Publications

May 2014
Article

Investment Incentives in Labor Market Matching

By: John William Hatfield, Fuhito Kojima and Scott Duke Kominers

We provide an illustration of how the design of labor market clearing mechanisms can affect incentives for human capital acquisition. Specifically, we extend the labor market matching model (with discrete transfers) of Kelso and Crawford (1982) to incorporate the... View Details

Keywords: Human Capital; Marketplace Matching

Purchase

2008
Working Paper

Stability and Nash Implementation in Matching Markets with Couples

By: Claus-Jochen Haake and Bettina-Elisabeth Klaus

We consider two-sided matching markets with couples. First, we extend a result by Klaus and Klijn (2005, Theorem 3.3) and show that for any weakly responsive couples market there always exists a "double stable" matching, i.e., a matching that is stable for the couples... View Details

Keywords: Marketplace Matching; Balance and Stability; Game Theory

2008
Working Paper

Stable Many-to-Many Matchings with Contracts

By: Bettina-Elisabeth Klaus and Markus Walzl

We consider several notions of setwise stability for many-to-many matching markets with contracts and provide an analysis of the relations between the resulting sets of stable allocations for general, substitutable, and strongly substitutable preferences. Apart from... View Details

Keywords: Marketplace Matching; Balance and Stability

December 2018
Article

Reserve Design: Unintended Consequences and the Demise of Boston's Walk Zones

By: Umut Dur, Scott Duke Kominers, Parag A. Pathak and Tayfun Sönmez

Admissions policies often use reserves to grant certain applicants higher priority for some (but not all) available seats. Boston’s school choice system, for example, reserved half of each school’s seats for local neighborhood applicants while leaving the other half... View Details

Keywords: Neighborhoods; Equal Access; School Choice; Affirmative Action; Desegregation; Marketplace Matching; Fairness; Local Range; Education; Policy

Article

Matching in Networks with Bilateral Contracts

By: John William Hatfield and Scott Duke Kominers

We introduce a model in which firms trade goods via bilateral contracts which specify a buyer, a seller, and the terms of the exchange. This setting subsumes (many-to-many) matching with contracts, as well as supply chain matching. When firms' relationships do not... View Details

Keywords: Contracts; Market Design; Marketplace Matching; Supply Chain

Purchase

2010
Working Paper

Unraveling Results from Comparable Demand and Supply: An Experimental Investigation

By: Muriel Niederle, Alvin E. Roth and M. Utku Unver

Markets sometimes unravel, with offers becoming inefficiently early. Often this is attributed to competition arising from an imbalance of demand and supply, typically excess demand for workers. However this presents a puzzle, since unraveling can only occur when firms... View Details

Keywords: Labor; Marketplace Matching; Quality; Competition; Balance and Stability

2016
Working Paper

Refugee Resettlement

By: David Delacretaz, Scott Duke Kominers and Alexander Teytelboym

Over 100,000 refugees are permanently resettled from refugee camps to hosting countries every year. Nevertheless, refugee resettlement processes in most countries are ad hoc, accounting for neither the priorities of hosting communities nor the preferences of refugees... View Details

Keywords: Refugees; Marketplace Matching; Mathematical Methods

16 Sep 2015
News

Creating more effective content across all media

Associate Professor Thales Teixeira’s research into the economics of attention explores the ways in which companies can better communicate with buyers of goods and services in a marketplace cluttered with messaging across all media.... View Details

May 2016
Article

Matching with Slot-Specific Priorities: Theory

By: Scott Duke Kominers and Tayfun Sönmez

We introduce a two-sided, many-to-one matching with contracts model in which agents with unit demand match to branches that may have multiple slots available to accept contracts. Each slot has its own linear priority order over contracts; a branch chooses contracts by... View Details

Keywords: Matching With Contracts; Stability; Strategy-proofness; School Choice; Affirmative Action; Airline Seat Upgrades; Contracts; Market Design; Marketplace Matching; Balance and Stability

Article

Preference Signaling in Matching Markets

Many labor markets share three stylized facts: employers cannot give full attention to all candidates, candidates are ready to provide information about their preferences for particular employers, and employers value and are prepared to act on this information. In this... View Details

Keywords: Signaling; Matching; Cheap Talk; Congestion; Market Design; Marketplace Matching; Communication; Job Search

2007
Working Paper

The New Market for Federal Judicial Law Clerks

By: Christopher Avery, Christine Jolls, Richard Posner and Alvin E. Roth

In the past, judges have often hired applicants for judicial clerkships as early as the beginning of the second year of law school for positions commencing approximately two years down the road. In the new hiring regime for federal judicial law clerks, by contrast,... View Details

Keywords: Law; Education; Employment; Selection and Staffing; Marketplace Matching

01 Dec 2003
News

Selling Digital Privacy

a middle ground, says Deighton, but it will take a new kind of institution, a personal data clearinghouse, to give consumers back their marketplace identities. In proposing a market-based solution to the consumer-privacy problem, Deighton... View Details

Keywords: Colleges, Universities, and Professional Schools; Educational Services

2015
Working Paper

Stability, Strategy-Proofness, and Cumulative Offer Mechanisms

By: John William Hatfield, Scott Duke Kominers and Alexander Westkamp

We consider the setting of many-to-one matching with contracts, where firms may demand multiple contracts but each worker desires at most one contract. We introduce three novel conditions—observable substitutability, observable size monotonicity,... View Details

Keywords: Matching With Contracts; Stability; Strategy-proofness; Substitutability; Size Monotonicity; Cumulative Offer Mechanism; Contracts; Market Design; Marketplace Matching; Balance and Stability

2011
Working Paper

Better-reply Dynamics in Deferred Acceptance Games

In this paper we address the question of learning in a two-sided matching mechanism that utilizes the deferred acceptance algorithm. We consider a repeated matching game where at each period agents observe their match and have the opportunity to revise their strategy... View Details

Keywords: Learning; Marketplace Matching; Outcome or Result; Game Theory; Mathematical Methods; Strategy

marketplaces throughout the United States. An "urban pioneer," Rouse also planned the entire town of Columbia, MD, based on his ideal of an "open community" where all races and levels of income would be represented. View Details

Keywords: Construction & Real Estate

Richard M. Schulze

Schulze transformed his small Sound of Music electronic store into an electronics retailing giant – Best Buy. Schulze introduced mass-merchandising techniques to the electronics marketplace and helped to transform the shopping process... View Details

Keywords: Retail

Article

On the Correspondence of Contracts to Salaries in (Many-to-Many) Matching

By: Scott Duke Kominers

In this note, I extend the work of Echenique (2012) to show that a model of many-to-many matching with contracts may be embedded into a model of many-to-many matching with wage bargaining whenever (1) all agentsʼ preferences are substitutable and (2) the matching with... View Details

Keywords: Many-to-Many Matching; Stability; Substitutes; Contract Design; Unitarity; Market Design; Contracts; Marketplace Matching; Balance and Stability; Economics