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Show Results For
- All HBS Web
(1,731)
- People (1)
- News (226)
- Research (1,299)
- Events (19)
- Multimedia (6)
- Faculty Publications (801)
- July 1983
- Exercise
Exercises in the Mechanics of Futures Contracts: Wheat Futures
By: Ray A. Goldberg
Goldberg, Ray A. "Exercises in the Mechanics of Futures Contracts: Wheat Futures." Harvard Business School Exercise 584-001, July 1983.
- 2015
- Article
What's so Institutional about Leadership?: Leadership Mechanisms of Value Infusion
By: Ryan Raffaelli and Mary Ann Glynn
Leaders are important social actors in organizations, centrally involved in establishing and maintaining institutional values, a view that was articulated by Philip Selznick (1957) nearly a half-century ago, but often overlooked in institutionalists' accounts. Our... View Details
Raffaelli, Ryan, and Mary Ann Glynn. "What's so Institutional about Leadership? Leadership Mechanisms of Value Infusion." Research in the Sociology of Organizations 44 (2015): 283–316.
- September 2019
- Article
Technology Reemergence: Creating New Value for Old Technologies in Swiss Mechanical Watchmaking, 1970-2008
By: Ryan Raffaelli
In 1983, 14 years after the introduction of the battery-powered quartz watch, mechanical watches and the Swiss watchmakers who built them were predicted to be obsolete (Landes, 1983). Unexpectedly, however, by 2008 the Swiss mechanical watchmaking industry had... View Details
Keywords: Technology Reemergence; Technology Cycles; Cognition And Market Redefinition; Legacy Technology Trajectories; Information Technology; Demand and Consumers; Organizational Change and Adaptation; Identity; Change; Consumer Products Industry; Switzerland
Raffaelli, Ryan. "Technology Reemergence: Creating New Value for Old Technologies in Swiss Mechanical Watchmaking, 1970-2008." Administrative Science Quarterly 64, no. 3 (September 2019): 576–618.
- March 2004 (Revised November 2004)
- Background Note
Building Capabilities: Mechanisms for and Impediments to Learning
By: Steven J. Spear and H. Kent Bowen
Stand-alone teaching note. View Details
Keywords: Education
Spear, Steven J., and H. Kent Bowen. "Building Capabilities: Mechanisms for and Impediments to Learning." Harvard Business School Background Note 604-082, March 2004. (Revised November 2004.)
- Research Summary
Dissertation - Social Structure and Mechanisms of Collective Production:Evidence from Wikipedia
Andreea's dissertation research examines social networks in the setting of collective production, defined as collective action oriented towards production of collective goods - goods available for consumption by all members of a group whenever they... View Details
- December 10, 2013
- Article
A Market-based Mechanism to Improve Capital Expenditures
By: Eric D. Werker
Werker, Eric D. "A Market-based Mechanism to Improve Capital Expenditures." Ideas for Africa (December 10, 2013).
- 2019
- Article
Allocation for Social Good: Auditing Mechanisms for Utility Maximization
By: Taylor Lundy, Alexander Wei, Hu Fu, Scott Duke Kominers and Kevin Leyton-Brown
Lundy, Taylor, Alexander Wei, Hu Fu, Scott Duke Kominers, and Kevin Leyton-Brown. "Allocation for Social Good: Auditing Mechanisms for Utility Maximization." Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (2019): 785–803.
- June 2017
- Article
Options Compensation as a Commitment Mechanism in Oligopoly Competition
By: Jun Ishii and David Hao Zhang
We analyze how CEO stock options compensation can be used as a commitment device in oligopolistic competition. We develop a two-stage model where shareholders choose managerial compensation to commit their managers to being aggressive in equilibrium. Our results may... View Details
Keywords: CEO Compensation; Ceo Risk-taking; Strategic Delegation; Stock Options; Executive Compensation
Ishii, Jun, and David Hao Zhang. "Options Compensation as a Commitment Mechanism in Oligopoly Competition." Managerial and Decision Economics 38, no. 4 (June 2017): 513–525.
- 2005
- Working Paper
Constraints and Triggers: Situational Mechanics of Gender in Negotiation
By: Hannah Riley Bowles, Linda Babcock and Kathleen L. McGinn
- 2011
- Chapter
Prospective Codes Fufilled: A Potential Neural Mechanism of Will
By: Thalia Wheatley and Christine E. Looser
One of my few shortcomings is that I can’t predict the future.
Lars Ulrich, Metallica.
Lars Ulrich was right and wrong. He was right in the way we most often think about the future—as a long stretch of time during which multiply... View Details
Lars Ulrich, Metallica.
