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(852)
- News (220)
- Research (548)
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- Faculty Publications (361)
Show Results For
- All HBS Web
(852)
- News (220)
- Research (548)
- Events (7)
- Multimedia (10)
- Faculty Publications (361)
- May 2014
- Article
Investment Incentives in Labor Market Matching
By: John William Hatfield, Fuhito Kojima and Scott Duke Kominers
We provide an illustration of how the design of labor market clearing mechanisms can affect incentives for human capital acquisition. Specifically, we extend the labor market matching model (with discrete transfers) of Kelso and Crawford (1982) to incorporate the... View Details
Hatfield, John William, Fuhito Kojima, and Scott Duke Kominers. "Investment Incentives in Labor Market Matching." American Economic Review: Papers and Proceedings 104, no. 5 (May 2014): 436–441.
- Article
Strategy-Proofness of Worker-Optimal Matching with Continuously Transferable Utility
By: Ravi Jagadeesan, Scott Duke Kominers and Ross Rheingans-Yoo
We give a direct proof of one-sided strategy-proofness for worker-firm matching under continuously transferable utility. A new “Lone Wolf” theorem (Jagadeesan et al., 2017) for settings with transferable utility allows us to adapt the method of proving one-sided... View Details
Keywords: Matching; Strategy-proofness; Lone Wolf Theorem; Rural Hospitals Theorem; Mechanism Design; Marketplace Matching
Jagadeesan, Ravi, Scott Duke Kominers, and Ross Rheingans-Yoo. "Strategy-Proofness of Worker-Optimal Matching with Continuously Transferable Utility." Games and Economic Behavior 108 (March 2018): 287–294.
- Article
Lone Wolves in Infinite, Discrete Matching Markets
By: Ravi Jagadeesan
In finite two-sided matching markets, the Lone Wolf Theorem guarantees that the same set of agents remains unmatched in all stable outcomes. I show by example that this assertion is not true in infinite, discrete markets. However, despite the fact that the Lone Wolf... View Details
Jagadeesan, Ravi. "Lone Wolves in Infinite, Discrete Matching Markets." Games and Economic Behavior 108 (March 2018): 275–286.
- 19 Mar 2018
- Working Paper Summaries
Lone Wolves in Competitive Equilibria
- 2017
- Working Paper
Lone Wolves in Competitive Equilibria
By: Ravi Jagadeesan, Scott Duke Kominers and Ross Rheingans-Yoo
This paper develops a class of equilibrium-independent predictions of competitive equilibrium with indivisibilities. Specifically, we prove an analogue of the “Lone Wolf Theorem” of classical matching theory, showing that when utility is perfectly transferable, any... View Details
Jagadeesan, Ravi, Scott Duke Kominers, and Ross Rheingans-Yoo. "Lone Wolves in Competitive Equilibria." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 18-055, January 2018.
- 2008
- Working Paper
Competition and Resource Sensitivity in Marriage and Roommate Markets
By: Bettina-Elisabeth Klaus
We consider one-to-one matching markets in which agents can either be matched as pairs or remain single. In these so-called roommate markets agents are consumers and resources at the same time. We investigate two new properties that capture the effect a newcomer has on... View Details
Klaus, Bettina-Elisabeth. "Competition and Resource Sensitivity in Marriage and Roommate Markets." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 09-072, December 2008.
- 2008
- Working Paper
'Fair Marriages:' An Impossibility
By: Bettina-Elisabeth Klaus
For the classical marriage model (introduced in Gale and Shapley, 1962) efficiency and envy-freeness are not always compatible, i.e., fair matchings do not always exist. However, for many allocation of indivisible goods models (see Velez, 2008, and references therein),... View Details
Klaus, Bettina-Elisabeth. "'Fair Marriages:' An Impossibility." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 09-053, October 2008.
- September 2019
- Article
Optimizing Reserves in School Choice: A Dynamic Programming Approach
By: Franklyn Wang, Ravi Jagadeesan and Scott Duke Kominers
We introduce a new model of school choice with reserves in which a social planner is constrained by a limited supply of reserve seats and tries to find an optimal matching according to a social welfare function. We construct the optimal distribution of reserves via a... View Details
Wang, Franklyn, Ravi Jagadeesan, and Scott Duke Kominers. "Optimizing Reserves in School Choice: A Dynamic Programming Approach." Operations Research Letters 47, no. 5 (September 2019): 438–446.
- Article
Landing the First Job: The Value of Intermediaries in Online Hiring
By: Christopher Stanton and Catherine Thomas
Online markets for remote labor services allow workers and firms to contract with each other directly. Despite this, intermediaries—called outsourcing agencies—have emerged in these markets. This paper shows that agencies signal to employers that inexperienced workers... View Details
Stanton, Christopher, and Catherine Thomas. "Landing the First Job: The Value of Intermediaries in Online Hiring." Review of Economic Studies 83, no. 2 (April 2016): 810–854.
- December 2019
- Article
Costly Concessions: An Empirical Framework for Matching with Imperfectly Transferable Utility
By: Alfred Galichon, Scott Duke Kominers and Simon Weber
We introduce an empirical framework for models of matching with imperfectly transferable utility and unobserved heterogeneity in tastes. Our framework allows us to characterize matching equilibrium in a flexible way that includes as special cases the classic fully- and... View Details
Keywords: Sorting; Matching; Marriage Market; Intrahousehold Allocation; Imperfectly Transferable Utility; Marketplace Matching; Mathematical Methods
Galichon, Alfred, Scott Duke Kominers, and Simon Weber. "Costly Concessions: An Empirical Framework for Matching with Imperfectly Transferable Utility." Journal of Political Economy 127, no. 6 (December 2019): 2875–2925.
