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(677)
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- News (98)
- Research (512)
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- Faculty Publications (254)
Show Results For
- All HBS Web
(677)
- People (1)
- News (98)
- Research (512)
- Events (8)
- Multimedia (2)
- Faculty Publications (254)
- 2015
- Article
Regulator Leniency and Mispricing in Beneficent Nonprofits
By: Jonas Heese, Ranjani Krishnan and Frank Moers
We posit that nonprofits that provide a greater supply of unprofitable services (beneficent nonprofits) face lenient regulatory enforcement for mispricing in price-regulated markets. Consequently, beneficent nonprofits exploit such regulatory leniency and exhibit... View Details
Regulatory Uncertainty and Corporate Responses to Environmental Protection in China
This article analyzes the closing gap between regulation and enforcement of environmental protection in China and explores its implications for doing business there. It identifies three major dimensions that characterize change in regulatory systems: priorities and... View Details
- 23 Jun 2022
- News
Corporate Criminal Liability for ESG Initiatives Is on Its Way
- Video
Ghassan E. Nuqul
Ghassan E. Nuqul, Chairman of the Nuqul Group, details how he has enforced anti-corruption policies and business ethics policies within the group. View Details
- September 2, 2014
- Article
Development of In-Group Favoritism in Children's Third-Party Punishment of Selfishness
By: Jillian J. Jordan, Katherine McAuliffe and Felix Warneken
When enforcing norms for cooperative behavior, human adults sometimes exhibit in-group bias. For example, third-party observers punish selfish behaviors committed by out-group members more harshly than similar behaviors committed by in-group members. Although evidence... View Details
Jordan, Jillian J., Katherine McAuliffe, and Felix Warneken. "Development of In-Group Favoritism in Children's Third-Party Punishment of Selfishness." Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 111, no. 35 (September 2, 2014): 12710–12715.
- 18 Aug 2010
- Working Paper Summaries
The Role of Organizational Scope and Governance in Strengthening Private Monitoring
Keywords: by Lamar Pierce & Michael W. Toffel
- 03 Feb 2015
- Working Paper Summaries
Regulator Leniency and Mispricing in Beneficent Nonprofits
- March 2010
- Case
Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2007
By: Jan W. Rivkin, Michael Roberto and Ranjay Gulati
In the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, Robert Mueller, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), sought to transform the storied Bureau. The FBI had long served as both the chief law enforcement agency and the main domestic intelligence wing of the... View Details
Keywords: Transformation; Organizational Structure; Organizational Change and Adaptation; Government Administration; National Security; Corporate Strategy; Knowledge Acquisition; Law Enforcement; Public Administration Industry; United States
Rivkin, Jan W., Michael Roberto, and Ranjay Gulati. "Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2007." Harvard Business School Case 710-451, March 2010.
- July 2010
- Background Note
Remedies for Patent Infringement under U.S. Law
By: Lena G. Goldberg and Chad Carr
Under the U.S. Patent Act, a patent owner has a statutory right to exclude others from engaging in the unauthorized production, use, sale, or importation of a patented invention. This note examines how that right is enforced and what remedies a patent owner has when... View Details
Goldberg, Lena G., and Chad Carr. "Remedies for Patent Infringement under U.S. Law." Harvard Business School Background Note 311-020, July 2010.
- Article
The Covid-19 Pandemic Should Not Delay Actions to Prevent Anticompetitive Consolidation in U.S. Health Care Markets
By: Leemore S. Dafny
This article describes potential regulatory and legislative reforms to assist antitrust enforcement agencies in halting anticompetitive acquisitions and practices, and preserving and promoting competition in health care markets. View Details
Keywords: Health Care and Treatment; Markets; Competition; Governing Rules, Regulations, and Reforms
Dafny, Leemore S. "The Covid-19 Pandemic Should Not Delay Actions to Prevent Anticompetitive Consolidation in U.S. Health Care Markets." Promarket (June 10, 2021).
