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- All HBS Web
(1,551)
- People (1)
- News (221)
- Research (1,154)
- Events (6)
- Multimedia (6)
- Faculty Publications (740)
- Research Summary
Optimal Contracting with Reciprocal Agents
(with Florian Englmaier) (Job Market Paper)
Abstract: Empirically, compensation systems often seem to generate substantial effort despite weak incentives. We consider reciprocal motivations as a source of incentives. We solve for the optimal... View Details
- May 2005 (Revised January 2006)
- Background Note
Note on Forward Contracts and Swaps
Introduces forward contracts and derives graphically through basic arbitrage principles the spot-forward parity. Introduces swap contracts as simply a portfolio of forward contracts. Also covers briefly the mathematics behind swaps as an extension of spot-forward... View Details
Keywords: Financial Instruments
Chacko, George C., Peter A. Hecht, Vincent Dessain, and Anders Sjoman. "Note on Forward Contracts and Swaps." Harvard Business School Background Note 205-118, May 2005. (Revised January 2006.)
- 2012
- Working Paper
Relational Contracts and Organizational Capabilities
By: R. Gibbons and R. Henderson
A large literature identifies unique organizational capabilities as a potent source of competitive advantage, yet our knowledge of why capabilities fail to diffuse more rapidly-particularly in situations in which competitors apparently have strong incentives to adopt... View Details
Keywords: Competitive Advantage; Motivation and Incentives; Management Practices and Processes; Contracts; Competency and Skills; Relationships; Complexity
Gibbons, R., and R. Henderson. "Relational Contracts and Organizational Capabilities." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 12-061, January 2012.
- December 1980 (Revised September 1985)
- Case
British Steel Corporation: The Korf Contract
By: John P. Kotter and John M. Stengrevics
Traces a complex resource allocation decision facing British Steel in 1975. Students study the influences on the various managers involved in making the decision. View Details
Keywords: Resource Allocation; Decision Making; Management Teams; Metals and Minerals; Steel Industry; United Kingdom
Kotter, John P., and John M. Stengrevics. "British Steel Corporation: The Korf Contract." Harvard Business School Case 481-110, December 1980. (Revised September 1985.)
- June 1974 (Revised April 1985)
- Background Note
Note on Managing the Psychological Contract
Thomas, R. Roosevelt, Jr. "Note on Managing the Psychological Contract." Harvard Business School Background Note 474-159, June 1974. (Revised April 1985.)
- Article
Real Effects of Relational Contracts
By: Steven Blader, Claudine Gartenberg, Rebecca Henderson and Andrea Pratt
How important are factors such as "firm culture" and "employee engagement" in driving firm performance? Increasing evidence from a wide range of fields suggests that productivity differs widely across firms, even after the inclusion of careful controls for factors such... View Details
Blader, Steven, Claudine Gartenberg, Rebecca Henderson, and Andrea Pratt. "Real Effects of Relational Contracts." American Economic Review: Papers and Proceedings 105, no. 5 (May 2015): 452–456.
- 08 Aug 2023
- Podcast
113. The Capitalist's Dilemma: A Conversation with Derek van Bever
"In our view, the crux of the problem is that investments in different types of innovation affect economies (and companies) in very different ways – but are evaluated using the same (flawed) metrics. Specifically, financial markets – and companies themselves – use... View Details
- Research Summary
Anti-Competitive Financial Contracting
Joint work with Giacinta Cestone, Institut d'Analisi Economica, Barcelona
This paper presents the first model where entry deterrence takes place through financial rather than product-market channels. In standard models of the interaction between product and... View Details
- July 31, 2017
- Article
A Commitment Contract to Achieve Virologic Suppression in Poorly Adherent Patients with HIV/AIDS
By: Marcella Alsan, John Beshears, Wendy S. Armstrong, James J. Choi, Brigitte C. Madrian, Minh Ly T. Nguyen, Carlos Del Rio, David Laibson and Vincent C. Marconi
Objective: Assess whether a commitment contract informed by behavioral economics leads to persistent virologic suppression among HIV-positive patients with poor antiretroviral therapy (ART) adherence.
Design: Single-center pilot randomized clinical trial and a... View Details
Keywords: Adherence; Antiretroviral Therapy; Behavioral Economics; Commitment Contract; Financial Incentives; HIV-1 Virologic Suppression; Health Disorders; Motivation and Incentives
Alsan, Marcella, John Beshears, Wendy S. Armstrong, James J. Choi, Brigitte C. Madrian, Minh Ly T. Nguyen, Carlos Del Rio, David Laibson, and Vincent C. Marconi. "A Commitment Contract to Achieve Virologic Suppression in Poorly Adherent Patients with HIV/AIDS." AIDS 31, no. 12 (July 31, 2017): 1765–1769.
