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(847)
- News (217)
- Research (547)
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- Multimedia (10)
- Faculty Publications (359)
Show Results For
- All HBS Web
(847)
- News (217)
- Research (547)
- Events (5)
- Multimedia (10)
- Faculty Publications (359)
- January 2017
- Article
Contract Design and Stability in Many-to-Many Matching
By: John William Hatfield and Scott Duke Kominers
We develop a model of many-to-many matching with contracts that subsumes as special cases many-to-many matching markets and buyer/seller markets with heterogeneous and indivisible goods. In our setting, substitutable preferences are sufficient to guarantee the... View Details
Keywords: Many-to-Many Matching; Stability; Substitutes; Contract Design; Contracts; Marketplace Matching; Balance and Stability
Hatfield, John William, and Scott Duke Kominers. "Contract Design and Stability in Many-to-Many Matching." Games and Economic Behavior 101 (January 2017): 78–97.
- Article
Analyzing Scrip Systems
By: Kris Johnson, David Simchi-Levi and Peng Sun
Scrip systems provide a nonmonetary trade economy for exchange of resources. We model a scrip system as a stochastic game and study system design issues on selection rules to match potential trade partners over time. We show the optimality of one particular rule in... View Details
Keywords: "Repeated Games"; Stochastic Trust Game; Dynamic Program; P2P Lending; Scrip Systems; Artificial Currency; Non-monetary Trade Economies; Marketplace Matching; Currency; Operations; Game Theory
Johnson, Kris, David Simchi-Levi, and Peng Sun. "Analyzing Scrip Systems." Operations Research 62, no. 3 (May–June 2014): 524–534.
- 2009
- Working Paper
Farsighted Stability for Roommate Markets
By: Bettina-Elisabeth Klaus, Flip Klijn and Markus Walzl
Using a bi-choice graph technique (Klaus and Klijn, 2009), we show that a matching for a roommate market indirectly dominates another matching if and only if no blocking pair of the former is matched in the latter (Proposition 1). Using this characterization of... View Details
Klaus, Bettina-Elisabeth, Flip Klijn, and Markus Walzl. "Farsighted Stability for Roommate Markets." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 09-135, May 2009.
- 2009
- Chapter
The Effects of a Central Clearinghouse on Job Placement, Wages, and Hiring Practices
By: Muriel Niederle and Alvin E. Roth
New gastroenterologists participated in a labor market clearinghouse (a "match") from 1986 through the late 1990s, after which the match was abandoned. This provides an opportunity to study the effects of a match by observing the differences in the outcomes and... View Details
Niederle, Muriel, and Alvin E. Roth. "The Effects of a Central Clearinghouse on Job Placement, Wages, and Hiring Practices." In Studies of Labor Market Intermediation, edited by David H. Autor, 273–306. University of Chicago Press, 2009.
- 2009
- Working Paper
Unraveling Results from Comparable Demand and Supply: An Experimental Investigation
By: Muriel Niederle, Alvin E. Roth and M. Utku Unver
Markets sometimes unravel, with offers becoming inefficiently early. Often this is attributed to competition arising from an imbalance of demand and supply, typically excess demand for workers. However this presents a puzzle, since unraveling can only occur when firms... View Details
Niederle, Muriel, Alvin E. Roth, and M. Utku Unver. "Unraveling Results from Comparable Demand and Supply: An Experimental Investigation." NBER Working Paper Series, No. 15006, May 2009.
- 2015
- Working Paper
Stability, Strategy-Proofness, and Cumulative Offer Mechanisms
By: John William Hatfield, Scott Duke Kominers and Alexander Westkamp
We consider the setting of many-to-one matching with contracts, where firms may
demand multiple contracts but each worker desires at most one contract. We introduce
three novel conditions—observable substitutability, observable size monotonicity,... View Details
Keywords: Matching With Contracts; Stability; Strategy-proofness; Substitutability; Size Monotonicity; Cumulative Offer Mechanism; Contracts; Market Design; Marketplace Matching; Balance and Stability
Hatfield, John William, Scott Duke Kominers, and Alexander Westkamp. "Stability, Strategy-Proofness, and Cumulative Offer Mechanisms." Working Paper, July 2015.
Joseph I. Miller
Under Miller’s direction, Cummins Engine was transformed from a small domestic engine producer to the largest provider of diesel truck engines in the world. He dramatically expanded the company’s presence in the international marketplace... View Details
Keywords: Fabricated Goods
- 2008
- Working Paper
Stability and Nash Implementation in Matching Markets with Couples
By: Claus-Jochen Haake and Bettina-Elisabeth Klaus
We consider two-sided matching markets with couples. First, we extend a result by Klaus and Klijn (2005, Theorem 3.3) and show that for any weakly responsive couples market there always exists a "double stable" matching, i.e., a matching that is stable for the couples... View Details
Haake, Claus-Jochen, and Bettina-Elisabeth Klaus. "Stability and Nash Implementation in Matching Markets with Couples." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 09-017, August 2008.
