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- All HBS Web
(411)
- News (40)
- Research (187)
- Multimedia (13)
- Faculty Publications (143)
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- June 2013
- Case
Hess Corporation
By: Jay W. Lorsch and Kathleen Durante
On January 29, 2013, Elliott Management, a hedge fund run by Paul E. Singer, which owned 4.5% of Hess Corporation stock, put forward a slate of five independent directors it wanted elected to improve the company's performance. Elliott argued that Hess lacked focus and... View Details
Keywords: Takeover Attempt; Board; Hess; Governing and Advisory Boards; Organizational Structure; Acquisition; Financial Services Industry; Energy Industry
Lorsch, Jay W., and Kathleen Durante. "Hess Corporation." Harvard Business School Case 413-126, June 2013.
- July 2015
- Exercise
An Activist Approach: Confidential Role Assignment for Remingtons Housewares
By: Guhan Subramanian and Kait Szydlowski
A three party, multiple-issue negotiation exercise dealing with a potential merger between two leading department stores, called for by an activist investor hedge fund in a letter to both companies. Company management will now attempt to navigate next moves, which are... View Details
Keywords: Negotiation; Activist Investors; Takeover Defense; Negotiation Types; Mergers and Acquisitions; Corporate Governance; Investment Activism; Retail Industry
Subramanian, Guhan, and Kait Szydlowski. "An Activist Approach: Confidential Role Assignment for Remingtons Housewares." Harvard Business School Exercise 916-014, July 2015.
- July 2015
- Exercise
An Activist Approach: Confidential Role Assignment for Fultons Department Stores
By: Guhan Subramanian and Kait Szydlowski
A three party, multiple-issue negotiation exercise dealing with a potential merger between two leading department stores, called for by an activist investor hedge fund in a letter to both companies. Company management will now attempt to navigate next moves, which are... View Details
Keywords: Negotiation; Activist Investors; Takeover Defense; Negotiation Types; Mergers and Acquisitions; Corporate Governance; Investment Activism; Retail Industry
Subramanian, Guhan, and Kait Szydlowski. "An Activist Approach: Confidential Role Assignment for Fultons Department Stores." Harvard Business School Exercise 916-013, July 2015.
- July 2015
- Exercise
An Activist Approach: Castle Rock-Fultons-Remingtons
By: Guhan Subramanian and Kait Szydlowski
A three party, multiple-issue negotiation exercise dealing with a potential merger between two leading department stores, called for by an activist investor hedge fund in a letter to both companies. Company management will now attempt to navigate next moves, which are... View Details
Keywords: Negotiation; Activist Investors; Takeover Defense; Negotiation Types; Mergers and Acquisitions; Corporate Governance; Investment Activism; Retail Industry
Subramanian, Guhan, and Kait Szydlowski. "An Activist Approach: Castle Rock-Fultons-Remingtons." Harvard Business School Exercise 916-011, July 2015.
- 1999
- Discussion Paper
The Contestability of Corporate Control: A Critique of the Scientific Evidence on Takeover Defenses
By: John C. Coates
Coates, John C. "The Contestability of Corporate Control: A Critique of the Scientific Evidence on Takeover Defenses." Discussion Paper Series, Harvard Law School, John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business, 1999. (No. 265.)
- June 2021
- Article
Deals in the Time of Pandemic
By: Guhan Subramanian and Caley Petrucci
The COVID-19 pandemic has brought new attention to the period between signing and closing in M&A transactions. Transactional planners heavily negotiate the provisions that govern the behavior of the parties during this window, not only to allocate risk between the... View Details
Subramanian, Guhan, and Caley Petrucci. "Deals in the Time of Pandemic." Columbia Law Review 121, no. 5 (June 2021): 1405–1480.
- June 1998
- Article
A New Takeover Defense Mechanism: Using an Equal Treatment Agreement as an Alternative to the Poison Pill
Subramanian, Guhan. "A New Takeover Defense Mechanism: Using an Equal Treatment Agreement as an Alternative to the Poison Pill." Delaware Journal of Corporate Law 23, no. 2 (June 1998).
- 2006
- Other Unpublished Work
The Effect of Takeover Defenses: Discussion Paper, Harvard Law School Olin Center for Law, Economics & Business
By: Lucian Arye Bebchuk, John C. Coates IV and Guhan Subramanian
- November 2017
- Supplement
Merging American Airlines and US Airways (B)
By: David G. Fubini, David A. Garvin and Carin-Isabel Knoop
Exhibit to Merging American Airlines and US Airways (A) case. In February 2013, US Airways announced that it would merge with American Airlines to create the world’s largest airline. Doug Parker, the CEO of US Airways, would become CEO of the new American Airlines... View Details
Keywords: Airlines; Merger; Takeover; Integration Strategy; Merger Integration; Mergers and Acquisitions; Decision Making; Governance; Management Teams; Operations; Organizational Culture; Air Transportation Industry; United States
Fubini, David G., David A. Garvin, and Carin-Isabel Knoop. "Merging American Airlines and US Airways (B)." Harvard Business School Supplement 418-036, November 2017.