- 2009
- Chapter
The Effects of a Central Clearinghouse on Job Placement, Wages, and Hiring Practices
By: Muriel Niederle and Alvin E. Roth
New gastroenterologists participated in a labor market clearinghouse (a "match") from 1986 through the late 1990s, after which the match was abandoned. This provides an opportunity to study the effects of a match by observing the differences in the outcomes and... View Details
Niederle, Muriel, and Alvin E. Roth. "The Effects of a Central Clearinghouse on Job Placement, Wages, and Hiring Practices." In Studies of Labor Market Intermediation, edited by David H. Autor, 273–306. University of Chicago Press, 2009.
- 2009
- Working Paper
Unraveling Results from Comparable Demand and Supply: An Experimental Investigation
By: Muriel Niederle, Alvin E. Roth and M. Utku Unver
Markets sometimes unravel, with offers becoming inefficiently early. Often this is attributed to competition arising from an imbalance of demand and supply, typically excess demand for workers. However this presents a puzzle, since unraveling can only occur when firms... View Details
Niederle, Muriel, Alvin E. Roth, and M. Utku Unver. "Unraveling Results from Comparable Demand and Supply: An Experimental Investigation." NBER Working Paper Series, No. 15006, May 2009.
- 2021
- Working Paper
Deep Learning for Two-Sided Matching
By: Sai Srivatsa Ravindranatha, Zhe Feng, Shira Li, Jonathan Ma, Scott Duke Kominers and David Parkes
We initiate the use of a multi-layer neural network to model two-sided matching and to explore the design space between strategy-proofness and stability. It is well known that both properties cannot be achieved simultaneously but the efficient frontier in this design... View Details
Keywords: Strategy-proofness; Deep Learning; Two-Sided Platforms; Marketplace Matching; Balance and Stability
Srivatsa Ravindranatha, Sai, Zhe Feng, Shira Li, Jonathan Ma, Scott Duke Kominers, and David Parkes. "Deep Learning for Two-Sided Matching." Working Paper, July 2021.
- 2008
- Working Paper
Stable Many-to-Many Matchings with Contracts
By: Bettina-Elisabeth Klaus and Markus Walzl
We consider several notions of setwise stability for many-to-many matching markets with contracts and provide an analysis of the relations between the resulting sets of stable allocations for general, substitutable, and strongly substitutable preferences. Apart from... View Details
Klaus, Bettina-Elisabeth, and Markus Walzl. "Stable Many-to-Many Matchings with Contracts." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 09-046, September 2008.
- 2009
- Working Paper
Smith and Rawls Share a Room: Stability and Medians
By: Bettina-Elisabeth Klaus and Flip Klijn
We consider one-to-one, one-sided matching (roommate) problems in which agents can either be matched as pairs or remain single. We introduce a so-called bi-choice graph for each pair of stable matchings and characterize its structure. Exploiting this structure we... View Details
Keywords: Fairness; One-Sided Platforms; Two-Sided Platforms; Marketplace Matching; Mathematical Methods; Balance and Stability
Klaus, Bettina-Elisabeth, and Flip Klijn. "Smith and Rawls Share a Room: Stability and Medians." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 09-111, March 2009.
- 2008
- Chapter
Matching and Market Design
By: Muriel Niederle, Alvin E. Roth and Tayfun Sonmez
Matching is the part of economics concerned with who transacts with whom and how. Models of matching, starting with the Gale-Shapley deferred acceptance algorithm, have been particularly useful in studying labour markets and in helping design clearinghouses to fix... View Details
- June 1993 (Revised July 1996)
- Case
Bajaj Auto Ltd.
By: John A. Quelch
Bajaj Auto Ltd., the world's second-largest manufacturer of two- and three-wheeler vehicles, is facing increasing competition in its domestic Indian market. The case evaluates appropriate marketing responses both in the Indian market and export markets. View Details
Keywords: Competition; Marketplace Matching; Product Development; Product Marketing; Transportation Industry; Manufacturing Industry; Auto Industry; India
Quelch, John A. "Bajaj Auto Ltd." Harvard Business School Case 593-097, June 1993. (Revised July 1996.)
- May 2021
- Article
Stability, Strategy-Proofness, and Cumulative Offer Mechanisms
By: John William Hatfield, Scott Duke Kominers and Alexander Westkamp
We consider the setting of many-to-one matching with contracts, where firms may demand multiple contracts, but each worker desires at most one contract. We introduce three novel conditions—observable substitutability, observable size monotonicity, and... View Details
Keywords: Matching With Contracts; Stability; Strategy-proofness; Substitutability; Size Monotonicity; Cumulative Offer Mechanism; Marketplace Matching; Balance and Stability
Hatfield, John William, Scott Duke Kominers, and Alexander Westkamp. "Stability, Strategy-Proofness, and Cumulative Offer Mechanisms." Review of Economic Studies 88, no. 3 (May 2021): 1457–1502.
- Article
Testing Substitutability
By: John William Hatfield, Nicole Immorlica and Scott Duke Kominers
We provide an algorithm for testing the substitutability of a length-N preference relation over a set of contracts X in time O(|X|3⋅N3). Access to the preference relation is essential for this result: We show that a substitutability-testing algorithm with access only... View Details
Keywords: Substitutability; Matching; Communication Complexity; Preference Elicitation; Marketplace Matching; Communication; Mathematical Methods; Economics
Hatfield, John William, Nicole Immorlica, and Scott Duke Kominers. "Testing Substitutability." Games and Economic Behavior 75, no. 2 (July 2012): 639–645.