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- All HBS Web (385)
- Faculty Publications (166)
- 2011
- Working Paper
Better-reply Dynamics in Deferred Acceptance Games
In this paper we address the question of learning in a two-sided matching mechanism that utilizes the deferred acceptance algorithm. We consider a repeated matching game where at each period agents observe their match and have the opportunity to revise their strategy... View Details
Keywords: Learning; Marketplace Matching; Outcome or Result; Game Theory; Mathematical Methods; Strategy
Haeringer, Guillaume, and Hanna Halaburda. "Better-reply Dynamics in Deferred Acceptance Games." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 11-126, June 2011.
- Teaching Interest
Economics
Instructor, Harvard Kennedy School of Government, MPA Mid-Career Summer Program View Details
- 2008
- Working Paper
Gender in Job Negotiations: A Two-Level Game
By: Hannah Riley Bowles and Kathleen L. McGinn
We propose a two-level-game (Putnam, 1988) perspective on gender in job negotiations. At Level 1, candidates negotiate with the employers. At Level 2, candidates negotiate with domestic partners. In order to illuminate the interplay between these two levels, we review... View Details
Bowles, Hannah Riley, and Kathleen L. McGinn. "Gender in Job Negotiations: A Two-Level Game." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 08-095, May 2008.
- 29 Jun 2011
- Working Paper Summaries
Better-reply Dynamics in Deferred Acceptance Games
Keywords: by Guillaume Haeringer & Hanna Halaburda
- 1998
- Chapter
Can Negotiators Outperform Game Theory?
By: M. H. Bazerman, R. Gibbons, L. Thompson and K. L. McGinn
Bazerman, M. H., R. Gibbons, L. Thompson, and K. L. McGinn. "Can Negotiators Outperform Game Theory?" Chap. 4 in Debating Rationality: Nonrational Aspects of Organizational Decision Making, edited by J. Halpern and R. N. Stern, 78–98. Ithaca, NY: ILR Press, 1998. (Reprinted in A. Rau, E. Sherman, & S. Peppet (Eds.), Processes of Dispute Resolution, Foundation Press, 2002.)
- October 2009
- Article
Negotiation Analysis: From Games to Inferences to Decisions to Deals
Exemplified by the pioneering work of Howard Raiffa and often expressed in the pages of the Negotiation Journal, the emergent prescriptive field of "negotiation analysis" progressively developed from Raiffa's early contributions to game theory and to his later... View Details
Keywords: Decision Choices and Conditions; Negotiation Participants; Negotiation Preparation; Negotiation Process; Negotiation Tactics; Game Theory
Sebenius, James K. "Negotiation Analysis: From Games to Inferences to Decisions to Deals." Negotiation Journal 25, no. 4 (October 2009): 449–465.
- 2016
- Chapter
Deriving an Optimally Deceptive Policy in Two-Player Iterated Games
By: Elisabeth Paulson and Christopher Griffin
We formulate the problem of determining an optimally deceptive strategy in a repeated game framework. We assume that two players are engaged in repeated play. During an initial time period, Player 1 may deceptively train his opponent to expect a specific strategy. The... View Details
Paulson, Elisabeth, and Christopher Griffin. "Deriving an Optimally Deceptive Policy in Two-Player Iterated Games." In Proceedings of 2016 American Control Conference. IEEE Press, 2016. (Developed with Booz Allen Hamilton.)
- Article
Delayed-Response Strategies in Repeated Games with Observation Lags
By: Drew Fudenberg, Yuhta Ishii and Scott Duke Kominers
We extend the folk theorem of repeated games to two settings in which players' information about others' play arrives with stochastic lags. In our first model, signals are almost-perfect if and when they do arrive, that is, each player either observes an almost-perfect... View Details
Fudenberg, Drew, Yuhta Ishii, and Scott Duke Kominers. "Delayed-Response Strategies in Repeated Games with Observation Lags." Journal of Economic Theory 150 (March 2014): 487–514.
