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Show Results For
- All HBS Web
(1,758)
- People (2)
- News (516)
- Research (952)
- Events (10)
- Multimedia (43)
- Faculty Publications (552)
- 2016
- Working Paper
Popular Acceptance of Inequality Due to Innate Brute Luck and Support for Classical Benefit-Based Taxation
U.S. survey respondents' views on distributive justice are shown to differ in two specific, related ways from what is conventionally assumed in modern optimal tax research. A large share of respondents, and in some cases a large majority, resist the full equalization... View Details
Weinzierl, Matthew C. "Popular Acceptance of Inequality Due to Innate Brute Luck and Support for Classical Benefit-Based Taxation." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 16-104, March 2016. (Revised July 2016. Also NBER Working Paper Series, No. 22462, July 2016. Also see Notes on Fortune article. Accepted for publication by the Journal of Public Economics.)
- 13 Sep 2013
- HBS Seminar
Nirupama Rao, NYC Wagner School of Public Service
- 13 Sep 2013
- HBS Seminar
Nirupama Rao, NYU Wagner School of Public Service
- November 2020
- Article
Taxation in Matching Markets
By: Arnaud Dupuy, Alfred Galichon, Sonia Jaffe and Scott Duke Kominers
We analyze the effects of taxation in two-sided matching markets, i.e., markets in which all agents have heterogeneous preferences over potential partners. In matching markets, taxes can generate inefficiency on the allocative margin by changing who is matched to whom,... View Details
Dupuy, Arnaud, Alfred Galichon, Sonia Jaffe, and Scott Duke Kominers. "Taxation in Matching Markets." International Economic Review 61, no. 4 (November 2020): 1591–1634.
- 29 Dec 2017
- News
Trump Gets A ’D’ For Bipartisan Deal-Making
- January 2019
- Article
Making Moves Matter: Experimental Evidence on Incentivizing Bureaucrats Through Performance-Based Postings
By: Adnan Q. Khan, Asim Ijaz Khwaja and Benjamin A. Olken
Bureaucracies often post staff to better or worse locations, ostensibly to provide incentives. Yet we know little about whether this works, with heterogeneity in preferences over postings impacting effectiveness. We propose a performance-ranked serial dictatorship... View Details
Keywords: Serial Dictatorship Mechanism; Employment; Geographic Location; Motivation and Incentives; Performance
Khan, Adnan Q., Asim Ijaz Khwaja, and Benjamin A. Olken. "Making Moves Matter: Experimental Evidence on Incentivizing Bureaucrats Through Performance-Based Postings." American Economic Review 109, no. 1 (January 2019): 237–270.
- 2012
- Working Paper
~Why Do We Redistribute so Much but Tag so Little? Normative Diversity, Equal Sacrifice and Optimal Taxation
Tagging is a free lunch in conventional optimal tax theory because it eases the classic tradeoff between efficiency and equality. But tagging is used in only limited ways in tax policy. I propose one explanation: conventional optimal tax theory has yet to capture the... View Details
Keywords: Forecasting and Prediction; Cost; Framework; Policy; Taxation; Analytics and Data Science; Performance Efficiency; United States
Weinzierl, Matthew. "~Why Do We Redistribute so Much but Tag so Little? Normative Diversity, Equal Sacrifice and Optimal Taxation." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 12-064, January 2012. (Revised August 2012. NBER Working Paper Series, No. 18045, August 2012)
- 28 Aug 2017
- News
Move Americans to Jobs, Not the Other Way Around
- February 2000
- Background Note
Medicine, Incentive Compensation, and the Law
By: Richard M.J. Bohmer and Bruce L. Hall
Summarizes legal issues in structuring a health care incentive plan, such as tax laws and federal regulations. Draws from an interview conducted with a New England lawyer in October 1999. View Details
Keywords: Motivation and Incentives; Compensation and Benefits; Law; Health Care and Treatment; Taxation; Laws and Statutes; Health Industry
Bohmer, Richard M.J., and Bruce L. Hall. "Medicine, Incentive Compensation, and the Law." Harvard Business School Background Note 600-087, February 2000.