- 2011
- Working Paper
Better-reply Dynamics in Deferred Acceptance Games
In this paper we address the question of learning in a two-sided matching mechanism that utilizes the deferred acceptance algorithm. We consider a repeated matching game where at each period agents observe their match and have the opportunity to revise their strategy... View Details
Keywords: Learning; Marketplace Matching; Outcome or Result; Game Theory; Mathematical Methods; Strategy
Haeringer, Guillaume, and Hanna Halaburda. "Better-reply Dynamics in Deferred Acceptance Games." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 11-126, June 2011.
Fred DeLuca
Hoping to earn enough money to go to college, DeLuca borrowed $1,000 from a family friend and opened his first sub shop in 1965. Though he struggled for a few years, he did pay his way through college. After graduation, DeLuca jumped on the franchising boon in the fast... View Details
Keywords: Food & Tobacco
- 2009
- Working Paper
Smith and Rawls Share a Room: Stability and Medians
By: Bettina-Elisabeth Klaus and Flip Klijn
We consider one-to-one, one-sided matching (roommate) problems in which agents can either be matched as pairs or remain single. We introduce a so-called bi-choice graph for each pair of stable matchings and characterize its structure. Exploiting this structure we... View Details
Keywords: Fairness; One-Sided Platforms; Two-Sided Platforms; Marketplace Matching; Mathematical Methods; Balance and Stability
Klaus, Bettina-Elisabeth, and Flip Klijn. "Smith and Rawls Share a Room: Stability and Medians." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 09-111, March 2009.
- 2008
- Chapter
Matching and Market Design
By: Muriel Niederle, Alvin E. Roth and Tayfun Sonmez
Matching is the part of economics concerned with who transacts with whom and how. Models of matching, starting with the Gale-Shapley deferred acceptance algorithm, have been particularly useful in studying labour markets and in helping design clearinghouses to fix... View Details
- June 1993 (Revised July 1996)
- Case
Bajaj Auto Ltd.
By: John A. Quelch
Bajaj Auto Ltd., the world's second-largest manufacturer of two- and three-wheeler vehicles, is facing increasing competition in its domestic Indian market. The case evaluates appropriate marketing responses both in the Indian market and export markets. View Details
Keywords: Competition; Marketplace Matching; Product Development; Product Marketing; Transportation Industry; Manufacturing Industry; Auto Industry; India
Quelch, John A. "Bajaj Auto Ltd." Harvard Business School Case 593-097, June 1993. (Revised July 1996.)
Richard M. Schulze
Schulze transformed his small Sound of Music electronic store into an electronics retailing giant – Best Buy. Schulze introduced mass-merchandising techniques to the electronics marketplace and helped to transform the shopping process... View Details
Keywords: Retail
- Article
Matching in Networks with Bilateral Contracts
By: John William Hatfield and Scott Duke Kominers
We introduce a model in which firms trade goods via bilateral contracts which specify a buyer, a seller, and the terms of the exchange. This setting subsumes (many-to-many) matching with contracts, as well as supply chain matching. When firms' relationships do not... View Details
Hatfield, John William, and Scott Duke Kominers. "Matching in Networks with Bilateral Contracts." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 4, no. 1 (February 2012): 176–208.
- 2014
- Working Paper
Hidden Substitutes
By: John William Hatfield and Scott Duke Kominers
In this paper, we show that preferences exhibiting some forms of complementarity
in fact have an underlying substitutable structure. Specifically, we show that some
preferences that are not substitutable in the setting of many-to-one matching with
contracts become... View Details
Keywords: Many-to-One Matching; Many-to-Many Matching; Stability; Substitutes; Matching With Contracts; Slot-Specific Priorities; Sherlock; Market Design; Contracts; Marketplace Matching; Balance and Stability
Hatfield, John William, and Scott Duke Kominers. "Hidden Substitutes." Working Paper, September 2014.
- 19 Oct 2023
- Blog Post
New Venture Competition 2023: Business and Environment Ventures
manufacturing approach. Concentro - Inigo Rengifo Melia (MBA 2023) - Concentro aims to become a tech-enabled marketplace for tax credits (starting with renewables' ITCs), providing the technology to allow tax credits' transfers and a... View Details
- 01 Dec 2003
- News
Selling Digital Privacy
a middle ground, says Deighton, but it will take a new kind of institution, a personal data clearinghouse, to give consumers back their marketplace identities. In proposing a market-based solution to the consumer-privacy problem, Deighton... View Details
- June 2023
- Exercise
Clash of Two Giants Simulation Exercise Instructions
By: Feng Zhu and Marco Iansiti
Many markets are organized around platforms that connect consumers with complimentary applications and services. These platforms are two-sided because both sides - consumers and those providing applications or services - need access to the same platform to interact. A... View Details
Keywords: Platform Strategies; Technology Platform; Customer Acquisition; Network Effects; Digital Platforms; Marketplace Matching; Strategy
Zhu, Feng, and Marco Iansiti. "Clash of Two Giants Simulation Exercise Instructions." Harvard Business School Exercise 623-092, June 2023.
- 16 Sep 2015
- News
Creating more effective content across all media
Associate Professor Thales Teixeira’s research into the economics of attention explores the ways in which companies can better communicate with buyers of goods and services in a marketplace cluttered with messaging across all media.... View Details