- 17 May 2012
- News
Study: Safety inspections don't hurt profits
- June 21, 2017
- Article
Uber Can't Be Fixed—It's Time for Regulators to Shut It Down
By: Benjamin G. Edelman
I argue that Uber's intentional malfeasance is its comparative advantage. But having grown through intentional illegality, Uber should face strict enforcement of applicable preexisting laws—penalties that would probably bankrupt the company. View Details
Keywords: Lawfulness; Laws and Statutes; Legal Liability; Law; Transportation; Transportation Industry; Information Technology Industry
Edelman, Benjamin G. "Uber Can't Be Fixed—It's Time for Regulators to Shut It Down." Harvard Business Review (website) (June 21, 2017). (Translations: Japanese, Russian.)
- December 2019 (Revised November 2023)
- Background Note
Legal Analysis: Insider Trading Liability
By: Trevor Fetter, Eugene F. Soltes and Grant Wahlquist
There are numerous restrictions against trading on material, nonpublic information (MNPI)—typically called “insider trading.” This note describes the limitations facing managers and investors as enforced civilly and criminally within the United States. View Details
Fetter, Trevor, Eugene F. Soltes, and Grant Wahlquist. "Legal Analysis: Insider Trading Liability." Harvard Business School Background Note 320-080, December 2019. (Revised November 2023.)
- June 2003 (Revised May 2006)
- Case
Cipla
By: Rohit Deshpande and Laura Winig
The head of Cipla, a $325-million-dollar Indian pharmaceutical company and seller of low-cost AIDS drugs to South Africa, must decide what to do about Cipla's future. With India poised to enforce international patents in only two years, much of Cipla's product line... View Details
- May 2008
- Article
Coerced Confessions: Self-Policing in the Shadow of the Regulator
By: Jodi L. Short and Michael W. Toffel
As part of a recent trend toward more cooperative relations between regulators and industry, novel government programs are encouraging firms to monitor their own regulatory compliance and voluntarily report their own violations. In this study, we examine how regulatory... View Details
Keywords: Governance Compliance; Law Enforcement; Corporate Disclosure; Governing Rules, Regulations, and Reforms; Environmental Sustainability; Programs; Power and Influence; Organizations; Decisions; Business and Government Relations; United States
Short, Jodi L., and Michael W. Toffel. "Coerced Confessions: Self-Policing in the Shadow of the Regulator." Journal of Law, Economics & Organization 24, no. 1 (May 2008): 45–71.
- Research Summary
What Makes the Bonding Stick? A Natural Experiment Involving the U.S. Supreme Court and Cross-Listed Firms
On March 29, 2010, the U.S. Supreme Court signaled its intention to geographically limit the reach of the U.S.securities antifraud regime and thus differentially exclude U.S.-listed foreign firms from the ambit of formal U.S.antifraud enforcement. We exploit this... View Details
- July 2011
- Background Note
Just an MOU or a Real Deal?
By: Lena G. Goldberg and Mary Beth Findlay
Notwithstanding the professed intention of a party to an MOU, a "preliminary" agreement can have binding effect. This note explores the circumstances under which MOUs may give rise to binding and enforceable agreements. View Details
Goldberg, Lena G., and Mary Beth Findlay. "Just an MOU or a Real Deal?" Harvard Business School Background Note 312-018, July 2011.
- 13 Mar 2019
- News
The supervision of listed companies: better out in the open?
- February 2005
- Article
Can Foreign Firms Bond Themselves Effectively by Renting U.S. Securities Laws?
By: Jordan I. Siegel
The study tests the functional convergence hypothesis, which states that foreign firms can leapfrog their countries' weak legal institutions by listing equities in New York and agreeing to follow U.S. securities law. Evidence shows that the SEC and minority... View Details
Keywords: Corporate Governance; Cross-listing; Reputation; Bonding; Business Ventures; Laws and Statutes; Financial Instruments; United States; Mexico
Siegel, Jordan I. "Can Foreign Firms Bond Themselves Effectively by Renting U.S. Securities Laws?" Journal of Financial Economics 75, no. 2 (February 2005): 319–359. (The study tests the functional convergence hypothesis, which states that foreign firms can
leapfrog their countries' weak legal institutions by listing equities in New York and agreeing to follow U.S. securities law. Evidence shows that the SEC and minority shareholders have not effectively enforced the law against cross-listed foreign firms. Detailed evidence from Mexico further shows that while some insiders exploited this weak legal enforcement with impunity, others that issued a cross-listing and passed through an economic downturn with a clean reputation went on to receive privileged long-term access to outside finance. As compared with legal bonding, reputational bonding better explains the success of cross-listings.)