Publications

2018
Article

Revenue Farming Reconsidered: Tenurial Rights and Tenurial Duties in Early Modern India, ca. 1556–1818

By: Sudev J Sheth

The meaning of land revenue farming in Indian history has eluded consensus. Some view it as an administrative aberration indicating weak state control, while others see it as a strategy for consolidating authority. This essay traces the historical development of iqṭāʻ... View Details

Keywords: Iqṭāʻ; Ijārah; Revenue Farming; Financial Agents; Mughal Empire; Business History; Business and Government Relations; Property; Finance; South Asia

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Forthcoming
Article

Collusion in Brokered Markets

By: John William Hatfield, Scott Duke Kominers and Richard Lowery

High commissions in the U.S. residential real estate agency market present a puzzle for economic theory because brokerage is not a concentrated industry. We model brokered markets as a game in which agents post prices for customers and then choose which other agents to... View Details

Article

Understanding the Advice of Commissions-Motivated Agents: Evidence from the Indian Life Insurance Market

By: Santosh Anagol, Shawn Cole and Shayak Sarkar

We conduct a series of field experiments to evaluate the quality of advice provided by life insurance agents in India. Agents overwhelmingly recommend unsuitable, strictly dominated products, which provide high commissions to the agent. Agents cater to the beliefs of... View Details

Keywords: Advice; Customers; Insurance; Service Operations; Motivation and Incentives; Ethics; India

23 Aug 2021
Research & Ideas

Why White-Collar Crime Spiked in America After 9/11

After the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the FBI shifted financial resources and hundreds of agents toward combatting terrorism, unintentionally weakening the agency’s ability to investigate white-collar crime in America, research shows. As a... View Details

Keywords: by Jay Fitzgerald

March 2023
Article

Not from Concentrate: Collusion in Collaborative Industries

By: Jordan M. Barry, John William Hatfield, Scott Duke Kominers and Richard Lowery

The chief principle of antitrust law and theory is that reducing market concentration—having more, smaller firms instead of fewer, bigger ones—reduces anticompetitive behavior. We demonstrate that this principle is fundamentally incomplete.

In many... View Details

February 1999
Case

Sports Agents: Is There a Firm Advantage?

By: Stephen A. Greyser and Brian R. Harris

Focuses on the decision of a young tennis player on what kind of agent to have as his representative. The choice is between someone in a large sports management/marketing firm and an independent agent representing a small number of individual athletes. Outlines the... View Details

Keywords: Decision Choices and Conditions; Knowledge Management; Marketing Communications; Marketing Strategy; Organizational Structure

Educators

Article

Trust and Incentives in Agency

By: Ramon Casadesus-Masanell and Daniel F Spulber

Contracts between a principal and an agent are not formed in a vacuum. Although formal contracts between a principal and an agent contain explicit incentives for performance, the relationship between a principal and an agent also involves implicit incentives. Three... View Details

Keywords: Trust; Motivation and Incentives; Agency Theory; Contracts; Market Transactions; Performance; Relationships; Societal Protocols; Legal Liability; Cost

January 2025
Teaching Note

AGENTS.inc: Pathways to Growth at an AI Startup

By: Frank Nagle and Susan Pinckney

Teaching Note for HBS Case No. 724-444. In 2024, AI agent startup company AGENTS.inc faced multiple strategic decisions that could shape the company’s ability to grow into the future AI agent market leader. View Details

Keywords: Business Startups; AI and Machine Learning; Growth and Development Strategy; Open Source Distribution; Entrepreneurial Finance; Competition; Computer Industry; Technology Industry; Europe; Germany

October 2020
Article

Comparative Statics for Size-Dependent Discounts in Matching Markets

By: David Delacretaz, Scott Duke Kominers and Alexandru Nichifor

We prove a natural comparative static for many-to-many matching markets in which agents’ choice functions exhibit size-dependent discounts: reducing the extent to which some agent discounts additional partners leads to improved outcomes for the agents on the other side... View Details

Keywords: Size-dependent Discounts; Path-independence; Respect For Improvements; Market Design; Mathematical Methods