- June 12, 2023
- Article
The Limits of Capacity Building for Investment Contract Negotiations
By: Karl P. Sauvant, Vanessa Sze Wai Tsang and Louis T. Wells
Developing countries must negotiate the best possible investment contracts with foreign investors at the outset. Donor organizations regularly push for “capacity building” to create technical expertise for negotiations within host country governments. But building and... View Details
Sauvant, Karl P., Vanessa Sze Wai Tsang, and Louis T. Wells. "The Limits of Capacity Building for Investment Contract Negotiations." Columbia FDI Perspectives, no. 359 (June 12, 2023).
- 2006
- Article
Performance Measure Properties and the Effect of Incentive Contracts
By: J. Bouwens and L. van Lent
Using data from a third-party survey on compensation practices at 151 Dutch firms, we show that less noisy or distorted performance measures and higher cash bonuses are associated with improved employee selection and better-directed effort. Specifically, (1) an... View Details
Keywords: Motivation and Incentives; Data and Data Sets; Problems and Challenges; Performance Evaluation; Compensation and Benefits; Netherlands
Bouwens, J., and L. van Lent. "Performance Measure Properties and the Effect of Incentive Contracts." Journal of Management Accounting Research 18 (2006): 55–75.
- June 1986
- Teaching Note
British Steel Corporation: The Korf Contract TN
By: W. Earl Sasser
Teaching Note for (9-481-110). View Details
- Article
Relational Contracts and the Theory of the Firm
By: George P. Baker, Robert Gibbons and Kevin J. Murphy
Baker, George P., Robert Gibbons, and Kevin J. Murphy. "Relational Contracts and the Theory of the Firm." Quarterly Journal of Economics 117, no. 1 (February 2002).
- Article
Shadow of the Contract: How Contract Structure Shapes Inter-Firm Dispute Resolution
By: Fabrice Lumineau and Deepak Malhotra
This paper investigates how contract structure influences inter-firm dispute resolution processes and outcomes by examining a unique dataset consisting of over 150,000 pages of documents relating to 102 business disputes. We find that the level of contractual detail... View Details
Keywords: Governance Controls; Contracts; Rights; Negotiation; Conflict and Resolution; Power and Influence
Lumineau, Fabrice, and Deepak Malhotra. "Shadow of the Contract: How Contract Structure Shapes Inter-Firm Dispute Resolution." Strategic Management Journal 32, no. 5 (May 2011): 532–555.
- 2008
- Working Paper
Stable Many-to-Many Matchings with Contracts
By: Bettina-Elisabeth Klaus and Markus Walzl
We consider several notions of setwise stability for many-to-many matching markets with contracts and provide an analysis of the relations between the resulting sets of stable allocations for general, substitutable, and strongly substitutable preferences. Apart from... View Details
Klaus, Bettina-Elisabeth, and Markus Walzl. "Stable Many-to-Many Matchings with Contracts." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 09-046, September 2008.
- Article
Matching in Networks with Bilateral Contracts
By: John William Hatfield and Scott Duke Kominers
We introduce a model in which firms trade goods via bilateral contracts which specify a buyer, a seller, and the terms of the exchange. This setting subsumes (many-to-many) matching with contracts, as well as supply chain matching. When firms' relationships do not... View Details
Hatfield, John William, and Scott Duke Kominers. "Matching in Networks with Bilateral Contracts." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 4, no. 1 (February 2012): 176–208.
- July 2002
- Article
The Sale of Ideas: Strategic Disclosure, Property Rights, and Contracting
By: James J. Anton and Dennis A. Yao
Ideas are difficult to sell when buyers cannot assess an idea's value before it is revealed and sellers cannot protect a revealed idea. These problems exist in a variety of intellectual property sales ranging from pure ideas to poorly protected inventions and reflect... View Details
Anton, James J., and Dennis A. Yao. "The Sale of Ideas: Strategic Disclosure, Property Rights, and Contracting." Review of Economic Studies 69, no. 3 (July 2002): 513–531. (Harvard users click here for full text.)
- December 1982 (Revised November 2006)
- Background Note
Note on Futures Contracts
By: David E. Bell
Provides an introduction to futures contracts, what they are, what their use in hedging is, and their usefulness in providing forecasts. Also covers basic risk. Includes a list of commodities currently traded in futures markets and the necessary properties of a... View Details
Keywords: Futures and Commodity Futures
Bell, David E. "Note on Futures Contracts." Harvard Business School Background Note 183-126, December 1982. (Revised November 2006.)
- Article
Multi-Echelon Inventory Management Under Short-Term Take-or-Pay Contracts
By: Joel Goh and Evan L. Porteus
We extend the Clark–Scarf serial multi-echelon inventory model to include procuring production inputs under short-term take-or-pay contracts at one or more stages. In each period, each such stage has the option to order/process at two different cost rates; the cheaper... View Details
Keywords: Inventory Management; Multi-echelon Inventory Theory; Karush Lemma; Clark-Scarf Model; Convex Ordering Cost; Advance Commitments; Supply Chain
Goh, Joel, and Evan L. Porteus. "Multi-Echelon Inventory Management Under Short-Term Take-or-Pay Contracts." Production and Operations Management 25, no. 8 (August 2016): 1415–1429. (Finalist for 2014 POMS College of Supply Chain Management Student Paper Award.)