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Publications

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    • All HBS Web  (357)
      • Faculty Publications  (98)

      Game TheoryRemove Game Theory →

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      • June 2011
      • Article

      Truth in Giving: Experimental Evidence on the Welfare Effects of Informed Giving to the Poor

      By: Christina Fong and Felix Oberholzer-Gee
      It is often difficult for donors to predict the value of charitable giving because they know little about the persons who receive their help. This concern is particularly acute when making contributions to organizations that serve heterogeneous populations. While we... View Details
      Keywords: Philanthropy and Charitable Giving; Policy; Information; Knowledge Acquisition; Game Theory; Prejudice and Bias; Poverty; Welfare
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      Fong, Christina, and Felix Oberholzer-Gee. "Truth in Giving: Experimental Evidence on the Welfare Effects of Informed Giving to the Poor." Special Issue on Charitable Giving and Fundraising Journal of Public Economics 95, nos. 5-6 (June 2011): 436–444.
      • 2011
      • Article

      A Choice Prediction Competition for Social Preferences in Simple Extensive Form Games: An Introduction

      By: Eyal Ert, Ido Erev and Alvin E. Roth
      Two independent, but related, choice prediction competitions are organized that focus on behavior in simple two-person extensive form games: one focuses on predicting the choices of the first mover and the other on predicting the choices of the second mover. The... View Details
      Keywords: Forecasting and Prediction; Behavior; Decision Choices and Conditions; Competition; Motivation and Incentives; Game Theory; Fairness
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      Ert, Eyal, Ido Erev, and Alvin E. Roth. "A Choice Prediction Competition for Social Preferences in Simple Extensive Form Games: An Introduction." Special Issue on Predicting Behavior in Games. Games 2, no. 3 (September 2011): 257–276.
      • January 2011
      • Article

      Let the Right One In: A Microeconomic Approach to Partner Choice in Mutualisms

      By: Marco Archetti, Francisco Ubeda, Drew Fudenberg, Jerry R. Green, Naomi E. Pierce and Douglas W. Yu
      One of the main problems impeding the evolution of cooperation is partner choice. When information is asymmetric (the quality of a potential partner is known only to himself), it may seem that partner choice is not possible without signaling. Many mutualisms, however,... View Details
      Keywords: Microeconomics; Strategy; Partners and Partnerships; System; Problems and Challenges; Information; Economics; Theory; Cost; Decision Choices and Conditions; Cooperation
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      Archetti, Marco, Francisco Ubeda, Drew Fudenberg, Jerry R. Green, Naomi E. Pierce, and Douglas W. Yu. "Let the Right One In: A Microeconomic Approach to Partner Choice in Mutualisms." American Naturalist 177, no. 1 (January 2011).
      • 2010
      • Working Paper

      Conveniently Upset: Avoiding Altruism by Distorting Beliefs about Others

      By: Rafael Di Tella and Ricardo Perez-Truglia
      In this paper we present the results from a "corruption game" (a dictator game modified so that the second player can accept a side payment that reduces the overall size of the pie). Dictators (silently) treated to have the possibility of taking a larger proportion of... View Details
      Keywords: Decision Choices and Conditions; Judgments; Fairness; Values and Beliefs; Game Theory; Personal Characteristics
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      Di Tella, Rafael, and Ricardo Perez-Truglia. "Conveniently Upset: Avoiding Altruism by Distorting Beliefs about Others." NBER Working Paper Series, No. 16645, December 2010.
      • 2010
      • Working Paper

      Overconfidence by Bayesian Rational Agents

      By: Eric Van den Steen
      This paper derives two mechanisms through which Bayesian-rational individuals with differing priors will tend to be relatively overconfident about their estimates and predictions, in the sense of overestimating the precision of these estimates. The intuition behind one... View Details
      Keywords: Risk and Uncertainty; Measurement and Metrics; Game Theory; Forecasting and Prediction
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      Van den Steen, Eric. "Overconfidence by Bayesian Rational Agents." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 11-049, November 2010.
      • 2010
      • Working Paper

      Competing Complements

      By: Ramon Casadesus-Masanell, Barry Nalebuff and David B. Yoffie
      In Cournot's model of complements, the producers of A and B are both monopolists. This paper extends Cournot's model to allow for competition between complements on one side of the market. Consider two complements, A and B, where the A + B bundle is valuable only when... View Details
      Keywords: Profit; Revenue; Monopoly; Game Theory; Competition
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      Casadesus-Masanell, Ramon, Barry Nalebuff, and David B. Yoffie. "Competing Complements." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 09-009, July 2008. (Revised March 2010.)
      • Article

