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Show Results For
- All HBS Web
(2,487)
- People (2)
- News (474)
- Research (1,594)
- Events (17)
- Multimedia (6)
- Faculty Publications (839)
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- March 2018 (Revised August 2018)
- Case
Matching Markets for Googlers
By: Bo Cowgill and Rembrand Koning
This case describes how Google designed and launched an internal matching market to assign individual workers with projects and managers. The case evaluates how marketplace design considerations—and several alternative staffing models—could affect the company’s goals... View Details
Keywords: People Analytics; Google; Labor Market; Staffing; Market Design; Marketplace Matching; Selection and Staffing; Goals and Objectives; Technology Industry; United States
Cowgill, Bo, and Rembrand Koning. "Matching Markets for Googlers." Harvard Business School Case 718-487, March 2018. (Revised August 2018.) (More about Bo Cowgill.)
- Research Summary
Optimal Contracts under Inequity Aversion with Voluntary Enforcement (with Tilman Borgers)
We analyze contract structure and efficiency in a Moral Hazard model with possibly fairminded agent and principal when the contract is not automatically enforced but this is a voluntary choice by the contracting parties independently. We find that no penalizing... View Details
- May 2021
- Article
Stability, Strategy-Proofness, and Cumulative Offer Mechanisms
By: John William Hatfield, Scott Duke Kominers and Alexander Westkamp
We consider the setting of many-to-one matching with contracts, where firms may demand multiple contracts, but each worker desires at most one contract. We introduce three novel conditions—observable substitutability, observable size monotonicity, and... View Details
Keywords: Matching With Contracts; Stability; Strategy-proofness; Substitutability; Size Monotonicity; Cumulative Offer Mechanism; Marketplace Matching; Balance and Stability
Hatfield, John William, Scott Duke Kominers, and Alexander Westkamp. "Stability, Strategy-Proofness, and Cumulative Offer Mechanisms." Review of Economic Studies 88, no. 3 (May 2021): 1457–1502.
- 2024
- Working Paper
Transitory and Permanent Cash Flow Shocks in Debt Contract Design
By: Le Ma, Anywhere Sikochi and Yajun Xiao
We examine how lenders design contracts to account for transitory and permanent cash flow shocks facing borrowers. We find that volatile transitory cash flow shocks are associated with fewer liquidity covenants, indicating financial flexibility that enables firms to... View Details
Keywords: Debt Covenants; Cash Flow Shocks; Debt Contracting; Likelihood Of Default; Cash Flow; System Shocks
Ma, Le, Anywhere Sikochi, and Yajun Xiao. "Transitory and Permanent Cash Flow Shocks in Debt Contract Design." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 22-026, October 2021. (Revised February 2024. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Conditional Accept.)
- June 1999
- Case
Matching Dell (A)
By: Jan W. Rivkin, Michael E. Porter, Charles E. Bruin, Markus Chappel, Thomas M Galizia and Laila J Worrell
After years of success with its vaunted "Direct Model" for computer manufacturing, marketing, and distribution, Dell Computer Corp. faces efforts by competitors to match its strategy. This case describes the evolution of the personal computer industry, Dell's strategy,... View Details
Rivkin, Jan W., Michael E. Porter, Charles E. Bruin, Markus Chappel, Thomas M Galizia, and Laila J Worrell. "Matching Dell (A)." Harvard Business School Case 799-158, June 1999.
- 2008
- Working Paper
Contracting for Servicizing
Servicizing, a novel business practice that sells product functionality rather than products, has been touted as an environmentally beneficial business practice. This paper describes how servicizing transactions mitigate some problems associated with sales... View Details
Keywords: Customer Focus and Relationships; Contracts; Market Transactions; Service Delivery; Service Operations; Sales
Toffel, Michael W. "Contracting for Servicizing." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 08-063, February 2008. (February 2008.)
- Forthcoming
- Article
Transitory and Permanent Cash Flow Shocks in Debt Contract Design
By: Le Ma, Anywhere Sikochi and Yajun Xiao
We examine how lenders design contracts to account for transitory and permanent cash flow shocks facing borrowers. We find that volatile transitory cash flow shocks are associated with fewer liquidity covenants, indicating financial flexibility that enables firms to... View Details
Keywords: Debt Covenants; Cash Flow Shocks; Debt Contracting; Likelihood Of Default; Cash Flow; System Shocks
Ma, Le, Anywhere Sikochi, and Yajun Xiao. "Transitory and Permanent Cash Flow Shocks in Debt Contract Design." Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis (forthcoming). (Pre-published online February 25, 2025.)
