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Show Results For
- All HBS Web
(854)
- News (220)
- Research (548)
- Events (7)
- Multimedia (10)
- Faculty Publications (362)
- Article
Testing Substitutability
By: John William Hatfield, Nicole Immorlica and Scott Duke Kominers
We provide an algorithm for testing the substitutability of a length-N preference relation over a set of contracts X in time O(|X|3⋅N3). Access to the preference relation is essential for this result: We show that a substitutability-testing algorithm with access only... View Details
Keywords: Substitutability; Matching; Communication Complexity; Preference Elicitation; Marketplace Matching; Communication; Mathematical Methods; Economics
Hatfield, John William, Nicole Immorlica, and Scott Duke Kominers. "Testing Substitutability." Games and Economic Behavior 75, no. 2 (July 2012): 639–645.
- 2009
- Working Paper
Smith and Rawls Share a Room: Stability and Medians
By: Bettina-Elisabeth Klaus and Flip Klijn
We consider one-to-one, one-sided matching (roommate) problems in which agents can either be matched as pairs or remain single. We introduce a so-called bi-choice graph for each pair of stable matchings and characterize its structure. Exploiting this structure we... View Details
Keywords: Fairness; One-Sided Platforms; Two-Sided Platforms; Marketplace Matching; Mathematical Methods; Balance and Stability
Klaus, Bettina-Elisabeth, and Flip Klijn. "Smith and Rawls Share a Room: Stability and Medians." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 09-111, March 2009.
- 2008
- Chapter
Matching and Market Design
By: Muriel Niederle, Alvin E. Roth and Tayfun Sonmez
Matching is the part of economics concerned with who transacts with whom and how. Models of matching, starting with the Gale-Shapley deferred acceptance algorithm, have been particularly useful in studying labour markets and in helping design clearinghouses to fix... View Details
- June 1993 (Revised July 1996)
- Case
Bajaj Auto Ltd.
By: John A. Quelch
Bajaj Auto Ltd., the world's second-largest manufacturer of two- and three-wheeler vehicles, is facing increasing competition in its domestic Indian market. The case evaluates appropriate marketing responses both in the Indian market and export markets. View Details
Keywords: Competition; Marketplace Matching; Product Development; Product Marketing; Transportation Industry; Manufacturing Industry; Auto Industry; India
Quelch, John A. "Bajaj Auto Ltd." Harvard Business School Case 593-097, June 1993. (Revised July 1996.)
- 2009
- Working Paper
Farsighted Stability for Roommate Markets
By: Bettina-Elisabeth Klaus, Flip Klijn and Markus Walzl
Using a bi-choice graph technique (Klaus and Klijn, 2009), we show that a matching for a roommate market indirectly dominates another matching if and only if no blocking pair of the former is matched in the latter (Proposition 1). Using this characterization of... View Details
Klaus, Bettina-Elisabeth, Flip Klijn, and Markus Walzl. "Farsighted Stability for Roommate Markets." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 09-135, May 2009.
- 2010
- Working Paper
Unraveling Results from Comparable Demand and Supply: An Experimental Investigation
By: Muriel Niederle, Alvin E. Roth and M. Utku Unver
Markets sometimes unravel, with offers becoming inefficiently early. Often this is attributed to competition arising from an imbalance of demand and supply, typically excess demand for workers. However this presents a puzzle, since unraveling can only occur when firms... View Details
Niederle, Muriel, Alvin E. Roth, and M. Utku Unver. "Unraveling Results from Comparable Demand and Supply: An Experimental Investigation." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 10-095, May 2010.
- 2010
- Working Paper
Manipulability in Matching Markets: Conflict and Coincidence of Interests
We study comparative statics of manipulations by women in the men-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism in the two-sided one-to-one marriage market. We prove that if a group of women employs truncation strategies or weakly successfully manipulates, then all other... View Details
Ashlagi, Itai, and Flip Klijn. "Manipulability in Matching Markets: Conflict and Coincidence of Interests." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 10-111, June 2010.
- January 2021 (Revised March 2022)
- Case
Brigad: The Future of Work
By: Nien-he Hsieh, Elena Corsi and Daniela Beyersdorfer
In 2019 Florent Malbranche, CEO and co-founder of the French tech startup Brigad, pondered the next growth steps. Founded in 2015, Brigad’s objective was two-fold: to help restaurants and bars find qualified staff for punctual shifts, and to make it easier for... View Details
- November 2017
- Case
Poppy: A Modern Village for Childcare
By: Thomas Eisenmann and Jeff Huizinga
In 2017, management at Poppy, which matched families that required occasional childcare with thoroughly vetted caregivers, was formulating plans for the Seattle-based seed-stage startup’s next phase of expansion. One option was to grow using the same business model... View Details
Keywords: Entrepreneurship; Market Design; Multi-Sided Platforms; Marketplace Matching; Expansion; United States
Eisenmann, Thomas, and Jeff Huizinga. "Poppy: A Modern Village for Childcare." Harvard Business School Case 818-075, November 2017.
- January 2017
- Article
Contract Design and Stability in Many-to-Many Matching
By: John William Hatfield and Scott Duke Kominers
We develop a model of many-to-many matching with contracts that subsumes as special cases many-to-many matching markets and buyer/seller markets with heterogeneous and indivisible goods. In our setting, substitutable preferences are sufficient to guarantee the... View Details
Keywords: Many-to-Many Matching; Stability; Substitutes; Contract Design; Contracts; Marketplace Matching; Balance and Stability
Hatfield, John William, and Scott Duke Kominers. "Contract Design and Stability in Many-to-Many Matching." Games and Economic Behavior 101 (January 2017): 78–97.