      A Choice Prediction Competition for Market Entry Games: An Introduction

      By: Ido Erev, Eyal Ert and Alvin E. Roth
      A choice prediction competition is organized that focuses on decisions from experience in market entry games (http://sites.google.com/site/gpredcomp/ and http://www.mdpi.com/si/games/predict-behavior/). The competition is based on two experiments: An estimation... View Details
      Keywords: Experience and Expertise; Decision Choices and Conditions; Forecasting and Prediction; Learning; Market Entry and Exit; Game Theory; Behavior; Competition
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      Erev, Ido, Eyal Ert, and Alvin E. Roth. "A Choice Prediction Competition for Market Entry Games: An Introduction." Special Issue on Predicting Behavior in Games. Games 1, no. 2 (June 2010): 117–136.
      • 2009
      • Working Paper

      Walking the Talk in Multiparty Bargaining: An Experimental Investigation

      By: Kathleen L. McGinn, Katherine L Milkman and Markus Noth
      We study the framing effects of communication in multiparty bargaining. Communication has been shown to be more truthful and revealing than predicted in equilibrium. Because talk is preference-revealing, it may effectively frame bargaining around a logic of fairness or... View Details
      Keywords: Equality and Inequality; Competition; Negotiation Process; Negotiation Types; Fairness; Interpersonal Communication; Game Theory; Cooperation
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      McGinn, Kathleen L., Katherine L Milkman, and Markus Noth. "Walking the Talk in Multiparty Bargaining: An Experimental Investigation." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 10-039, November 2009.
      • October 2009
      • Article

      Negotiation Analysis: From Games to Inferences to Decisions to Deals

      By: James K. Sebenius
      Exemplified by the pioneering work of Howard Raiffa and often expressed in the pages of the Negotiation Journal, the emergent prescriptive field of "negotiation analysis" progressively developed from Raiffa's early contributions to game theory and to his later... View Details
      Keywords: Decision Choices and Conditions; Negotiation Participants; Negotiation Preparation; Negotiation Process; Negotiation Tactics; Game Theory
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      Sebenius, James K. "Negotiation Analysis: From Games to Inferences to Decisions to Deals." Negotiation Journal 25, no. 4 (October 2009): 449–465.
      • 2008
      • Chapter

      Corporate Honesty and Business Education: A Behavioral Model

      By: Rakesh Khurana and Herbert Gintis
      Since the mid-1970s neoclassical economic theory has dominated business school thinking and teaching in dealing with the nature of human motivation. However valuable in understanding competitive product and financial markets, neoclassical economic theory employs an... View Details
      Keywords: Business Education; Ethics; Managerial Roles; Corporate Social Responsibility and Impact; Organizational Culture; Business and Shareholder Relations; Mathematical Methods; Behavior
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      Khurana, Rakesh, and Herbert Gintis. "Corporate Honesty and Business Education: A Behavioral Model." In Moral Markets: The Critical Role of Values in the Economy, edited by Paul J. Zak. Princeton University Press, 2008.
      • July 2008
      • Article

      Fairness in Extended Dictator-Game Experiments

      By: Felix Oberholzer-Gee and Reiner Eichenberger
      We test the robustness of behavior in dictator games by offering allocators the choice to play an unattractive lottery. With this lottery option, mean transfers from allocators to recipients substantially decline, partly because many allocators now keep the entire... View Details
      Keywords: Decision Choices and Conditions; Fairness; Game Theory; Risk and Uncertainty; Behavior
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      Oberholzer-Gee, Felix, and Reiner Eichenberger. "Fairness in Extended Dictator-Game Experiments." Art. 16. B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy 8, no. 1 (July 2008).
      • 2008
      • Working Paper

      Gender in Job Negotiations: A Two-Level Game

      By: Hannah Riley Bowles and Kathleen L. McGinn
      We propose a two-level-game (Putnam, 1988) perspective on gender in job negotiations. At Level 1, candidates negotiate with the employers. At Level 2, candidates negotiate with domestic partners. In order to illuminate the interplay between these two levels, we review... View Details
      Keywords: Negotiation; Jobs and Positions; Game Theory; Gender
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      Bowles, Hannah Riley, and Kathleen L. McGinn. "Gender in Job Negotiations: A Two-Level Game." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 08-095, May 2008.
      • January 2008
      • Article

