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- All HBS Web
(1,649)
- People (1)
- News (339)
- Research (1,025)
- Events (18)
- Multimedia (9)
- Faculty Publications (578)
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- 2013
- Dissertation
Firm-to-Firm Matching Along the Global Supply Chain
By: Raluca Dragusanu
This paper examines the matching patterns between buyers and sellers at different stages of the global production chain. I construct a new dataset, which links firm-level information on Indian manufacturing exporters from the CMIE-Prowess database with firm-level... View Details
- February 2006
- Teaching Note
Matching Dell: Teaching Note Supplement
By: Jan W. Rivkin
Keywords: Computer Industry
- Research Summary
What Happens when Agents Join Many-to-One Matching Market?
In their seminal book about matching theory, Roth and Sotomayor (1990) discuss (among other things) what happens in a one-to-one matching market when a new woman joins it. An elegant result shows that in this scenario there exists a non-empty set of men (related to a... View Details
- 2013
- Article
Matching with Couples: Stability and Incentives in Large Markets
By: Fuhito Kojima, Parag A. Pathak and Alvin E. Roth
Accommodating couples has been a long-standing issue in the design of centralized labor market clearinghouses for doctors and psychologists, because couples view pairs of jobs as complements. A stable matching may not exist when couples are present. This article's main... View Details
Keywords: Market Design; Marketplace Matching; Balance and Stability; Jobs and Positions; Family and Family Relationships; Health Care and Treatment; Employment Industry; Health Industry
Kojima, Fuhito, Parag A. Pathak, and Alvin E. Roth. "Matching with Couples: Stability and Incentives in Large Markets." Quarterly Journal of Economics 128, no. 4 (November 2013): 1585–1632.
- April 1984 (Revised December 1985)
- Case
Swedish Match Co. (B)
By: Norman A. Berg and John Young
Keywords: Sweden
Berg, Norman A., and John Young. "Swedish Match Co. (B)." Harvard Business School Case 384-222, April 1984. (Revised December 1985.)
- 2007
- Working Paper
Strategy-proofness versus Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences: Redesigning the NYC High School Match
By: Atila Abdulkadiroglu and Alvin E. Roth
Abdulkadiroglu, Atila, Parag A. Pathak, and Alvin E. Roth. "Strategy-proofness versus Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences: Redesigning the NYC High School Match." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 07-076, April 2007.
- 2008
- Working Paper
Stability and Nash Implementation in Matching Markets with Couples
By: Claus-Jochen Haake and Bettina-Elisabeth Klaus
We consider two-sided matching markets with couples. First, we extend a result by Klaus and Klijn (2005, Theorem 3.3) and show that for any weakly responsive couples market there always exists a "double stable" matching, i.e., a matching that is stable for the couples... View Details
Haake, Claus-Jochen, and Bettina-Elisabeth Klaus. "Stability and Nash Implementation in Matching Markets with Couples." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 09-017, August 2008.
- 18 Mar 2010
- Working Paper Summaries
Matching Firms, Managers, and Incentives
- 2008
- Working Paper
Unravelling in Two-Sided Matching Markets and Similarity of Preferences
By: Hanna Halaburda
This paper investigates the causes and welfare consequences of unravelling in two-sided matching markets. It shows that similarity of preferences is an important factor driving unravelling. In particular, it shows that under the ex-post stable mechanism (the mechanism... View Details
Halaburda, Hanna. "Unravelling in Two-Sided Matching Markets and Similarity of Preferences." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 09-068, November 2008.
- December 2024
- Article
Respect for Improvements and Comparative Statics in Matching Markets
One of the oldest results in the theory of two-sided matching is the entry comparative static, which shows that under the Gale–Shapley deferred acceptance algorithm, adding a new agent to one side of the market makes all the agents on the other side weakly... View Details
Kominers, Scott Duke. "Respect for Improvements and Comparative Statics in Matching Markets." Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design 9, no. 1 (December 2024): 83–104.
- 2009
- Working Paper
Strategy-proofness versus Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences: Redesigning the New York City High School Match
By: Atila Abdulkadiroglu, Parag A. Pathak and Alvin E. Roth
- Article
Unravelling in Two-Sided Matching Markets and Similarity of Preferences
This paper investigates the causes and welfare consequences of unravelling in two-sided matching markets. It shows that similarity of preferences is an important factor driving unravelling. In particular, it shows that under the ex-post stable mechanism (the mechanism... View Details
Halaburda, Hanna. "Unravelling in Two-Sided Matching Markets and Similarity of Preferences." Games and Economic Behavior 69, no. 2 (July 2010): 365–393.
- May 2005
- Article
The Boston Public School Match
By: Atila Abdulkadiroglu, Parag A. Pathak, Alvin E. Roth and Tayfun Sonmez
Abdulkadiroglu, Atila, Parag A. Pathak, Alvin E. Roth, and Tayfun Sonmez. "The Boston Public School Match." American Economic Review 95, no. 2 (May 2005): 368–371.
- 04 Feb 2009
- Working Paper Summaries
Unravelling in Two-Sided Matching Markets and Similarity of Preferences
Keywords: by Hanna Halaburda
- July 2017
- Teaching Note
Match Next: Next Generation Middle School?
By: John J-H Kim
Teaching Note for HBS No. 316-138. View Details
- January 1990 (Revised October 1992)
- Case
Competition and Compatibility: Mix and Match
Brandenburger, Adam M., and Vijay Krishna. "Competition and Compatibility: Mix and Match." Harvard Business School Case 190-112, January 1990. (Revised October 1992.)
- October 2020
- Article
Comparative Statics for Size-Dependent Discounts in Matching Markets
By: David Delacretaz, Scott Duke Kominers and Alexandru Nichifor
We prove a natural comparative static for many-to-many matching markets in which agents’ choice functions exhibit size-dependent discounts: reducing the extent to which some agent discounts additional partners leads to improved outcomes for the agents on the other side... View Details
Keywords: Size-dependent Discounts; Path-independence; Respect For Improvements; Market Design; Mathematical Methods
Delacretaz, David, Scott Duke Kominers, and Alexandru Nichifor. "Comparative Statics for Size-Dependent Discounts in Matching Markets." Journal of Mathematical Economics 90 (October 2020): 127–131.
- 16 Nov 2010
- Lessons from the Classroom
Data.gov: Matching Government Data with Rapid Innovation
participants wondered what the endeavor interrupted in local agencies as it began to fulfill its mandate of gathering data. "I don't believe there were no ripple effects," said one executive. Public trust and consistency of data architecture: Does government... View Details
- 2025
- Working Paper
CEO-Firm Matches and Productivity in 42 Countries
By: Amanda Dahlstrand, Dávid László, Helena Schweiger, Oriana Bandiera, Andrea Prat and Raffaella Sadun
Firms are key to economic development, and CEOs are key to firm productivity. Are firms in countries at varying stages of development led by the right CEOs, and if not, why? We develop a parsimonious measure of CEO time use that allows us to differentiate CEOs into... View Details
Dahlstrand, Amanda, Dávid László, Helena Schweiger, Oriana Bandiera, Andrea Prat, and Raffaella Sadun. "CEO-Firm Matches and Productivity in 42 Countries." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 25-033, January 2025. (NBER Working Paper Series, No. 33324, January 2025.)
- May 2005
- Article
The New York City High School Match
By: Atila Abdulkadiroglu, Parag A. Pathak and Alvin E. Roth
Keywords: Education
Abdulkadiroglu, Atila, Parag A. Pathak, and Alvin E. Roth. "The New York City High School Match." American Economic Review 95, no. 2 (May 2005).