Capital Markets
By: Michael C. Jensen
Jensen, Michael C. "The Debasement of Contracts and the Decline of Capital Markets." In The World Capital Shortage, edited by Alan Heslop. Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1977.
- Article
Management Practices, Relational Contracts and the Decline of General Motors
By: Susan Helper and Rebecca Henderson
General Motors was once regarded as one of the best managed and most successful firms in the world, but between 1980 and 2009 its share of the U.S. market fell from 62.6% to 19.8%, and in 2009 the firm went bankrupt. In this paper we argue that the conventional... View Details
Keywords: Organizational Design; Management Practices and Processes; Insolvency and Bankruptcy; Manufacturing Industry; Auto Industry; United States
Helper, Susan, and Rebecca Henderson. "Management Practices, Relational Contracts and the Decline of General Motors." Journal of Economic Perspectives 28, no. 1 (Winter 2014): 49–72.
- April–May 2021
- Article
The Influence of Loan Officers on Loan Contract Design and Performance
By: Robert Bushman, Janet Gao, Xiumin Martin and Joseph Pacelli
We investigate the extent to which loan officers generate independent, individual effects on the design and performance of syndicated loans. We construct a large database containing the identities of loan officers involved in structuring syndicated loan deals, allowing... View Details
Keywords: Loan Officers; Covenants; Interest Spreads; Syndicated Loans; Banks and Banking; Financing and Loans; Design; Performance
Bushman, Robert, Janet Gao, Xiumin Martin, and Joseph Pacelli. "The Influence of Loan Officers on Loan Contract Design and Performance." Journal of Accounting & Economics 71, nos. 2-3 (April–May 2021).
- 2004
- Working Paper
Contract Rights and Risk Aversion: Foreign Banks and the Mexican Economy, 1997-2004
By: Stephen Haber and Aldo Musacchio
In 1997 Mexico allowed foreign banks unrestricted entry to the market. What impact did foreign mergers and acquisitions have on Mexico's banks? We find that all banks in Mexico have become increasingly risk averse, and that foreign banks are even more so. Foreign banks... View Details
- Research Summary
Optimal Contracts under Inequity Aversion with Voluntary Enforcement (with Tilman Borgers)
We analyze contract structure and efficiency in a Moral Hazard model with possibly fairminded agent and principal when the contract is not automatically enforced but this is a voluntary choice by the contracting parties independently. We find that no penalizing... View Details
- 1982
- Article
The Contraction Mapping Approach to the Perron-Frobenius Theory: Why Hilbert's Metric?
By: Elon Kohlberg and John W. Pratt
Kohlberg, Elon, and John W. Pratt. "The Contraction Mapping Approach to the Perron-Frobenius Theory: Why Hilbert's Metric?" Mathematics of Operations Research, no. 7 (1982): 198–210.
- 08 Sep 2015
- Working Paper Summaries
Through the Grapevine: Network Effects on the Design of Executive Compensation Contracts
Keywords: by Susanna Gallani
- June 2013
- Supplement
Multiasistencia: Redefining the Relationship with its Service Professionals. Spreadsheet Supplement
By: Francisco de Asis Martinez-Jerez
Multiasistencia, a major Spanish BPO of insurance repairs, is changing the relational contract with its service profesionals from a referral model to a guaranteed workload one. View Details
- May 2001
- Article
Empirical Strategies in Contract Economics: Information and the Boundary of the Firm.
By: George P. Baker and Thomas Hubbard
Baker, George P., and Thomas Hubbard. "Empirical Strategies in Contract Economics: Information and the Boundary of the Firm." American Economic Review 91, no. 2 (May 2001).
- Article
Socialization at the Top: How CEOs and Subordinates Develop Interpersonal Contracts
By: John J. Gabarro
Gabarro, John J. "Socialization at the Top: How CEOs and Subordinates Develop Interpersonal Contracts." Organizational Dynamics 7, no. 3 (Winter 1979).
- Research Summary
'Optimal Incentive Contracts under Inequity Aversion' (with Achim Wambach) ), 2005
We analyze the Moral Hazard problem, assuming that the agent is inequity averse. Our results differ from conventional contract theory and are more in line with empirical findings than these standard results. Our key findings are: Inequity aversion alters the structure... View Details
- 2025
- Working Paper
Unwinding Loan Prospecting Pressure Through Renegotiation: The Role of Loan Officer Changes in Debt Contracting
By: Jung Koo Kang, Regina Wittenberg Moerman and Jessie Cheong
We examine the impact of loan officer changes on debt contract design. Loan officers play a critical role in initiating and maintaining lending relationships but also face pressure to originate more loans, incentivizing them to offer loan terms more favorable than... View Details
Keywords: Financing and Loans; Borrowing and Debt; Contracts; Negotiation; Motivation and Incentives
Kang, Jung Koo, Regina Wittenberg Moerman, and Jessie Cheong. "Unwinding Loan Prospecting Pressure Through Renegotiation: The Role of Loan Officer Changes in Debt Contracting." Working Paper, March 2025.