2018
Working Paper

Bundling Incentives in (Many-to-Many) Matching with Contracts

By: Jonathan Ma and Scott Duke Kominers

In many-to-many matching with contracts, the way in which contracts are specified can affect the set of stable equilibrium outcomes. Consequently, agents may be incentivized to modify the set of contracts upfront. We consider one simple way in which agents may do so:... View Details

Keywords: Matching With Contracts; Contract Design; Bundling-proofness; Substitutability; Mathematical Methods

March 2002 (Revised May 2002)
Case

Astel Manufacturing Company

By: Joseph L. Bower

The FBI indicates that three purchasing agents are suspected recipients of bribes. After an inconclusive investigation, the agents leave. The superiors are unsure what to do. A rewritten version of an earlier case. View Details

Keywords: Crime and Corruption; Ethics; Problems and Challenges; Decision Choices and Conditions; Government and Politics; Resignation and Termination

Educators

2013
Working Paper

Competing by Restricting Choice: The Case of Search Platforms

By: Hanna Halaburda and Mikolaj Jan Piskorski

Seminal papers recommend that platforms in two-sided markets increase the number of complements available. We show that a two-sided platform can successfully compete by limiting the choice of potential matches it offers to its customers while charging higher prices... View Details

Keywords: Matching Platform; Indirect Network Effects; Limits To Network Effects; Decision Choices and Conditions; Network Effects; Two-Sided Platforms; Marketplace Matching; Competitive Strategy

June 2004 (Revised January 2005)
Background Note

Principals, Agents, and Partners

By: Arthur I Segel, Armen Panossian and Jeff Mandelbaum

The establishment of the principal-agent relationship, the duties owed by the agent to the principal, and the principal's liability for illegal actions or representations made by the agent are all examined. Also covers the creation of partnerships and the duties of... View Details

Keywords: Partners and Partnerships; Agency Theory; Legal Liability

Educators

December 2010
Article

Social Preferences and Strategic Uncertainty: An Experiment on Markets and Contracts

This paper reports a three-phase experiment on a stylized labor market. In the first two phases, agents face simple games, which we use to estimate subjects' social and reciprocity concerns. In the last phase, four principals compete by offering agents a contract from... View Details

Keywords: Strategy; Risk and Uncertainty; Markets; Contracts; Decisions; Distribution; Labor; Game Theory

2009
Working Paper

Authority versus Persuasion

By: Eric J. Van den Steen

This paper studies a principal's trade-off between using persuasion versus using interpersonal authority to get the agent to "do the right thing"; from the principal's perspective (when the principal and agent openly disagree on the right course of action). It shows... View Details

Keywords: Employee Relationship Management; Managerial Roles; Projects; Motivation and Incentives; Power and Influence

Article

Testing Substitutability

By: John William Hatfield, Nicole Immorlica and Scott Duke Kominers

We provide an algorithm for testing the substitutability of a length-N preference relation over a set of contracts X in time O(|X|3⋅N3). Access to the preference relation is essential for this result: We show that a substitutability-testing algorithm with access only... View Details

Keywords: Substitutability; Matching; Communication Complexity; Preference Elicitation; Marketplace Matching; Communication; Mathematical Methods; Economics

Article

Commitments with Third Parties

By: Jerry R. Green

Observable irrevocable contracts between a principal and an agent have been suggested as a way in which the principal can enhance his payoff when playing a game against, or bargaining with, an opponent. It is shown that such beneficial agency relationships depend on... View Details

April 2011
Supplement

Emergia: Driving Profitability on Help Desk Contracts (CW)

By: F. Asis Martinez Jerez

Contact Data for September 2010, dictionary of terms, and agent login information. View Details

Keywords: Contracts

2016
Working Paper

Operations in the On-Demand Economy: Staffing Services with Self-Scheduling Capacity

By: Itai Gurvich, Martin Lariviere and Antonio Moreno

Motivated by recent innovations in service delivery such as ride-sharing services and work-from-home call centers, we study capacity management when workers self-schedule. Our service provider chooses capacity to maximize its profit (revenue from served customers minus... View Details

Keywords: Strategic Servers; On-demand Economy; Independent Capacity; Distributed Systems; Uber; Service Operations; Performance Capacity