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Show Results For
- All HBS Web
(786)
- News (171)
- Research (410)
- Events (8)
- Multimedia (2)
- Faculty Publications (131)
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- 2007
- Chapter
Legal Origin vs. the Politics of Creditor Rights: Bond Markets in Brazil, 1850-2002
By: Aldo Musacchio
This paper explores the question: Do institutions persist over time and determine current economic outcomes? Specifically, does the adoption or inheritance of a legal tradition in the past determine the subsequent course of institutional and financial development? This... View Details
- 21 Dec 2009
- Research & Ideas
Good Banks, Bad Banks, and Government’s Role as Fixer
funds, Pozen writes with authority and unusual clarity about complex issues in Too Big to Save? How to Fix the U.S. Financial System (John Wiley & Sons). Roger Thompson: How does the government figure out which financial institutions... View Details
- 2014
- Working Paper
Putting Skin in the Game: Managerial Ownership and Bank Risk-Taking
By: Jan Bouwens and Arnt Verriest
This paper examines the relation between managerial ownership and bank risk exposure for a large sample of international financial institutions. We seek empirical evidence suggested by theories concerning conflicts between managers and owners over risk-taking. We argue... View Details
Keywords: Managerial Equity Ownership; Financial Risk; Banks; Motivation and Incentives; Risk Management; Employee Ownership; Corporate Governance; Banks and Banking; Banking Industry
Bouwens, Jan, and Arnt Verriest. "Putting Skin in the Game: Managerial Ownership and Bank Risk-Taking." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 14-070, February 2014. (Revised June 2014.)
- September–October 2022
- Article
Seeking Purity, Avoiding Pollution: Strategies for Moral Career Building
By: Erin Reid and Lakshmi Ramarajan
This study builds theory on how people construct moral careers. Analyzing interviews with 102 journalists, we show how people build moral careers by seeking jobs that allow them to fulfill both the institution’s moral obligations and their own material aims. We... View Details
Reid, Erin, and Lakshmi Ramarajan. "Seeking Purity, Avoiding Pollution: Strategies for Moral Career Building." Organization Science 33, no. 5 (September–October 2022): 1909–1937.
- 03 Feb 2018
- Op-Ed
How to Heed BlackRock's Call for Corporate Social Responsibility
Larry Fink recently created a shockwave. As cofounder, chairman, and CEO of BlackRock, one of the world’s largest global asset management firms, in an open letter to CEOs he caught the attention of financial markets and beyond by insisting on the importance of... View Details
Keywords: by Julie Battilana
- July 2024
- Article
How Artificial Intelligence Constrains Human Experience
By: A. Valenzuela, S. Puntoni, D. Hoffman, N. Castelo, J. De Freitas, B. Dietvorst, C. Hildebrand, Y.E. Huh, R. Meyer, M. Sweeney, S. Talaifar, G. Tomaino and K. Wertenbroch
Many consumption decisions and experiences are digitally mediated. As a consequence, consumer behavior is increasingly the joint product of human psychology and ubiquitous algorithms (Braun et al. 2024; cf. Melumad et al. 2020). The coming of age of Large Language... View Details
Keywords: Large Language Model; User Experience; AI and Machine Learning; Consumer Behavior; Technology Adoption; Risk and Uncertainty; Cost vs Benefits
Valenzuela, A., S. Puntoni, D. Hoffman, N. Castelo, J. De Freitas, B. Dietvorst, C. Hildebrand, Y.E. Huh, R. Meyer, M. Sweeney, S. Talaifar, G. Tomaino, and K. Wertenbroch. "How Artificial Intelligence Constrains Human Experience." Journal of the Association for Consumer Research 9, no. 3 (July 2024): 241–256.
