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Show Results For
- All HBS Web
(1,626)
- People (1)
- News (222)
- Research (1,226)
- Events (6)
- Multimedia (6)
- Faculty Publications (820)
- Article
Renegotiation and the Form of Efficient Contracts
By: Jerry R. Green and J. J. Laffont
Two parties may agree to a mutually binding contract that will govern their behavior after an uncertain event becomes known. As there is no agent who can both observe this uncertain outcome and enforce the contract, contingent agreements are precluded. However, the... View Details
Green, Jerry R., and J. J. Laffont. "Renegotiation and the Form of Efficient Contracts." Annales d'économie et de statistique, nos. 25-26 (January–June 1992): 123–150.
- November 1980
- Case
Norton Co.: Polish Contract
Capon, Noel. "Norton Co.: Polish Contract." Harvard Business School Case 581-046, November 1980.
- September 2010 (Revised January 2012)
- Case
Emergia: Driving Profitability on Help Desk Contracts
Emergia wants to keep its customer happy with its contact center service, but the margins on the help desk contract are dangerously low. Can Miguel Neira, the COO, increase margins while preserving the customer relationship? View Details
Keywords: Customer Relationship Management; Customer Satisfaction; Profit; Job Cuts and Outsourcing; Management Analysis, Tools, and Techniques; Service Operations; Performance Capacity; Performance Evaluation; Mathematical Methods; Service Industry
Martinez Jerez, F. Asis, and Lisa Brem. "Emergia: Driving Profitability on Help Desk Contracts." Harvard Business School Case 111-048, September 2010. (Revised January 2012.)
- 2011
- Article
'Deprival Value' vs. 'Fair Value' Measurement for Contract Liabilities: How to Resolve the 'Revenue Recognition' Conundrum
By: Joanne Horton, Richard H. Macve and George Serafeim
Revenue recognition and measurement principles can conflict with liability recognition and measurement principles. We explore here under different market conditions when the two measurement approaches coincide and when they conflict. We show that where entities expect... View Details
Keywords: Fair Value; Deprival Value; Contract Liabilities; Fair Value Accounting; Measurement and Metrics; Profit; Revenue Recognition; Assets; Performance Evaluation; Contracts
Horton, Joanne, Richard H. Macve, and George Serafeim. "'Deprival Value' vs. 'Fair Value' Measurement for Contract Liabilities: How to Resolve the 'Revenue Recognition' Conundrum." Accounting and Business Research 41, no. 5 (2011): 491–514.
- 26 Aug 2015
- News
Five steps to a solid contract
- May 2012
- Article
Contracting with Heterogeneous Externalities
By: Shai Bernstein and Eyal Winter
Bernstein, Shai, and Eyal Winter. "Contracting with Heterogeneous Externalities." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 4, no. 2 (May 2012): 50–76.
- December 1982 (Revised November 2006)
- Background Note
Note on Futures Contracts
By: David E. Bell
Provides an introduction to futures contracts, what they are, what their use in hedging is, and their usefulness in providing forecasts. Also covers basic risk. Includes a list of commodities currently traded in futures markets and the necessary properties of a... View Details
Keywords: Futures and Commodity Futures
Bell, David E. "Note on Futures Contracts." Harvard Business School Background Note 183-126, December 1982. (Revised November 2006.)
- 20 Jul 2021
- News
Rewriting the Social Contract
- August 2003 (Revised December 2003)
- Background Note
Formalizing Business Relationships: Note on Contract Formation for Managers
Equips managers with a basic understanding of how to use contracts to define, formalize, and strengthen business relationships. Explains how managers can use properly structured contracts to increase predictability; to create or preserve valuable legal, financial, and... View Details
Bagley, Constance E. "Formalizing Business Relationships: Note on Contract Formation for Managers." Harvard Business School Background Note 804-004, August 2003. (Revised December 2003.)
- Article
Multi-Echelon Inventory Management Under Short-Term Take-or-Pay Contracts
By: Joel Goh and Evan L. Porteus
We extend the Clark–Scarf serial multi-echelon inventory model to include procuring production inputs under short-term take-or-pay contracts at one or more stages. In each period, each such stage has the option to order/process at two different cost rates; the cheaper... View Details
Keywords: Inventory Management; Multi-echelon Inventory Theory; Karush Lemma; Clark-Scarf Model; Convex Ordering Cost; Advance Commitments; Supply Chain
Goh, Joel, and Evan L. Porteus. "Multi-Echelon Inventory Management Under Short-Term Take-or-Pay Contracts." Production and Operations Management 25, no. 8 (August 2016): 1415–1429. (Finalist for 2014 POMS College of Supply Chain Management Student Paper Award.)
- November 2006
- Background Note
Technical Game Theory Note #4: Contracting and Strategic Alliances
By: Dennis A. Yao
Provides a game theory-based interpretation of contracting and strategic alliances and introduces the problem of moral hazard. View Details
- 2002
- Other Unpublished Work
Relational Contracts in Strategic Alliances
By: George P. Baker, Robert Gibbons and Kevin J. Murphy
- 1981
- Article
Insecure Contracts and Resource Development
By: James K. Sebenius and David Lax
Sebenius, James K., and David Lax. "Insecure Contracts and Resource Development." Public Policy 29 (1981): 419–436.
- June 1992
- Article
Incentive Contracts and Performance Measurement
By: George P. Baker
Baker, George P. "Incentive Contracts and Performance Measurement." Journal of Political Economy (June 1992).
- 23 Jan 2018
- Working Paper Summaries
Transaction Costs and the Duration of Contracts
Keywords: by Alexander MacKay
- 2023
- Working Paper
Pulp Friction: The Value of Quantity Contracts in Decentralized Markets
By: Olivier Darmouni, Simon Essig Aberg and Juha Tolvanen
Firms in decentralized markets often trade using quantity contracts, agreements that specify quantity prior to the point of sale. These contracts are valuable because they provide quantity assurance, as trading frictions could prevent a buyer and seller from matching... View Details
Keywords: Decentralized Markets; Trading Frictions; Market Structure; Transaction Costs; Contracts; Market Transactions; Pulp and Paper Industry
Darmouni, Olivier, Simon Essig Aberg, and Juha Tolvanen. "Pulp Friction: The Value of Quantity Contracts in Decentralized Markets." Working Paper, December 2023.
- March 2000
- Article
The Structure of Licensing Contracts
Keywords: Contracts
Anand, B., and T. Khanna. "The Structure of Licensing Contracts." Journal of Industrial Economics 48, no. 1 (March 2000): 103–35. (Formerly titled "Intellectual Property Rights and Contract Structure.")
- March – April 1994
- Article
Choosing Appropriate Construction Contracting Method
By: Christopher M. Gordon
Keywords: Contracts
Gordon, Christopher M. "Choosing Appropriate Construction Contracting Method." Journal of Construction Engineering and Management 120, no. 1 (March–April 1994).
- 27 Jan 2024
- News