Filter Results:
(456)
Show Results For
- All HBS Web
(705)
- People (1)
- News (120)
- Research (456)
- Events (12)
- Multimedia (3)
- Faculty Publications (278)
Show Results For
- All HBS Web
(705)
- People (1)
- News (120)
- Research (456)
- Events (12)
- Multimedia (3)
- Faculty Publications (278)
Sort by
- January 2006 (Revised October 2009)
- Supplement
Negotiating Star Compensation at the USAWBL (A-3): Confidential Instructions for Jesse J's Agent
By: Ian Larkin, James K. Sebenius and Guhan Subramanian
Larkin, Ian, James K. Sebenius, and Guhan Subramanian. "Negotiating Star Compensation at the USAWBL (A-3): Confidential Instructions for Jesse J's Agent." Harvard Business School Supplement 906-028, January 2006. (Revised October 2009.)
- October 2008
- Article
Choosing Agents and Monitoring Consumption: A Note on Wealth as a Corruption-Controlling-Device
By: Rafael Di Tella and Federico Weinschelbaum
Di Tella, Rafael, and Federico Weinschelbaum. "Choosing Agents and Monitoring Consumption: A Note on Wealth as a Corruption-Controlling-Device ." Economic Journal 118, no. 532 (October 2008).
- December 2018
- Teaching Note
The Campbell Home (A), (B), and (C)
By: Leslie John
Email mking@hbs.edu for a courtesy copy.
Teaching Note for HBS Nos. 918-017, 918-018, and 918-019. Campbell siblings Thomas and Sally are faced with selling their childhood home. They need to make several... View Details
Teaching Note for HBS Nos. 918-017, 918-018, and 918-019. Campbell siblings Thomas and Sally are faced with selling their childhood home. They need to make several... View Details
Keywords: Agents; Bidding Process; Negotiation; Negotiation Process; Negotiation Preparation; Negotiation Participants; Valuation; Real Estate Industry; United States
John, Leslie. "The Campbell Home (A), (B), and (C)." Harvard Business School Teaching Note 919-012, December 2018. (Email mking@hbs.edu for a courtesy copy.)
- March 1992
- Article
Agents As Information Brokers: The Effects of Information Disclosure on Negotiated Outcomes
By: K. L. McGinn, S. B. White, M. A. Neale and M. H. Bazerman
McGinn, K. L., S. B. White, M. A. Neale, and M. H. Bazerman. "Agents As Information Brokers: The Effects of Information Disclosure on Negotiated Outcomes." Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 51, no. 2 (March 1992): 220–236.
- December 2017 (Revised January 2020)
- Case
The Campbell Home (A)
By: Leslie K. John and Matthew G. Preble
Email mking@hbs.edu for a courtesy copy.
Campbell siblings Thomas and Sally are faced with selling their childhood home. They need to make several difficult consequential decisions, all the while navigating their... View Details
Campbell siblings Thomas and Sally are faced with selling their childhood home. They need to make several difficult consequential decisions, all the while navigating their... View Details
Keywords: Agents; Bidding Process; Negotiation; Negotiation Process; Negotiation Preparation; Negotiation Participants; Valuation; Real Estate Industry; United States
John, Leslie K., and Matthew G. Preble. "The Campbell Home (A)." Harvard Business School Case 918-017, December 2017. (Revised January 2020.) (Email mking@hbs.edu for a courtesy copy.)
- December 1999
- Case
Sun Microsystems, Inc. (A6): Enterprise 250: Mark Canepa on the Newcomer as Change Agent
By: Rosabeth M. Kanter and Jane Roessner
Coming to Sun Microsystems after 20 years with Hewlett-Packard (HP), Mark Canepa brought a highly organized leadership style more characteristic of HP than Sun. His goal was to use the development of a new workstation product to build a disciplined, process-oriented,... View Details
- June 2002
- Article
The Timing of Bids in Internet Auctions: Market Design, Bidder Behavior, and Artificial Agents
By: Axel Ockenfels and Alvin E. Roth
Keywords: Auctions; Bids and Bidding; Internet and the Web; Markets; Design; Behavior; Internet and the Web
Ockenfels, Axel, and Alvin E. Roth. "The Timing of Bids in Internet Auctions: Market Design, Bidder Behavior, and Artificial Agents." AI Magazine (June 2002).