Lars Ulrich was right and wrong. He was right in the way we most often think about the future—as a long stretch of time during which multiply... View Details
Keywords: Free Will; Neuroscience; Responsibility; Prospection; Forecasting and Prediction; Science; Cognition and Thinking
Wheatley, Thalia, and Christine E. Looser. "Prospective Codes Fufilled: A Potential Neural Mechanism of Will." Chap. 13 in Conscious Will and Responsibility: A Tribute to Benjamin Libet, edited by Walter Sinnott-Armstrong and Lynn Nadel, 146–158. New York: Oxford University Press, 2011.
- December 2005
- Article
Constraints and Triggers: Situational Mechanics of Gender in Negotiation
By: Hannah Riley Bowles, Linda C. Babcock and Kathleen McGinn
Bowles, Hannah Riley, Linda C. Babcock, and Kathleen McGinn. "Constraints and Triggers: Situational Mechanics of Gender in Negotiation." Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 89, no. 6 (December 2005): 951–965.
- March 2022
- Article
Targeting High Ability Entrepreneurs Using Community Information: Mechanism Design in the Field
Identifying high-growth microentrepreneurs in low-income countries remains a challenge due to a scarcity of verifiable information. With a cash grant experiment in India we demonstrate that community knowledge can help target high-growth microentrepreneurs; while the... View Details
Keywords: Microentrepreneurs; Community Information; Field Experiment; Loans; Entrepreneurship; Developing Countries and Economies; Financing and Loans; Information; Mathematical Methods; India
Hussam, Reshmaan, Natalia Rigol, and Benjamin N. Roth. "Targeting High Ability Entrepreneurs Using Community Information: Mechanism Design in the Field." American Economic Review 112, no. 3 (March 2022): 861–898.
(Online Appendix with Corrigendum—Thanks to Isabella Masetto, Diego Ubfal, and The Institute for Replication for identifying a minor coding error in the production of Table 4.)
(Online Appendix with Corrigendum—Thanks to Isabella Masetto, Diego Ubfal, and The Institute for Replication for identifying a minor coding error in the production of Table 4.)
- September 2013
- Article
Prizes, Publicity, and Patents: Non-Monetary Awards as a Mechanism to Encourage Innovation
By: Petra Moser and Tom Nicholas
This paper exploits the selection of prize-winning technologies among exhibitors at the Crystal Palace Exhibition in 1851 to examine whether—and how—ex post prizes that are awarded to high-quality innovations may encourage future innovation. U.S. patent data... View Details
Moser, Petra, and Tom Nicholas. "Prizes, Publicity, and Patents: Non-Monetary Awards as a Mechanism to Encourage Innovation." Journal of Industrial Economics 61, no. 3 (September 2013): 763–788.
- March 1991
- Article
Incentives in Two-Sided Matching with Random Stable Mechanisms
By: A. E. Roth and J. H. Vande Vate
Keywords: Motivation and Incentives
Roth, A. E., and J. H. Vande Vate. "Incentives in Two-Sided Matching with Random Stable Mechanisms." Economic Theory 1, no. 1 (March 1991): 31–44.
- September 2009
- Article
Is There a Better Commitment Mechanism than Cross-Listings for Emerging Economy Firms? Evidence from Mexico
By: Jordan I. Siegel
The last decade of work in corporate governance has shown that weak legal institutions at the country level hinder firms in emerging economies from accessing finance and technology affordably. To attract outside resources, these firms must often use external... View Details
Keywords: Commitment; Inter-organizational Relationships; Emerging Markets; Economics; International Political Economy; Economy; Business Ventures; Information; Mexico
Siegel, Jordan I. "Is There a Better Commitment Mechanism than Cross-Listings for Emerging Economy Firms? Evidence from Mexico." Journal of International Business Studies 40, no. 7 (September 2009): 1171–1191. (The last decade of work in corporate governance has shown that weak legal institutions at the country level hinder firms in emerging economies from accessing finance and technology affordably. To attract outside resources, these firms must often use external commitments for repayment. Research suggests that a common commitment mechanism is to borrow US securities laws, which involves listing the emerging economy firm's shares on a US exchange. This paper uses a quasi-natural experiment from Mexico to examine the conditions under which forming a strategic alliance with a foreign multinational firm is actually a superior mechanism for ensuring good corporate governance.)
- Research Summary
Interfirm Alliances as Mechanisms to Access and Exploit Technological Capabilities
How do firms choose alliance partners, and how do alliances affect the subsequent evolution of partners' technological capabilities? Silverman is examining how pre-alliance 'technological overlap' between firms influences partner selection. He is also examining... View Details
- Aug 2005 - 2005
- Conference Presentation
The Innovative Capacity of Institutional Entrepreneurs: Mechanisms for Generating Alternative Ideas
By: Julie Battilana and E. Boxenbaum