- 2007
- Chapter
Negotiation Analysis: Between Decisions and Games
- 1985
- Chapter
Toward a Focal-Point Theory of Bargaining
By: A. E. Roth
Roth, A. E. "Toward a Focal-Point Theory of Bargaining." In Game-Theoretic Models of Bargaining, edited by A. E. Roth, 259–268. Cambridge University Press, 1985.
- July 16, 2016
- Article
A Game Theoretic Model for Resource Allocation Among Countermeasures with Multiple Attributes
By: Elisabeth C. Paulson, Igor Linkov and Jeffrey Keisler
We study a strategic, two-player, sequential game between an attacker and defender. The defender must allocate resources amongst possible countermeasures and across possible targets. The attacker then chooses a type of threat and a target to attack. This paper proposes... View Details
Paulson, Elisabeth C., Igor Linkov, and Jeffrey Keisler. "A Game Theoretic Model for Resource Allocation Among Countermeasures with Multiple Attributes." European Journal of Operational Research 252, no. 2 (July 16, 2016): 610–622.
- 2016
- Working Paper
Diversified Business Groups in the West: History and Theory
By: Asli M. Colpan and Takashi Hikino
This working paper examines the historical origins, evolutionary paths, and long-term resilience of diversified business groups in contemporary developed economies of Western Europe, North America, and Oceania. It aims to come up with a new theoretical understanding of... View Details
Colpan, Asli M., and Takashi Hikino. "Diversified Business Groups in the West: History and Theory." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 17-035, October 2016.
- June 2008
- Article
Minimally Acceptable Altruism and the Ultimatum Game
By: Julio J. Rotemberg
I suppose that people react with anger when others show themselves not to be minimally altruistic. With heterogeneous agents, this can account for the experimental results of ultimatum and dictator games. Moreover, it can account for the surprisingly large fraction of... View Details
Rotemberg, Julio J. "Minimally Acceptable Altruism and the Ultimatum Game." Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 66, nos. 3-4 (June 2008).
- 1988
- Chapter
The Expected Utility of Playing a Game
By: A. E. Roth
Roth, A. E. "The Expected Utility of Playing a Game." In The Shapley Value: Essays in Honor of Lloyd S. Shapley, edited by A. E. Roth, 51–70. Cambridge University Press, 1988.
- 2007
- Working Paper
Correlated Equilibrium and Nash Equilibrium as an Observer's Assessment of the Game
By: John Hillas, Elon Kohlberg and John W. Pratt
Noncooperative games are examined from the point of view of an outside observer who believes that the players are rational and that they know at least as much as the observer. The observer is assumed to be able to observe many instances of the play of the game; these... View Details
Hillas, John, Elon Kohlberg, and John W. Pratt. "Correlated Equilibrium and Nash Equilibrium as an Observer's Assessment of the Game." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 08-005, July 2007.
- 14 Jun 2007
- Working Paper Summaries
Evolution Analysis of Large-Scale Software Systems Using Design Structure Matrices and Design Rule Theory
- July– September 2002
- Article
Predictive Value and the Usefulness of Game Theoretic Models
By: Ido Erev, Alvin E. Roth, Robert L. Slonim and Greg Barron
Erev, Ido, Alvin E. Roth, Robert L. Slonim, and Greg Barron. "Predictive Value and the Usefulness of Game Theoretic Models." International Journal of Forecasting 18, no. 3 (July– September 2002): 359–368.
- 2020
- Working Paper
To Infinity and Beyond: Scaling Economic Theories via Logical Compactness
By: Yannai A. Gonczarowski, Scott Duke Kominers and Ran I. Shorrer
Many economic-theoretic models incorporate finiteness assumptions that, while introduced for simplicity, play a real role in the analysis. Such assumptions introduce a conceptual problem, as results that rely on finiteness are often implicitly nonrobust; for example,... View Details
Gonczarowski, Yannai A., Scott Duke Kominers, and Ran I. Shorrer. "To Infinity and Beyond: Scaling Economic Theories via Logical Compactness." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 19-127, June 2019. (Revised November 2020.)