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Show Results For
- All HBS Web
(963)
- News (194)
- Research (649)
- Events (7)
- Multimedia (5)
- Faculty Publications (307)
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- October 2009
- Article
Influence and Inefficiency in the Internal Capital Market
By: Julie Wulf
I model inefficient resource allocations in M-form organizations due to influence activities by division managers that skew capital budgets in their favor. Corporate headquarters receives two types of signals about investment opportunities: private signals that can be... View Details
Keywords: Capital Markets; Resource Allocation; Business Processes; Capital Budgeting; Business Headquarters; Investment; Opportunities; Cost; Value; Motivation and Incentives; Equity
Wulf, Julie. "Influence and Inefficiency in the Internal Capital Market." Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 72, no. 1 (October 2009): 305–321.
- 05 Jun 2020
- Research & Ideas
How Anchor Investors Help Impact Funds Succeed
the experience of development and fundraising professionals in the impact investing space—that anchor investors are motivated by the ability to catalyze additional change by supporting fund managers early in their fund raise, often providing a View Details
- 2007
- Other Unpublished Work
Influence and Inefficiency in the Internal Capital Market
By: Julie Wulf
I model inefficient resource allocations in M-form organizations due to influence activities by division managers that skew capital budgets in their favor. Corporate headquarters receives two types of signals about investment opportunities: private signals that can be... View Details
- 13 May 2022
- Research & Ideas
Company Reviews on Glassdoor: Petty Complaints or Signs of Potential Misconduct?
Corporate scandals often follow a pattern: Whether it’s Theranos and its fraudulent blood testing technology, Wells Fargo and its fake financial accounts, or Volkswagen and its bogus emissions data, a whistleblower eventually comes forward to expose the behavior, and... View Details
- March 2017
- Article
Risky Business: When Humor Increases and Decreases Status
By: T. B. Bitterly, A.W. Brooks and M. E. Schweitzer
Across eight experiments, we demonstrate that humor can influence status, but attempting to use humor is risky. The successful use of humor can increase status in both new and existing relationships, but unsuccessful humor attempts (e.g., inappropriate jokes) can harm... View Details
Bitterly, T. B., A.W. Brooks, and M. E. Schweitzer. "Risky Business: When Humor Increases and Decreases Status." Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 112, no. 3 (March 2017): 431–455.
- 2024
- Working Paper
Content Moderation with Opaque Policies
By: Scott Duke Kominers and Jesse M. Shapiro
A sender sends a signal about a state to a receiver who takes an action that determines a payoff. A moderator can block some or all of the sender's signal before it reaches the receiver. When the moderator's policy is transparent to the receiver, the moderator can... View Details
Kominers, Scott Duke, and Jesse M. Shapiro. "Content Moderation with Opaque Policies." NBER Working Paper Series, No. 32156, February 2024.
- March 2008
- Article
The Consequences of Information Revealed in Auctions
By: Brett E. Katzman and Matthew Rhodes-Kropf
This paper considers the ramifications of post-auction competition on bidding behavior under different bid announcement policies. In equilibrium, the auctioneer's announcement policy has two distinct effects. First, announcement entices players to signal information to... View Details
Katzman, Brett E., and Matthew Rhodes-Kropf. "The Consequences of Information Revealed in Auctions." Special Issue on Theoretical, Empirical and Experimental Research on Auctions. Applied Economics Research Bulletin 2 (March 2008): 53–87.
- Article
Delayed-Response Strategies in Repeated Games with Observation Lags
By: Drew Fudenberg, Yuhta Ishii and Scott Duke Kominers
We extend the folk theorem of repeated games to two settings in which players' information about others' play arrives with stochastic lags. In our first model, signals are almost-perfect if and when they do arrive, that is, each player either observes an almost-perfect... View Details
Fudenberg, Drew, Yuhta Ishii, and Scott Duke Kominers. "Delayed-Response Strategies in Repeated Games with Observation Lags." Journal of Economic Theory 150 (March 2014): 487–514.
- Research Summary
I give therefore I have: Philanthropy and Prosperity
We suggest and document a surprising means by which people can feel wealthier: giving their money away. We suggest that just as acts of conspicuous generosity signal wealth and power to others, they trigger feelings of subjective wealth and power in the giver--despite... View Details
- April 7, 2017
- Article
Signs You’re Losing Control of Your Family Business
By: Josh Baron and Rob Lachenauer
These red flags signal the need to reassert authority. View Details
Baron, Josh, and Rob Lachenauer. "Signs You’re Losing Control of Your Family Business." Harvard Business Review (website) (April 7, 2017).
