Publications

2020
Working Paper

Collusion in Brokered Markets

By: John William Hatfield, Scott Duke Kominers and Richard Lowery

The U.S. residential real estate agency market presents a puzzle for economic theory: commissions on real estate transactions have remained high for decades even though entry is frequent and costs are low. We model the real estate agency market, and other brokered... View Details

Keywords: Real Estate; ＂Repeated Games＂; Collusion; Antitrust; Brokered Markets; Game Theory; Real Estate Industry

SSRN

Article

Governments as Owners: State-Owned Multinational Companies

By: Alvaro Cuervo-Cazurra, Andrew Inkpen, Aldo Musacchio and Kannan Ramaswamy

The globalization of state-owned multinational companies (SOMNCs) has become an important phenomenon in international business (IB), yet it has received scant attention in the literature. We explain how the analysis of SOMNCs can help advance the literature by... View Details

Keywords: Multinational Corporation; State-owned Enterprises; State Capitalism; FDI; Internationalization; Government And Business; National Oil Companies; State Ownership; Multinational Firms and Management; Business Subsidiaries; Acquisition; Pharmaceutical Industry; Energy Industry; China; India; Europe

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2006
Working Paper

On the Origin of Shared Beliefs (and Corporate Culture)

By: Eric J. Van den Steen

This paper shows why members of an organization often share similar beliefs. I argue that there are two mechanisms. First, when performance depends on making correct decisions, people prefer to work with others who share their beliefs and assumptions, since such... View Details

Keywords: Organizational Culture; Employees; Values and Beliefs; Mathematical Methods

SSRN

2004
Working Paper

Are Perks Purely Managerial Excess?

By: Raghuram G. Rajan and Julie Wulf

Why do some firms tend to offer executives a variety of perks while others offer none at all? A widespread view in the corporate finance literature is that executive perks are a form of agency or private benefit and a way for managers to misappropriate some of the... View Details

Keywords: Motivation and Incentives; Performance Productivity; Executive Compensation; Corporate Finance

13 Oct 2010
First Look

First Look: October 13, 2010

advertising agency industry: What accounts for the shift from bundling to unbundling of services and the slow pace of change? Using Evans and Salinger's (2005, 2008) cost-based theory of bundling, we develop... View Details

Keywords: Sean Silverthorne

March 1995 (Revised April 1995)
Background Note

Scope of the Corporation, The

By: David J. Collis

Describes analyses that determine the appropriate limit to the scope of the firm. Examines both the production cost justification for firm diversification--economies of scope and shared resources, and the governance cost justification for including transactions inside... View Details

Keywords: Cost; Agency Theory; Corporate Strategy; Diversification; Expansion

Educators

Jerry R. Green

David A. Wells Professor of Political Economy

John Leverett Professor in the University

Harvard University

Jerry Green is the John Leverett Professor in the University and the David A. Wells... View Details

Keywords: aerospace; education industry; insurance industry; professional services

March 2018
Teaching Note

ISRO: Explore Space or Exploit CubeSats?

By: Prithwiraj Choudhury

ISRO, India’s space agency, established to address domestic challenges with space technology, is one of the six largest space agencies in the world. Through its 59 missions, ISRO has launched numerous satellites for communication, disaster management, navigation,... View Details

Keywords: Strategic Planning; Decision Choices and Conditions; Operations; Management; Aerospace Industry; India

30 Oct 2018
Working Paper Summaries

Design Rules, Volume 2: How Technology Shapes Organizations: Chapter 5 Complementarity

Keywords: by Carliss Y. Baldwin

17 Sep 2007
Working Paper Summaries

Evidence on the Effects of Unverifiable Fair-Value Accounting

Keywords: by Karthik Ramanna & Ross L. Watts

September–October 2013
Article

The Role of Organizational Scope and Governance in Strengthening Private Monitoring

By: Lamar Pierce and Michael W. Toffel

Governments and other organizations often outsource activities to achieve cost savings from market competition. Yet such benefits are often accompanied by poor quality resulting from moral hazard, which can be particularly onerous when outsourcing the monitoring and... View Details

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2024
Working Paper

Second- versus Third-party Audit Quality: Evidence from Global Supply Chain Monitoring

By: Maria R. Ibanez, Ashley Palmarozzo, Jodi L. Short and Michael W. Toffel

Capitalizing on the superior credibility and flexibility and potential lower cost of external assessments, many global buyers are relying less on their own employee (“second-party”) auditors and more on third-party auditors to monitor and prevent environmental and... View Details

Keywords: Auditing; Audit Quality; Working Conditions; Sustainability; Empirical Operations; Empirical Service Operations; Sustainability Management; Corporate Accountability; Corporate Social Responsibility and Impact; Supply Chain Management

SSRN

July–August 2016
Article

Minimum Advertised Pricing: Patterns of Violation in Competitive Retail Markets

By: Ayelet Israeli, Eric Anderson and Anne Coughlan

Manufacturers in many industries frequently use vertical price policies, such as minimum advertised price (MAP), to influence prices set by downstream retailers. Although manufacturers expect retail partners to comply with MAP policies, violations of MAP are common in... View Details

Keywords: Pricing Policies; Pricing; Channel Management; Legal Aspects Of Business; Price; Governance Compliance; Marketing Channels; Retail Industry

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Agency theory, a new model of governance promulgated by academic economists in the 1970s, is behind the idea that corporate managers should make shareholder value their primary concern and that boards should ensure they do. The theory regards shareholders as... View Details

22 Apr 2015
HBS Seminar

Riitta Katila, Stanford School of Engineering

April 2000
Background Note

Aligning Incentives for Supply Chain Efficiency

By: V.G. Narayanan and Ananth Raman

Introduces students to the basics of principal-agency theory as it applies to supply chains. Operational problems in supply chains can often be traced to incentive issues. Students and managers lack frameworks to analyze incentive problems in supply chains. This note... View Details

Keywords: Supply Chain Management; Motivation and Incentives; Framework; Management Analysis, Tools, and Techniques; Agency Theory

Educators