      Putting Leadership Back into Strategy

      By: Cynthia A. Montgomery
      In recent decades an infusion of economics has lent the study of strategy much needed theory and empirical evidence. Strategy consultants, armed with frameworks and techniques, have stepped forward to help managers analyze their industries and position their companies... View Details
      Keywords: Leadership; Growth and Development Strategy; Managerial Roles; Mission and Purpose; Organizational Change and Adaptation; Creativity; Competitive Strategy; Competitive Advantage
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      Montgomery, Cynthia A. "Putting Leadership Back into Strategy." Special Issue on HBS Centennial. Harvard Business Review 86, no. 1 (January 2008): 54–60.
      • October 2007
      • Article

      The Art of Designing Markets

      By: Alvin E. Roth
      Traditionally, markets have been viewed as simply the confluence of supply and demand. But to function properly, they must be able to attract a sufficient number of buyers and sellers, induce participants to make their preferences clear, and overcome congestion by... View Details
      Keywords: Market Design; Market Participation; Market Transactions; Information Technology; Internet and the Web
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      Roth, Alvin E. "The Art of Designing Markets." Harvard Business Review 85, no. 10 (October 2007): 118–126.
      • Article

      Reputation When Threats and Transfers Are Available

      By: Ernesto Dal Bo, Pedro Dal Bo and Rafael Di Tella
      We present a model where a long-run player is allowed to use both money transfers and threats to influence the decisions of a sequence of short-run players. We show that threats might be used credibly (even in arbitrarily short repeated games) by a long-lived player... View Details
      Keywords: Crime and Corruption; Decision Choices and Conditions; Game Theory; Mathematical Methods; Interests; Power and Influence; Reputation
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      Dal Bo, Ernesto, Pedro Dal Bo, and Rafael Di Tella. "Reputation When Threats and Transfers Are Available." Journal of Economics & Management Strategy 16, no. 3 (Fall 2007).
      • 2007
      • Chapter

      Negotiation Analysis: Between Decisions and Games

      By: James K. Sebenius
      Keywords: Negotiation; Decision Making; Game Theory
      Citation
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      Sebenius, James K. "Negotiation Analysis: Between Decisions and Games." In Advances in Decision Analysis, edited by Ward Edwards, Ralph Miles, and Detlof von Winterfeldt, 469–488. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007.
      • July 2007
      • Article

      A Two-Person Game of Information Transmission

      By: Jerry R. Green and Nancy L. Stokey
      We consider a statistical decision problem faced by a two player organization whose members may not agree on outcome evaluations and prior probabilities. One player is specialized in gathering information and transmitting it to the other, who takes the decision. This... View Details
      Keywords: Game Theory; Cheap Talk; Communication Games; Communication; Information
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      Green, Jerry R., and Nancy L. Stokey. "A Two-Person Game of Information Transmission." Journal of Economic Theory 135, no. 1 (July 2007): 90–104.
      • 2007
      • Working Paper

      Correlated Equilibrium and Nash Equilibrium as an Observer's Assessment of the Game

      By: John Hillas, Elon Kohlberg and John W. Pratt
      Noncooperative games are examined from the point of view of an outside observer who believes that the players are rational and that they know at least as much as the observer. The observer is assumed to be able to observe many instances of the play of the game; these... View Details
      Keywords: Decision Choices and Conditions; Game Theory; Cooperation
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      Hillas, John, Elon Kohlberg, and John W. Pratt. "Correlated Equilibrium and Nash Equilibrium as an Observer's Assessment of the Game." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 08-005, July 2007.
      • November 2006
      • Background Note

      Technical Game Theory Note #4: Contracting and Strategic Alliances

      By: Dennis A. Yao
      Provides a game theory-based interpretation of contracting and strategic alliances and introduces the problem of moral hazard. View Details
      Keywords: Contracts; Alliances; Game Theory
      Citation
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      Yao, Dennis A. "Technical Game Theory Note #4: Contracting and Strategic Alliances." Harvard Business School Background Note 707-480, November 2006.
      • November 2006
      • Background Note

      Technical Game Theory Note #5: Private Information and Signaling Models

      By: Dennis A. Yao
      Discusses private information and signaling. View Details
      Keywords: Information; Game Theory
      Citation
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      Yao, Dennis A. "Technical Game Theory Note #5: Private Information and Signaling Models." Harvard Business School Background Note 707-481, November 2006.
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