- 28 Sep 2009
- Research & Ideas
Improving Accountability at the World Bank
Editor's Note: As an institution charged with fighting global poverty, the World Bank has found itself on the firing line of late. Critics cite a persistent lack of transparency and failure to include local insights in decision-making... View Details
Keywords: by Alnoor Ebrahim
- December 2013
- Article
Reputational Contagion and Optimal Regulatory Forbearance
By: Alan Morrison and Lucy White
Existing studies suggest that systemic crises may arise because banks either hold correlated assets or are connected by interbank lending. This paper shows that common regulation is also a conduit for interbank contagion. One bank's failure may undermine confidence in... View Details
Morrison, Alan, and Lucy White. "Reputational Contagion and Optimal Regulatory Forbearance." Journal of Financial Economics 110, no. 3 (December 2013): 642–658.
- October 1990
- Article
Bankruptcy, Boards, Banks, and Blockholders: Evidence on Changes in Corporate Ownership and Control When Firms Default
By: S. C. Gilson
In 111 publicly traded firms that either file for bankruptcy or privately restructure their debt between 1979 and 1985, bank lenders frequently become major stockholders or appoint new directors. On average, only 46% of incumbent directors remain when bankruptcy or... View Details
Keywords: Insolvency and Bankruptcy; Governance; Banks and Banking; Change; Business Ventures; Ownership
Gilson, S. C. "Bankruptcy, Boards, Banks, and Blockholders: Evidence on Changes in Corporate Ownership and Control When Firms Default." Journal of Financial Economics 27, no. 2 (October 1990): 355–387.
- 27 Jan 2003
- Research & Ideas
New Cluster Mapping Project Helps Companies Locate Facilities
Silicon Valley or the Napa wine country) that can lead to competitive advantage. Porter's Institute for Strategy and Competitiveness has just introduced a new database tool to help corporations and policy makers pinpoint these clusters,... View Details
Keywords: by Sean Silverthorne
- 2009
- Working Paper
Do Analysts Follow Managers Who Switch Companies? An Analysis of Relationships in the Capital Markets.
By: Francois Brochet, Gregory S. Miller and Suraj Srinivasan
We examine the importance of professional relationships developed between analysts and managers by investigating analyst coverage decisions in the context of CEO and CFO moves between publicly listed firms. We find that top executive moves from an origin firm to a... View Details
Keywords: Business and Stakeholder Relations; Capital Markets; Decisions; Managerial Roles; Financial Institutions; Investment; Market Participation; Public Ownership; Relationships
Brochet, Francois, Gregory S. Miller, and Suraj Srinivasan. "Do Analysts Follow Managers Who Switch Companies? An Analysis of Relationships in the Capital Markets." American Accounting Association Financial Accounting and Reporting Section Paper, August 2009. (Forthcoming, The Accounting Review, March 2014.)
- August 2009
- Case
Nomura's Global Growth: Picking Up Pieces of Lehman
By: C. Fritz Foley and Linnea Meyer
What issues commonly arise in international financial management? Kenichi Watanabe and Takumi Shibata, CEO and COO of Nomura Holdings Inc., one of the leading investment banks in Asia, have the opportunity to expand their firm internationally through the acquisition of... View Details
Keywords: Mergers and Acquisitions; Insolvency and Bankruptcy; Investment Banking; International Finance; Cross-Cultural and Cross-Border Issues; Expansion; Financial Services Industry; Japan
Foley, C. Fritz, and Linnea Meyer. "Nomura's Global Growth: Picking Up Pieces of Lehman." Harvard Business School Case 210-017, August 2009.
- 08 Nov 2012
- Working Paper Summaries
Admitting Mistakes: Home Country Effect on the Reliability of Restatement Reporting
- 02 Nov 2009
- Research & Ideas
Shareholders Need a Say on Pay
hasn't been much variation on compensation packages in the past, Ferri advocates a more holistic approach that tailors executive pay to a company's individual circumstances. "I like the notion of say on pay because it encourages View Details
- 13 Jan 2010
- Working Paper Summaries
Private Equity and Industry Performance
- 07 Aug 2007
- First Look
First Look: August 7, 2007
between firm payout policy and tax incentives. Analysis of a panel of firms matched with the tax characteristics of the clients of their institutional shareholders indicates that "dividend-averse" View Details
Keywords: Martha Lagace
- 2022
- Working Paper
On the Estimation of Demand-Based Asset Pricing Models
A growing literature uses portfolio holdings data to quantify the impact of investor demand on equilibrium prices via counterfactual experiments. The key parameter in relating demand and equilibrium prices is investors’ elasticity of demand with respect to the price.... View Details
van der Beck, Philippe. "On the Estimation of Demand-Based Asset Pricing Models." Swiss Finance Institute Research Paper Series, No. 22-67, May 2022.