- July 2004
- Article
When a Contract Isn't Enough: How to Be Sure Your Agent Gets You the Best Deal
Keywords: Contracts
Sebenius, James K. "When a Contract Isn't Enough: How to Be Sure Your Agent Gets You the Best Deal." Negotiation 7, no. 7 (July 2004).
- 2018
- Article
Revenue Farming Reconsidered: Tenurial Rights and Tenurial Duties in Early Modern India, ca. 1556–1818
By: Sudev J Sheth
The meaning of land revenue farming in Indian history has eluded consensus. Some view it as an administrative aberration indicating weak state control, while others see it as a strategy for consolidating authority. This essay traces the historical development of iqṭāʻ... View Details
Keywords: Iqṭāʻ; Ijārah; Revenue Farming; Financial Agents; Mughal Empire; Business History; Business and Government Relations; Property; Finance; South Asia
Sheth, Sudev J. "Revenue Farming Reconsidered: Tenurial Rights and Tenurial Duties in Early Modern India, ca. 1556–1818." Art. 4. Special Issue on Repossessing Property in South Asia: Land, Rights, and Law across the Early Modern/Modern Divide edited by Faisal Chaudhury. Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient 61, nos. 5-6 (2018): 878–919.
- Forthcoming
- Article
Collusion in Brokered Markets
By: John William Hatfield, Scott Duke Kominers and Richard Lowery
High commissions in the U.S. residential real estate agency market present a puzzle for economic theory because brokerage is not a concentrated industry. We model brokered markets as a game in which agents post prices for customers and then choose which other agents to... View Details
Keywords: Real Estate Agents; Real Estate; Realtors; Broker Networks; Brokerage; Brokerage Commissions; ＂Brokerage Industry; Brokered Markets; Brokering; Brokers; Industrial Organization; Repeated Game Framework; ＂Repeated Games＂; Collusion; Antitrust; Microeconomics; Market Design; Theory; Game Theory; Real Estate Industry
Hatfield, John William, Scott Duke Kominers, and Richard Lowery. "Collusion in Brokered Markets." Journal of Finance (forthcoming).
- Article
Understanding the Advice of Commissions-Motivated Agents: Evidence from the Indian Life Insurance Market
By: Santosh Anagol, Shawn Cole and Shayak Sarkar
We conduct a series of field experiments to evaluate the quality of advice provided by life insurance agents in India. Agents overwhelmingly recommend unsuitable, strictly dominated products, which provide high commissions to the agent. Agents cater to the beliefs of... View Details
Keywords: Advice; Customers; Insurance; Service Operations; Motivation and Incentives; Ethics; India
Anagol, Santosh, Shawn Cole, and Shayak Sarkar. "Understanding the Advice of Commissions-Motivated Agents: Evidence from the Indian Life Insurance Market." Review of Economics and Statistics 99, no. 1 (March 2017).
- 23 Aug 2021
- Research & Ideas
Why White-Collar Crime Spiked in America After 9/11
After the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the FBI shifted financial resources and hundreds of agents toward combatting terrorism, unintentionally weakening the agency’s ability to investigate white-collar crime in America, research shows. As a... View Details
Keywords: by Jay Fitzgerald
- March 2023
- Article
Not from Concentrate: Collusion in Collaborative Industries
By: Jordan M. Barry, John William Hatfield, Scott Duke Kominers and Richard Lowery
The chief principle of antitrust law and theory is that reducing market concentration—having more, smaller firms instead of fewer, bigger ones—reduces anticompetitive behavior. We demonstrate that this principle is fundamentally incomplete.
In many... View Details
In many... View Details
Keywords: Antitrust; Antitrust Law; Antitrust Theory; Law And Economics; Collusion; Collaboration; Collaborative Industries; Regulation; ＂Repeated Games＂; IPOs; Initial Public Offerings; Underwriters; Real Estate; Real Estate Agents; Realtors; Syndicated Markets; Syndication; Brokers; Market Concentration; Competition; Law; Economics; Collaborative Innovation and Invention; Governing Rules, Regulations, and Reforms; Game Theory; Initial Public Offering
Barry, Jordan M., John William Hatfield, Scott Duke Kominers, and Richard Lowery. "Not from Concentrate: Collusion in Collaborative Industries." Iowa Law Review 108, no. 3 (March 2023): 1089–1148.
