by Rafael Di Tella and Dani Rodrik - Publications - Faculty & Research

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October 1997
Article

Does Competition Kill Corruption?

By: Christopher Bliss and Rafael Di Tella

Corrupt agents (officials or gangsters) exact money from firms. Corruption affects the number of firms in a free-entry equilibrium. The degree of deep competition in the economy increases with lower overhead costs relative to profits and with a tendency toward similar... View Details

Keywords: Competition; Crime and Corruption

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July 1997
Article

National Champions and Corruption: Some Unpleasant Interventionist Arithmetic

By: Alberto Ades and Rafael Di Tella

We present a hold-up model of investment where active industrial policy promotes both corruption and investment. Since corruption deters investment, the effect of industrial policy on investment is lower than when corruption is absent. We find evidence suggesting that... View Details

Keywords: Crime and Corruption

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