Publications
Publications
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- All HBS Web
(292)
- Faculty Publications (107)
- August 2012
- Article
Organ Allocation Policy and the Decision to Donate
By: Judd B. Kessler and Alvin E. Roth
Organ donations from deceased donors (cadavers) provide the majority of transplanted organs in the United States, and one deceased donor can save numerous lives by providing multiple organs. Nevertheless, most Americans are not registered organ donors despite the... View Details
- 2012
- Working Paper
The Need for (long) Chains in Kidney Exchange
By: Itai Ashlagi, David Gamarnik, Michael A. Rees and Alvin E. Roth
It has been previously shown that for sufficiently large pools of patient-donor pairs, (almost) efficient kidney exchange can be achieved by using at most 3-way cycles, i.e., by using cycles among no more than 3 patient-donor pairs. However, as kidney exchange has... View Details
- Editorial
NEAD Chains in Transplantation
By: Itai Ashlagi, Duncan S. Gilchrist, Alvin E. Roth and Michael A. Rees
- July 2011
- Article
Kidney Paired Donation
By: C. Bradley Wallis, Kannan P. Samy, Alvin E. Roth and Michael A. Rees
Kidney paired donation (KPD) was first suggested in 1986, but it was not until 2000 when the first paired donation transplant was performed in the U.S. In the past decade, KPD has become the fastest growing source of transplantable kidneys, overcoming the barrier faced... View Details
- May 2011
- Article
Nonsimultaneous Chains and Dominos in Kidney Paired Donation—Revisited
By: Itai Ashlagi, Duncan S. Gilchrist, Alvin E. Roth and Michael A. Rees
Since 2008 kidney exchange in America has grown in part from the incorporation of non-directed donors in transplant chains rather than simple exchanges. It is controversial whether these chains should be performed simultaneously ("domino paired donation," DPD) or... View Details
- 2011
- Article
A Choice Prediction Competition for Social Preferences in Simple Extensive Form Games: An Introduction
By: Eyal Ert, Ido Erev and Alvin E. Roth
Two independent, but related, choice prediction competitions are organized that focus on behavior in simple two-person extensive form games: one focuses on predicting the choices of the first mover and the other on predicting the choices of the second mover. The... View Details
- 2011
- Working Paper
Individual Rationality and Participation in Large Scale, Multi-Hospital Kidney Exchange
By: Itai Ashlagi and Alvin E. Roth
As multi-hospital kidney exchange clearinghouses have grown, the set of players has grown from patients and surgeons to include hospitals. Hospitals have the option of enrolling only their hard-to-match patient-donor pairs, while conducting easily arranged exchanges... View Details
- 2010
- Working Paper
Marketplace Institutions Related to the Timing of Transactions
By: Alvin E. Roth
This paper describes the unraveling of transaction dates in several markets, including the labor markets for new lawyers hired by large law firms and for gastroenterology fellows, and the market for post-season college football bowls. Together these will illustrate... View Details
- Article
The Job Market for New Economists: A Market Design Perspective
By: Peter A. Coles, John Cawley, Phillip B. Levine, Muriel Niederle, Alvin E. Roth and John J. Siegfried
This paper, written by the members of the American Economic Association (AEA) Ad Hoc Committee on the Job Market, provides an overview of the market for new Ph.D. economists. It describes the role of the AEA in the market and focuses in particular on two mechanisms... View Details
- 2010
- Working Paper
The Job Market for New Economists: A Market Design Perspective
By: Peter A. Coles, John Cawley, Phillip B. Levine, Muriel Niederle, Alvin E. Roth and John J. Siegfried
This paper provides an overview of the market for new Ph.D. economists. It describes the role of the American Economic Association (AEA) in the market and focuses in particular on two mechanisms adopted in recent years at the suggestion of our committee. First, job... View Details
- Article
Kidneys for Sale: Who Disapproves, and Why?
By: Stephen Leider and Alvin E. Roth
The shortage of transplant kidneys has spurred debate about legalizing monetary payments to donors to increase the number of available kidneys. However, buying and selling organs faces widespread disapproval. We survey a representative sample of Americans to assess... View Details
- 2010
- Working Paper
Matching with Couples: Stability and Incentives in Large Markets
By: Fuhito Kojima, Parag A. Pathak and Alvin E. Roth
- 2010
- Working Paper
Unraveling Results from Comparable Demand and Supply: An Experimental Investigation
By: Muriel Niederle, Alvin E. Roth and M. Utku Unver
Markets sometimes unravel, with offers becoming inefficiently early. Often this is attributed to competition arising from an imbalance of demand and supply, typically excess demand for workers. However this presents a puzzle, since unraveling can only occur when firms... View Details
- Article
A Choice Prediction Competition for Market Entry Games: An Introduction
By: Ido Erev, Eyal Ert and Alvin E. Roth
A choice prediction competition is organized that focuses on decisions from experience in market entry games (http://sites.google.com/site/gpredcomp/ and http://www.mdpi.com/si/games/predict-behavior/). The competition is based on two experiments: An estimation... View Details
- January 2010
- Journal Article
A Choice Prediction Competition: Choices from Experience and from Description
By: Ido Erev, Eyal Ert, Alvin E. Roth, Ernan E. Haruvy, Stefan Herzog, Robin Hau, Ralph Hertwig, Terrence Steward, Robert West and Christian Lebiere
Erev, Ert, and Roth organized three choice prediction competitions focused on three related choice tasks: one-shot decisions from description (decisions under risk), one-shot decisions from experience, and repeated decisions from experience. Each competition was based... View Details
- 2010
- Chapter
Deferred Acceptance Algorithms: History, Theory, Practice
By: Alvin E. Roth
The deferred acceptance algorithm proposed by Gale and Shapley (1962) has had a profound influence on market design, both directly, by being adapted into practical matching mechanisms, and indirectly, by raising new theoretical questions. Deferred acceptance algorithms... View Details
- December 2009
- Article
Strategy-proofness versus Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences: Redesigning the NYC High School Match
By: Atila Abdulkadiroglu, Parag A. Pathak and Alvin E. Roth
The design of the New York City (NYC) High School match involved tradeoffs among efficiency, stability, and strategy-proofness that raise new theoretical questions. We analyze a model with indifferences—ties—in school preferences. Simulations with field data and the... View Details
- 2009
- Chapter
The Effects of a Central Clearinghouse on Job Placement, Wages, and Hiring Practices
By: Muriel Niederle and Alvin E. Roth
New gastroenterologists participated in a labor market clearinghouse (a "match") from 1986 through the late 1990s, after which the match was abandoned. This provides an opportunity to study the effects of a match by observing the differences in the outcomes and... View Details
- August 2009
- Article
Market Culture: How Rules Governing Exploding Offers Affect Market Performance
By: Muriel Niederle and Alvin E. Roth
- 2009
- Working Paper
Unraveling Results from Comparable Demand and Supply: An Experimental Investigation
By: Muriel Niederle, Alvin E. Roth and M. Utku Unver
Markets sometimes unravel, with offers becoming inefficiently early. Often this is attributed to competition arising from an imbalance of demand and supply, typically excess demand for workers. However this presents a puzzle, since unraveling can only occur when firms... View Details