- 17 Dec 2015
- Working Paper Summaries
Observability Increases the Demand for Commitment Devices
Keywords: by Christine Exley & Jeffrey Naecker
- July 2014
- Article
Accounting for Crises
By: Venky Nagar and Gwen Yu
We provide among the first empirical evidence consistent with recent macro global-game crisis models, which show that the precision of public signals can coordinate crises (e.g., Angeletos and Werning, 2006; Morris and Shin, 2002, 2003). In these models,... View Details
Keywords: Corporate Disclosure; Mathematical Methods; Game Theory; Financial Markets; Forecasting and Prediction; Accounting; Financial Crisis
Nagar, Venky, and Gwen Yu. "Accounting for Crises." American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics 6, no. 3 (July 2014): 184–213.
- February 2025
- Article
Seeing the Whole: Configurational Cognition and New Venture Resource Mobilization
By: Goran Calic, François Neville, Santi Furnari and C. S. Richard Chan
Research is scant on how multiple venture attributes combine as “whole packages” of signals (or cognitive configurations) in resource holders’ eyes, shaping a venture’s ability to mobilize resources. Drawing on a Qualitative Comparative Analysis of 1,395 crowdfunding... View Details
Calic, Goran, François Neville, Santi Furnari, and C. S. Richard Chan. "Seeing the Whole: Configurational Cognition and New Venture Resource Mobilization." Strategic Management Journal 46, no. 2 (February 2025): 309–347.
- 2023
- Working Paper
Culture as a Signal: Evidence from a Natural Field Experiment
By: Wei Cai, Dennis Campbell and Jiehang Yu
The importance of culture as an informal management control system is increasingly acknowledged in academia. While prior research mainly focuses on the value of culture on internal stakeholders (e.g., employees), we examine whether culture serves as a credible signal... View Details
Cai, Wei, Dennis Campbell, and Jiehang Yu. "Culture as a Signal: Evidence from a Natural Field Experiment." SSRN Working Paper Series, No. 4447603, May 2023.
- 11 May 2020
- Op-Ed
Immigration Policies Threaten American Competitiveness
It is no secret that immigration has reshaped American innovation. Immigrants are the backbone of America’s most innovative industries, provide a quarter of our patent applications, and are numerous among our science and engineering superstars. Taken from World... View Details
Keywords: by William R. Kerr
- November 1989 (Revised August 1994)
- Supplement
Du Pont's Titanium Dioxide Business (C)
Provides students the opportunity to track industry evolution over time, to explore the role that signaling may play in such evolution, and to construct and validate industry scenarios. View Details
Ghemawat, Pankaj. "Du Pont's Titanium Dioxide Business (C)." Harvard Business School Supplement 390-115, November 1989. (Revised August 1994.)
- 19 Dec 2014
- Research & Ideas
China’s Complicated Relationship With Mother Nature
Despite its name, the Great Wall of China began as a series of smaller, isolated defensive fortifications. Those structures grew and were later unified into the imposing structure that exists today. The Great Wall is a great metaphor for the Chinese economy. By... View Details
- January 1996
- Background Note
The Motivation for Creativity in Organizations
People will be most creative when they feel motivated primarily by the interest, enjoyment, satisfaction, and challenge of the work itself--when they are driven by a deep involvement in their work and a passion for it. This note describes the ways in which creativity... View Details
Keywords: Compensation and Benefits; Managerial Roles; Organizations; Creativity; Motivation and Incentives; Satisfaction
Amabile, Teresa M. "The Motivation for Creativity in Organizations." Harvard Business School Background Note 396-240, January 1996.
- summer 2003
- Article
Patents, Invalidity, and the Strategic Transmission of Enabling Information
By: James J. Anton and Dennis A. Yao
The patent system encourages innovation and knowledge disclosure by providing exclusivity to inventors. Exclusivity is limited, however, because a substantial fraction of patents have some probability of being ruled invalid when challenged in court. The possibility of... View Details
Keywords: System; Innovation and Invention; Knowledge Dissemination; Courts and Trials; Competition; Patents; Corporate Disclosure
Anton, James J., and Dennis A. Yao. "Patents, Invalidity, and the Strategic Transmission of Enabling Information." Journal of Economics & Management Strategy 12, no. 2 (summer 2003): 151–178. (Harvard users click here for full text.)
- 2025
- Working Paper
Incentive-Compatible Recovery from Manipulated Signals, with Applications to Decentralized Physical Infrastructure
By: Jason Milionis, Jens Ernstberger, Joseph Bonneau, Scott Duke Kominers and Tim Roughgarden
We introduce the first formal model capturing the elicitation of unverifiable information from a party (the "source") with implicit signals derived by other players (the "observers"). Our model is motivated in part by applications in decentralized physical... View Details
Milionis, Jason, Jens Ernstberger, Joseph Bonneau, Scott Duke Kominers, and Tim Roughgarden. "Incentive-Compatible Recovery from Manipulated Signals, with Applications to Decentralized Physical Infrastructure." Working Paper, March 2025.