- 1986
- Article
A Note on Job Matching with Budget Constraints
By: S. J. Mongell and A. E. Roth
Keywords: Budgets and Budgeting
Mongell, S. J., and A. E. Roth. "A Note on Job Matching with Budget Constraints." Economics Letters 21, no. 2 (1986): 135–138.
- March 1991
- Article
Incentives in Two-Sided Matching with Random Stable Mechanisms
By: A. E. Roth and J. H. Vande Vate
Keywords: Motivation and Incentives
Roth, A. E., and J. H. Vande Vate. "Incentives in Two-Sided Matching with Random Stable Mechanisms." Economic Theory 1, no. 1 (March 1991): 31–44.
- May 1997
- Teaching Note
Managing Product Development: Matching Technology with Context, Instructor's Note
By: Marco Iansiti
This overview to Managing Product Development (MPD) both previews course material, cases, exercises, and lectures--and provides its conceptual and academic underpinnings. Additionally, this note links these materials to the activities students will be undertaking in... View Details
- 2009
- Working Paper
Strategy-proofness versus Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences: Redesigning the New York City High School Match
By: Atila Abdulkadiroglu, Parag A. Pathak and Alvin E. Roth
- June 1989
- Article
Two-Sided Matching with Incomplete Information about Others' Preferences
By: A. E. Roth
Roth, A. E. "Two-Sided Matching with Incomplete Information about Others' Preferences." Games and Economic Behavior 1, no. 2 (June 1989): 191–209.
- 03 Jul 2018
- What Do You Think?
Should CEO Satya Nadella Cancel Microsoft’s Contract with ICE?
Madrolly When Should a Board Encourage a Triple Bottom Line Philosophy? Respondents to this month’s column provided a resounding “no” to the question of whether CEO Satya Nadella should accede to the wishes of a vocal minority of employees and cancel Microsoft’s View Details
- June 1983
- Article
A Comparison of Tournaments and Contracts
By: Jerry R. Green and Nancy Stokey
Tournaments, reward structures based on rank order, are compared with individual contracts in a model with one risk-neutral principal and many risk-averse agents. Each agent's output is a stochastic function of his effort level plus an additive shock term that is... View Details
Green, Jerry R., and Nancy Stokey. "A Comparison of Tournaments and Contracts." Journal of Political Economy 91, no. 3 (June 1983): 349–364.
- 2008
- Chapter
Matching and Market Design
By: Muriel Niederle, Alvin E. Roth and Tayfun Sonmez
Matching is the part of economics concerned with who transacts with whom and how. Models of matching, starting with the Gale-Shapley deferred acceptance algorithm, have been particularly useful in studying labour markets and in helping design clearinghouses to fix... View Details
- Article
Matching Firms, Managers, and Incentives
By: Oriana Bandiera, Luigi Guiso, Andrea Prat and Raffaella Sadun
We combine unique administrative and survey data to study the match between firms and managers. The data include manager characteristics, firm characteristics, detailed measures of managerial practices, and outcomes for the firm and the manager. A parsimonious model of... View Details
Bandiera, Oriana, Luigi Guiso, Andrea Prat, and Raffaella Sadun. "Matching Firms, Managers, and Incentives." Journal of Labor Economics 33, no. 3 (July 2015): 623–681.
- 2012
- Working Paper
Relational Contracts and Organizational Capabilities
By: R. Gibbons and R. Henderson
A large literature identifies unique organizational capabilities as a potent source of competitive advantage, yet our knowledge of why capabilities fail to diffuse more rapidly-particularly in situations in which competitors apparently have strong incentives to adopt... View Details
Keywords: Competitive Advantage; Motivation and Incentives; Management Practices and Processes; Contracts; Competency and Skills; Relationships; Complexity
Gibbons, R., and R. Henderson. "Relational Contracts and Organizational Capabilities." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 12-061, January 2012.
- 2010
- Working Paper
Matching with Couples: Stability and Incentives in Large Markets
By: Fuhito Kojima, Parag A. Pathak and Alvin E. Roth
Kojima, Fuhito, Parag A. Pathak, and Alvin E. Roth. "Matching with Couples: Stability and Incentives in Large Markets." NBER Working Paper Series, No. 16028, May 2010.
- June 2013
- Supplement
Multiasistencia: Redefining the Relationship with its Service Professionals. Spreadsheet Supplement
By: Francisco de Asis Martinez-Jerez
Multiasistencia, a major Spanish BPO of insurance repairs, is changing the relational contract with its service profesionals from a referral model to a guaranteed workload one. View Details