- April 2014
- Article
Golden Parachutes and the Wealth of Shareholders
By: Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alma Cohen and Charles C.Y. Wang
Golden parachutes (GPs) have attracted substantial attention from investors and public officials for more than two decades. We find that GPs are associated with higher expected acquisition premiums and that this association is at least partly due to the effect of GPs... View Details
Keywords: Golden Parachute; Acquisitions; Takeovers; Acquisition Takeover; Acquisition Likelihood; Acquisition Premiums; Agency Costs; Managerial Slack; Dodd-Frank; Executive Compensation; Acquisition; Corporate Governance; Business and Shareholder Relations
Bebchuk, Lucian A., Alma Cohen, and Charles C.Y. Wang. "Golden Parachutes and the Wealth of Shareholders." Journal of Corporate Finance 25 (April 2014): 140–154.
- March 2016 (Revised October 2023)
- Case
Central European Distribution Corporation: Hostile Takeover, Bankruptcy Makeover
By: Stuart C. Gilson and Sarah L. Abbott
In early 2013, Central European Distribution Corporation (CEDC), a large publicly traded producer and distributer of vodka and spirits in Eastern and Central Europe, has suffered significant declines in its financial performance, is at risk of defaulting on its debt,... View Details
Keywords: Hostile Takeover; Accounting Restatement; Activist Shareholder; Restructuring; Mergers and Acquisitions; Financial Statements; Corporate Governance; Investment Activism; Distribution Industry; Food and Beverage Industry; United States; Russia; Europe
Gilson, Stuart C., and Sarah L. Abbott. "Central European Distribution Corporation: Hostile Takeover, Bankruptcy Makeover." Harvard Business School Case 216-059, March 2016. (Revised October 2023.)
- January 2016 (Revised January 2019)
- Supplement
The Allergan Board Under Fire (B)
By: Lynn S. Paine, Suraj Srinivasan, John C. Coates and David Lane
In 2014, the Allergan Inc. board of directors received a surprise takeover offer from Valeant Pharmaceuticals in alliance with hedge fund activist Bill Ackman's Pershing Square Capital Management. In the unprecedented arrangement between an acquirer and a hedge fund... View Details
Keywords: Allergan, Inc.; Valeant; Ackman; Pershing Square; Tender Offer; Activist Investors; Business Models; R＆D; Board Of Directors; Securities Litigation; Acquisition Strategy; Takeover Defenses; Hedge Funds; Shareholder Rights; Proxy Contest; Shareholder Special Meetings; Legal Issues In Contested Takeovers; Corporate Governance; Investment Activism; Business and Stakeholder Relations; Business Model; Business and Shareholder Relations; Valuation; Pharmaceutical Industry
Paine, Lynn S., Suraj Srinivasan, John C. Coates, and David Lane. "The Allergan Board Under Fire (B)." Harvard Business School Supplement 316-029, January 2016. (Revised January 2019.)
- September 2017
- Article
Reexamining Staggered Boards and Shareholder Value
By: Charles C.Y. Wang and Alma Cohen
Cohen and Wang (2013) (CW2013) provide evidence consistent with market participants perceiving staggered boards to be value reducing. Amihud and Stoyanov (2016) (AS2016) contests these findings, reporting some specifications under which the results are not... View Details
Keywords: Staggered Boards; Takeover Defense; Antitakeover Provision; Firm Value; Delaware; Airgas; Governing and Advisory Boards; Corporate Governance; Value
Wang, Charles C.Y., and Alma Cohen. "Reexamining Staggered Boards and Shareholder Value." Journal of Financial Economics 125, no. 3 (September 2017): 637–647.
- January 2016 (Revised January 2019)
- Case
The Allergan Board Under Fire (A)
By: Lynn S. Paine, Suraj Srinivasan, John C. Coates and David Lane
In 2014, the Allergan Inc. board of directors received a surprise takeover offer from Valeant Pharmaceuticals in alliance with hedge fund activist Bill Ackman's Pershing Square Capital Management. In the unprecedented arrangement between an acquirer and a hedge fund... View Details
Keywords: Allergan, Inc.; Valeant; Ackman; Pershing Square; Tender Offer; Activist Investors; Business Models; R＆D; Board Of Directors; Securities Litigation; Acquisition Strategy; Takeover Defenses; Hedge Funds; Shareholder Rights; Proxy Contest; Shareholder Special Meetings; Legal Issues In Contested Takeovers; Governing and Advisory Boards; Mergers and Acquisitions; Corporate Governance; Management Teams; Business and Shareholder Relations; Pharmaceutical Industry
Paine, Lynn S., Suraj Srinivasan, John C. Coates, and David Lane. "The Allergan Board Under Fire (A)." Harvard Business School Case 316-010, January 2016. (Revised January 2019.)