- Article
De Gustibus non est Taxandum: Heterogeneity in Preferences and Optimal Redistribution
By: Benjamin B Lockwood and Matthew Weinzierl
The prominent but unproven intuition that preference heterogeneity reduces redistribution in a standard optimal tax model is shown to hold under the plausible condition that the distribution of preferences for consumption relative to leisure rises, in terms of... View Details
Keywords: Motivation and Incentives; Income; Decision Choices and Conditions; Consumer Behavior; Taxation; Microeconomics; Macroeconomics
Lockwood, Benjamin B., and Matthew Weinzierl. "De Gustibus non est Taxandum: Heterogeneity in Preferences and Optimal Redistribution." Journal of Public Economics 124 (April 2015): 74–80. (Also NBER Working Paper Series, No. 17784, September 2014 and Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 12-063, January 2012.)
- 13 Jul 2012
- Working Paper Summaries
De Gustibus non est Taxandum: Theory and Evidence on Preference Heterogeneity and Redistribution
Keywords: by Benjamin Lockwood & Matthew Weinzierl
- 12 Sep 2019
- News
One Argument for Radical Income Transparency
- Video
Adi Godrej
Adi Godrej, head of the India-based consumer products Godrej Group, describes the organization’s strategy for coping with high levels of taxes before liberalization in 1991, including the tactic of selling... View Details
- Article
Popular Acceptance of Inequality Due to Innate Brute Luck and Support for Classical Benefit-based Taxation
U.S. survey respondents' views on distributive justice differ in two specific, related ways from what is conventionally assumed in modern optimal tax research. When expressing their preferences over allocations in stylized, hypothetical scenarios meant to isolate key... View Details
Keywords: Optimal Taxation; Welfarism; Luck; Benefit-based Taxation; Taxation; Equality and Inequality; Attitudes
Weinzierl, Matthew C. "Popular Acceptance of Inequality Due to Innate Brute Luck and Support for Classical Benefit-based Taxation." Journal of Public Economics 155 (November 2017): 54–63. (Also Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 16-104, March 2016; revised July 2016, and NBER Working Paper Series, No. 22462, July 2016. See Notes on Fortune article.)
- September 1992 (Revised August 2010)
- Case
The Carried Interest
By: Henry B. Reiling
Makes the point that general partners and others frequently contract to receive a share of any profits that the venture they manage generates. This practice raises the question of whether the value of this contract right should be taxed when it is received or only when... View Details
Keywords: Venture Capital; Cash Flow; Profit Sharing; Taxation; Contracts; Business or Company Management; Partners and Partnerships
Reiling, Henry B. "The Carried Interest." Harvard Business School Case 293-043, September 1992. (Revised August 2010.)
- 2014
- Working Paper
De Gustibus non est Taxandum: Heterogeneity in Preferences and Optimal Redistribution
By: Benjamin B Lockwood and Matthew Weinzierl
The prominent but unproven intuition that preference heterogeneity reduces redistribution in a standard optimal tax model is shown to hold under the plausible condition that the distribution of preferences for consumption relative to leisure rises, in terms of... View Details
Lockwood, Benjamin B., and Matthew Weinzierl. "De Gustibus non est Taxandum: Heterogeneity in Preferences and Optimal Redistribution." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 12-063, January 2012. (Updated September 2014. NBER Working Paper Series, No. 17784. Published in Journal of Public Economics.)
- 26 Sep 2017
- News
The Length Cities Will Go To Get Amazon's New Headquarters
- 12 May 2020
- Working Paper Summaries
Elusive Safety: The New Geography of Capital Flows and Risk
- June 2009
- Journal Article
Taxes, Institutions and Foreign Diversification Opportunities
By: Mihir Desai and Dhammika Dharmapala
Investors can access foreign diversification opportunities through either foreign portfolio investment (FPI) or foreign direct investment (FDI). The worldwide tax regime employed by the U.S. potentially distorts this choice by penalizing FDI, relative to FPI, in... View Details
Keywords: International Finance; Foreign Direct Investment; Investment Portfolio; Multinational Firms and Management; Taxation; Diversification; United States
Desai, Mihir, and Dhammika Dharmapala. "Taxes, Institutions and Foreign Diversification Opportunities." Journal of Public Economics 93, nos. 5-6 (June 2009): 703–714.
- 15 Feb 2007
- Research & Ideas
Helping Low-Income Families Save More
Podcast with: Peter TufanoInterviewer: James AisnerRunning Time: 18 min., 55 sec. View Details