- Article
Analyzing Scrip Systems
By: Kris Johnson, David Simchi-Levi and Peng Sun
Scrip systems provide a nonmonetary trade economy for exchange of resources. We model a scrip system as a stochastic game and study system design issues on selection rules to match potential trade partners over time. We show the optimality of one particular rule in... View Details
Keywords: "Repeated Games"; Stochastic Trust Game; Dynamic Program; P2P Lending; Scrip Systems; Artificial Currency; Non-monetary Trade Economies; Marketplace Matching; Currency; Operations; Game Theory
Johnson, Kris, David Simchi-Levi, and Peng Sun. "Analyzing Scrip Systems." Operations Research 62, no. 3 (May–June 2014): 524–534.
Joseph I. Miller
Under Miller’s direction, Cummins Engine was transformed from a small domestic engine producer to the largest provider of diesel truck engines in the world. He dramatically expanded the company’s presence in the international marketplace... View Details
Keywords: Fabricated Goods
- 05 Apr 2016
- News
A Business Plan with Spice
saffron fields of Afghanistan as cofounders of Rumi Spice, a company which imports one of the world’s most expensive foodstuffs and markets it to top chefs. “Connecting Afghan farmers to the international marketplace is something that's... View Details
- 2015
- Working Paper
Stability, Strategy-Proofness, and Cumulative Offer Mechanisms
By: John William Hatfield, Scott Duke Kominers and Alexander Westkamp
We consider the setting of many-to-one matching with contracts, where firms may
demand multiple contracts but each worker desires at most one contract. We introduce
three novel conditions—observable substitutability, observable size monotonicity,... View Details
Keywords: Matching With Contracts; Stability; Strategy-proofness; Substitutability; Size Monotonicity; Cumulative Offer Mechanism; Contracts; Market Design; Marketplace Matching; Balance and Stability
Hatfield, John William, Scott Duke Kominers, and Alexander Westkamp. "Stability, Strategy-Proofness, and Cumulative Offer Mechanisms." Working Paper, July 2015.
- December 2024
- Article
Respect for Improvements and Comparative Statics in Matching Markets
One of the oldest results in the theory of two-sided matching is the entry comparative static, which shows that under the Gale–Shapley deferred acceptance algorithm, adding a new agent to one side of the market makes all the agents on the other side weakly... View Details
Kominers, Scott Duke. "Respect for Improvements and Comparative Statics in Matching Markets." Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design 9, no. 1 (December 2024): 83–104.
- Winter 2013
- Article
The New Patent Intermediaries: Platforms, Defensive Aggregators and Super-Aggregators
By: Andrei Hagiu and David B. Yoffie
The patent market consists mainly of privately negotiated, bilateral transactions, either sales or cross-licenses, between large companies. There is no eBay, Amazon, New York Stock Exchange, or Kelley's Blue Book equivalent for patents, and when buyers and sellers do... View Details
Keywords: Intellectual Property; Platforms; Intermediaries; Aggregator; Patents; Digital Platforms; Marketplace Matching; Distribution Channels
Hagiu, Andrei, and David B. Yoffie. "The New Patent Intermediaries: Platforms, Defensive Aggregators and Super-Aggregators." Journal of Economic Perspectives 27, no. 1 (Winter 2013): 45–66.
Fred DeLuca
Hoping to earn enough money to go to college, DeLuca borrowed $1,000 from a family friend and opened his first sub shop in 1965. Though he struggled for a few years, he did pay his way through college. After graduation, DeLuca jumped on the franchising boon in the fast... View Details
Keywords: Food & Tobacco
- 2008
- Working Paper
Stability and Nash Implementation in Matching Markets with Couples
By: Claus-Jochen Haake and Bettina-Elisabeth Klaus
We consider two-sided matching markets with couples. First, we extend a result by Klaus and Klijn (2005, Theorem 3.3) and show that for any weakly responsive couples market there always exists a "double stable" matching, i.e., a matching that is stable for the couples... View Details
Haake, Claus-Jochen, and Bettina-Elisabeth Klaus. "Stability and Nash Implementation in Matching Markets with Couples." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 09-017, August 2008.
- 2014
- Working Paper
Hidden Substitutes
By: John William Hatfield and Scott Duke Kominers
In this paper, we show that preferences exhibiting some forms of complementarity
in fact have an underlying substitutable structure. Specifically, we show that some
preferences that are not substitutable in the setting of many-to-one matching with
contracts become... View Details
Keywords: Many-to-One Matching; Many-to-Many Matching; Stability; Substitutes; Matching With Contracts; Slot-Specific Priorities; Sherlock; Market Design; Contracts; Marketplace Matching; Balance and Stability
Hatfield, John William, and Scott Duke Kominers. "Hidden Substitutes." Working Paper, September 2014.
- 01 Nov 2013
- News
Selling Crafts with a Story
turned into Brika.com, an online marketplace featuring everything from handmade tea towels and dishes to tote bags and "Mr. T" onesies for baby. Brika, which takes its name from the Spanish word for factory, fabricá (they just loved the... View Details