- March 2002 (Revised May 2002)
- Case
Astel Manufacturing Company
By: Joseph L. Bower
The FBI indicates that three purchasing agents are suspected recipients of bribes. After an inconclusive investigation, the agents leave. The superiors are unsure what to do. A rewritten version of an earlier case. View Details
Keywords: Crime and Corruption; Ethics; Problems and Challenges; Decision Choices and Conditions; Government and Politics; Resignation and Termination
Bower, Joseph L. "Astel Manufacturing Company." Harvard Business School Case 302-112, March 2002. (Revised May 2002.)
- February 1999
- Case
Sports Agents: Is There a Firm Advantage?
By: Stephen A. Greyser and Brian R. Harris
Focuses on the decision of a young tennis player on what kind of agent to have as his representative. The choice is between someone in a large sports management/marketing firm and an independent agent representing a small number of individual athletes. Outlines the... View Details
Keywords: Decision Choices and Conditions; Knowledge Management; Marketing Communications; Marketing Strategy; Organizational Structure
Greyser, Stephen A., and Brian R. Harris. "Sports Agents: Is There a Firm Advantage?" Harvard Business School Case 599-038, February 1999.
- December 2010
- Article
Social Preferences and Strategic Uncertainty: An Experiment on Markets and Contracts
This paper reports a three-phase experiment on a stylized labor market. In the first two phases, agents face simple games, which we use to estimate subjects' social and reciprocity concerns. In the last phase, four principals compete by offering agents a contract from... View Details
Keywords: Strategy; Risk and Uncertainty; Markets; Contracts; Decisions; Distribution; Labor; Game Theory
Cabrales, Antonio, Raffaele Miniaci, Marco Piovesan, and Giovanni Ponti. "Social Preferences and Strategic Uncertainty: An Experiment on Markets and Contracts." American Economic Review 100, no. 5 (December 2010): 2261–2278.
- 2009
- Working Paper
Authority versus Persuasion
This paper studies a principal's trade-off between using persuasion versus using interpersonal authority to get the agent to "do the right thing"; from the principal's perspective (when the principal and agent openly disagree on the right course of action). It shows... View Details
Keywords: Employee Relationship Management; Managerial Roles; Projects; Motivation and Incentives; Power and Influence
Van den Steen, Eric J. "Authority versus Persuasion." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 09-085, January 2009.
- Article
Trust and Incentives in Agency
By: Ramon Casadesus-Masanell and Daniel F Spulber
Contracts between a principal and an agent are not formed in a vacuum. Although formal contracts between a principal and an agent contain explicit incentives for performance, the relationship between a principal and an agent also involves implicit incentives. Three... View Details
Keywords: Trust; Motivation and Incentives; Agency Theory; Contracts; Market Transactions; Performance; Relationships; Societal Protocols; Legal Liability; Cost
Casadesus-Masanell, Ramon, and Daniel F Spulber. "Trust and Incentives in Agency." Southern California Interdisciplinary Law Journal 15, no. 1 (Fall 2005): 45–104.
- 2018
- Working Paper
Bundling Incentives in (Many-to-Many) Matching with Contracts
By: Jonathan Ma and Scott Duke Kominers
In many-to-many matching with contracts, the way in which contracts are specified can affect the set of stable equilibrium outcomes. Consequently, agents may be incentivized to modify the set of contracts upfront. We consider one simple way in which agents may do so:... View Details
Keywords: Matching With Contracts; Contract Design; Bundling-proofness; Substitutability; Mathematical Methods
Ma, Jonathan, and Scott Duke Kominers. "Bundling Incentives in (Many-to-Many) Matching with Contracts." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 19-011, August 2018.
- October 2020
- Article
Comparative Statics for Size-Dependent Discounts in Matching Markets
By: David Delacretaz, Scott Duke Kominers and Alexandru Nichifor
We prove a natural comparative static for many-to-many matching markets in which agents’ choice functions exhibit size-dependent discounts: reducing the extent to which some agent discounts additional partners leads to improved outcomes for the agents on the other side... View Details
Keywords: Size-dependent Discounts; Path-independence; Respect For Improvements; Market Design; Mathematical Methods
Delacretaz, David, Scott Duke Kominers, and Alexandru Nichifor. "Comparative Statics for Size-Dependent Discounts in Matching Markets." Journal of Mathematical Economics 90 (October 2020): 127–131.