- November 2017
- Case
Third Point Paints a Target on Sotheby's
By: Lena G. Goldberg
When faced with the increasing accumulation of its stock by activist investors led by Daniel Loeb’s Third Point LLC and the activists’ stated objective to replace management and at least some Sotheby’s Board members, Sotheby’s, the world’s oldest auction house,... View Details
Keywords: Fiduciary Duties; Activists; Activist Investors; Rights Plan; Poison Pills; Takeover Defenses; Corporate Governance; Laws and Statutes; Lawsuits and Litigation; Ownership Stake; Value Creation; Crisis Management
Goldberg, Lena G. "Third Point Paints a Target on Sotheby's." Harvard Business School Case 318-086, November 2017.
- March 2018
- Supplement
China Vanke: Battle for Control (C)
By: Lynn S. Paine, Charles C.Y. Wang, Dawn H. Lau and Anthony K. Woo
Baoneng calls for the removal of China Vanke's board of directors, citing as reasons the directors' mishandling of the Shenzhen Metro proposal as well as the company's various breaches of corporate governance requirements. Vanke defends itself against Baoneng's... View Details
Keywords: China Vanke; China Resources; Hostile Takeover; Board Of Directors; Shareholding Structure; Shareholder Rights; Asset Restructuring; Corporate Governance; Governing and Advisory Boards; Valuation; Business and Shareholder Relations; Real Estate Industry; China
Paine, Lynn S., Charles C.Y. Wang, Dawn H. Lau, and Anthony K. Woo. "China Vanke: Battle for Control (C)." Harvard Business School Supplement 318-119, March 2018.
- March 2018
- Supplement
China Vanke: Battle for Control (B)
By: Lynn S. Paine, Charles C.Y. Wang, Dawn H. Lau and Anthony K. Woo
China Resources expresses disagreement over the validity of the results of the board vote as announced by China Vanke. It further raises objections to Vanke's handling of the announcement as well as reiterates its doubts about the strategic rationale of the proposed... View Details
Keywords: China Vanke; China Resources; Hostile Takeover; Board Of Directors; Shareholding Structure; Shareholder Rights; Asset Restructuring; Corporate Governance; Governing and Advisory Boards; Valuation; Business and Shareholder Relations; Real Estate Industry; China
Paine, Lynn S., Charles C.Y. Wang, Dawn H. Lau, and Anthony K. Woo. "China Vanke: Battle for Control (B)." Harvard Business School Supplement 318-118, March 2018.
- 2015
- Working Paper
Staggered Boards and Shareholder Value: A Reply to Amihud and Stoyanov
By: Alma Cohen and Charles C.Y. Wang
In a paper published in the Journal of Financial Economics in 2013, we provided evidence that market participants perceive staggered boards to be on average value-reducing. In a recent response paper, Amihud and Stoyanov (2015) “contest” our results. They... View Details
Keywords: Staggered Boards; Takeover Defense; Antitakeover Provision; Firm Value; Agency Costs; Delaware; Chancery Court; Airgas; Governing and Advisory Boards; Acquisition; Corporate Governance; Business and Shareholder Relations; Delaware
Cohen, Alma, and Charles C.Y. Wang. "Staggered Boards and Shareholder Value: A Reply to Amihud and Stoyanov." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 16-097, February 2016.
- March 2018 (Revised January 2021)
- Case
China Vanke: Battle for Control (A)
By: Lynn S. Paine, Charles C.Y. Wang, Dawn H. Lau and Anthony K. Woo
In June 2016, the board of China Vanke, one of China’s largest and best-known private residential real estate developers, must vote on a proposed acquisition that is opposed by its largest shareholders, state-owned China Resources Co. and the lesser-known property... View Details
Keywords: China Vanke; China Resources; Hostile Takeover; Board Of Directors; Shareholding Structure; Shareholder Rights; Asset Restructuring; Corporate Governance; Governing and Advisory Boards; Valuation; Business and Shareholder Relations; Real Estate Industry; China
Paine, Lynn S., Charles C.Y. Wang, Dawn H. Lau, and Anthony K. Woo. "China Vanke: Battle for Control (A)." Harvard Business School Case 318-117, March 2018. (Revised January 2021.)
- December 2013
- Article
How Do Staggered Boards Affect Shareholder Value? Evidence from a Natural Experiment
By: Alma Cohen and Charles C.Y. Wang
The well-established negative correlation between staggered boards (SBs) and firm value could be due to SBs leading to lower value or a reflection of low-value firms' greater propensity to maintain SBs. We analyze the causal question using a natural experiment... View Details
Keywords: Staggered Board; Takeover Defense; Antitakeover Provision; Proxy Fight; Tobin's; Firm Value; Agency Cost; Delaware; Chancery Court; Airgas; Governing and Advisory Boards; Corporate Governance
Cohen, Alma, and Charles C.Y. Wang. "How Do Staggered Boards Affect Shareholder Value? Evidence from a Natural Experiment." Journal of Financial Economics 110, no. 3 (December 2013): 627–641.