- January 2009
- Case
The Federal Reserve and the Banking Crisis of 1931
By: David A. Moss and Cole Bolton
In early October 1931, in the midst of a global economic depression, the U.S. banking system was in crisis—with bank suspensions running at near record levels. At the same time, the broader economy was sputtering, and U.S. gold reserves had come under severe pressure... View Details
Keywords: Decision Choices and Conditions; Financial Crisis; Central Banking; Business History; Crisis Management; Banking Industry; United States
Moss, David A., and Cole Bolton. "The Federal Reserve and the Banking Crisis of 1931." Harvard Business School Case 709-040, January 2009.
- September 1989 (Revised April 1990)
- Case
Banc One Corp.--1989
Banc One Corp., an innovative and financially successful super-regional bank holding company, has a track record of upgrading performance of acquisitions while retaining previous management--doing better with the same people. In June 1989 Banc One made its first... View Details
Keywords: Business Growth and Maturation; Banks and Banking; Private Ownership; Human Resources; Mergers and Acquisitions; Performance Evaluation; Management Teams; Banking Industry; United States
Kanter, Rosabeth M. "Banc One Corp.--1989." Harvard Business School Case 390-029, September 1989. (Revised April 1990.)
- September 2011
- Article
Political Instability: Effects on Financial Development, Roots in the Severity of Economic Inequality
By: Mark J. Roe and Jordan I. Siegel
We here bring forward strong evidence that political instability impedes financial development, with its variation a primary determinant of differences in financial development around the world. As such, it needs to be added to the short list of major determinants of... View Details
Keywords: Financial Development; Political Instability; Government and Politics; Finance; Growth and Development; Economics; Equality and Inequality
Roe, Mark J., and Jordan I. Siegel. "Political Instability: Effects on Financial Development, Roots in the Severity of Economic Inequality." Journal of Comparative Economics 39, no. 3 (September 2011): 279–309. (We here bring forward strong evidence that political instability impedes financial development, with its variation a primary determinant of differences in financial development around the world. As such, it needs to be added to the short list of major determinants of financial development. First, structural conditions first postulated by
Engerman and Sokoloff (2002) as generating long-term inequality are shown here empirically to be exogenous determinants of political instability. Second, that exogenously-determined political instability in turn holds back financial development, even when we control for factors prominent in the last decade's cross-country studies of
financial development. The findings indicate that inequality-perpetuating conditions that result in political instability are fundamental roadblocks for international organizations like the World Bank that seek to promote financial development. The evidence here includes country fixed effect regressions and an instrumental model inspired by Engerman and Sokoloff's (2002) work, which to our knowledge has not yet been used in finance and which is consistent with current tests as valid instruments. Four conventional measures of national political instability — Alesina and Perotti's (1996) well-known index of instability, a subsequent index derived from Banks' (2005) work,
and two indices of managerial perceptions of nation-by-nation political instability — persistently predict a wide range of national financial development outcomes for recent decades. Political instability's significance is time consistent in cross-sectional regressions back to the 1960's, the period when the key data becomes available, robust
in both country fixed-effects and instrumental variable regressions, and consistent across multiple measures of instability and of financial development. Overall, the results indicate the existence of an important channel running from structural inequality to political instability, principally in nondemocratic settings, and then to financial
backwardness. The robust significance of that channel extends existing work demonstrating the importance of political economy explanations for financial development and financial backwardness. It should help to better understand which policies will work for financial development, because political instability has causes, cures, and effects quite distinct from those of many of the key institutions most studied in the past decade as explaining financial backwardness.)