Publications

2015
Working Paper

Stability, Strategy-Proofness, and Cumulative Offer Mechanisms

By: John William Hatfield, Scott Duke Kominers and Alexander Westkamp

We consider the setting of many-to-one matching with contracts, where firms may demand multiple contracts but each worker desires at most one contract. We introduce three novel conditions—observable substitutability, observable size monotonicity,... View Details

Keywords: Matching With Contracts; Stability; Strategy-proofness; Substitutability; Size Monotonicity; Cumulative Offer Mechanism; Contracts; Market Design; Marketplace Matching; Balance and Stability

2014
Working Paper

Hidden Substitutes

By: John William Hatfield and Scott Duke Kominers

In this paper, we show that preferences exhibiting some forms of complementarity in fact have an underlying substitutable structure. Specifically, we show that some preferences that are not substitutable in the setting of many-to-one matching with contracts become... View Details

Keywords: Many-to-One Matching; Many-to-Many Matching; Stability; Substitutes; Matching With Contracts; Slot-Specific Priorities; Sherlock; Market Design; Contracts; Marketplace Matching; Balance and Stability

Article

Analyzing Scrip Systems

By: Kris Johnson, David Simchi-Levi and Peng Sun

Scrip systems provide a nonmonetary trade economy for exchange of resources. We model a scrip system as a stochastic game and study system design issues on selection rules to match potential trade partners over time. We show the optimality of one particular rule in... View Details

Keywords: ＂Repeated Games＂; Stochastic Trust Game; Dynamic Program; P2P Lending; Scrip Systems; Artificial Currency; Non-monetary Trade Economies; Marketplace Matching; Currency; Operations; Game Theory

May 2014
Article

Investment Incentives in Labor Market Matching

By: John William Hatfield, Fuhito Kojima and Scott Duke Kominers

We provide an illustration of how the design of labor market clearing mechanisms can affect incentives for human capital acquisition. Specifically, we extend the labor market matching model (with discrete transfers) of Kelso and Crawford (1982) to incorporate the... View Details

Keywords: Human Capital; Marketplace Matching

2013
Article

Matching with Couples: Stability and Incentives in Large Markets

By: Fuhito Kojima, Parag A. Pathak and Alvin E. Roth

Accommodating couples has been a long-standing issue in the design of centralized labor market clearinghouses for doctors and psychologists, because couples view pairs of jobs as complements. A stable matching may not exist when couples are present. This article's main... View Details

Keywords: Market Design; Marketplace Matching; Balance and Stability; Jobs and Positions; Family and Family Relationships; Health Care and Treatment; Employment Industry; Health Industry

Article

On the Correspondence of Contracts to Salaries in (Many-to-Many) Matching

By: Scott Duke Kominers

In this note, I extend the work of Echenique (2012) to show that a model of many-to-many matching with contracts may be embedded into a model of many-to-many matching with wage bargaining whenever (1) all agentsʼ preferences are substitutable and (2) the matching with... View Details

Keywords: Many-to-Many Matching; Stability; Substitutes; Contract Design; Unitarity; Market Design; Contracts; Marketplace Matching; Balance and Stability; Economics

Article

Matching in Networks with Bilateral Contracts

By: John William Hatfield and Scott Duke Kominers

We introduce a model in which firms trade goods via bilateral contracts which specify a buyer, a seller, and the terms of the exchange. This setting subsumes (many-to-many) matching with contracts, as well as supply chain matching. When firms' relationships do not... View Details

Keywords: Contracts; Market Design; Marketplace Matching; Supply Chain

2010
Chapter

Deferred Acceptance Algorithms: History, Theory, Practice

The deferred acceptance algorithm proposed by Gale and Shapley (1962) has had a profound influence on market design, both directly, by being adapted into practical matching mechanisms, and indirectly, by raising new theoretical questions. Deferred acceptance algorithms... View Details

Keywords: Labor; Market Design; Marketplace Matching; Failure; Mathematical Methods

December 2009
Article

Strategy-proofness versus Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences: Redesigning the NYC High School Match

By: Atila Abdulkadiroglu, Parag A. Pathak and Alvin E. Roth

The design of the New York City (NYC) High School match involved tradeoffs among efficiency, stability, and strategy-proofness that raise new theoretical questions. We analyze a model with indifferences—ties—in school preferences. Simulations with field data and the... View Details

Keywords: Decision Choices and Conditions; Secondary Education; Marketplace Matching; Performance Efficiency; Mathematical Methods; Motivation and Incentives; Strategy; Balance and Stability

March 2008
Article

Deferred Acceptance Algorithms: History, Theory, Practice, and Open Questions

The deferred acceptance algorithm proposed by Gale and Shapley (1962) has had a profound influence on market design, both directly, by being adapted into practical matching mechanisms, and, indirectly, by raising new theoretical questions. Deferred acceptance... View Details

Keywords: History; Market Design; Labor; System; Practice; Performance; Theory; Boston; New York (city, NY)

March 2008
Article

What Have We Learned from Market Design?

This essay discusses some things we have learned about markets, in the process of designing marketplaces to fix market failures. To work well, marketplaces have to provide thickness, i.e. they need to attract a large enough proportion of the potential participants in... View Details

Keywords: Risk Management; Market Design; Market Participation; Market Transactions; Failure; Safety

2008
Chapter

Matching and Market Design

By: Muriel Niederle, Alvin E. Roth and Tayfun Sonmez

Matching is the part of economics concerned with who transacts with whom and how. Models of matching, starting with the Gale-Shapley deferred acceptance algorithm, have been particularly useful in studying labour markets and in helping design clearinghouses to fix... View Details

Keywords: Market Design; Marketplace Matching; Outcome or Result; Mathematical Methods

2007
Working Paper

What Have We Learned From Market Design?

This essay discusses some things we have learned about markets, in the process of designing marketplaces to fix market failures. To work well, marketplaces have to provide thickness, i.e. they need to attract a large enough proportion of the potential participants in... View Details

Keywords: Market Design; Market Participation; Market Transactions; Risk and Uncertainty; Safety

2007
Working Paper

Deferred Acceptance Algorithms: History, Theory, Practice, and Open Questions

The deferred acceptance algorithm proposed by Gale and Shapley (1962) has had a profound influence on market design, both directly, by being adapted into practical matching mechanisms, and, indirectly, by raising new theoretical questions. Deferred acceptance... View Details

Keywords: Education; Marketplace Matching; Market Design; Mathematical Methods; Theory; Practice

July 2003 (Revised August 2003)
Case

Global Healthcare Exchange

By: Lynda M. Applegate and Jamie Ladge

Founded in March 2000 at the height of the dot-com bubble, Global Healthcare Exchange (GHX) was one of 90 online marketplaces in the health care industry. The company's founders were among the largest suppliers in the industry, including Johnson & Johnson, GE Medical,... View Details

Keywords: Mergers and Acquisitions; Entrepreneurship; Price; Leadership; Growth and Development Strategy; Supply and Industry; Organizational Design; Expansion; Internet and the Web; Valuation; Health Industry

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