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August 2020
Article

Lone Wolves in Competitive Equilibria

By: Ravi Jagadeesan, Scott Duke Kominers and Ross Rheingans-Yoo

This paper develops a class of equilibrium-independent predictions of competitive equilibrium with indivisibilities. Specifically, we prove an analogue of the “Lone Wolf Theorem” of classical matching theory, showing that when utility is perfectly transferable, any... View Details

Keywords: Indivisibilities; Matching; Lone Wolf Theorem; Marketplace Matching; Theory

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13 May 2009
News

Stores adapt to a whole new shopper

December 2019
Article

Costly Concessions: An Empirical Framework for Matching with Imperfectly Transferable Utility

By: Alfred Galichon, Scott Duke Kominers and Simon Weber

We introduce an empirical framework for models of matching with imperfectly transferable utility and unobserved heterogeneity in tastes. Our framework allows us to characterize matching equilibrium in a flexible way that includes as special cases the classic fully- and... View Details

Keywords: Sorting; Matching; Marriage Market; Intrahousehold Allocation; Imperfectly Transferable Utility; Marketplace Matching; Mathematical Methods

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Person Page

Press / Media

By: Karim R. Lakhani

Can America Invent Its Way Back?

BusinessWeek, by Michael Mandel, 12 Sept. 2008

Today, researchers are focusing on ways to make those... View Details

May 2021
Article

Stability, Strategy-Proofness, and Cumulative Offer Mechanisms

By: John William Hatfield, Scott Duke Kominers and Alexander Westkamp

We consider the setting of many-to-one matching with contracts, where firms may demand multiple contracts, but each worker desires at most one contract. We introduce three novel conditions—observable substitutability, observable size monotonicity, and... View Details

Keywords: Matching With Contracts; Stability; Strategy-proofness; Substitutability; Size Monotonicity; Cumulative Offer Mechanism; Marketplace Matching; Balance and Stability

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Article

Strategy-Proofness of Worker-Optimal Matching with Continuously Transferable Utility

By: Ravi Jagadeesan, Scott Duke Kominers and Ross Rheingans-Yoo

We give a direct proof of one-sided strategy-proofness for worker-firm matching under continuously transferable utility. A new “Lone Wolf” theorem (Jagadeesan et al., 2017) for settings with transferable utility allows us to adapt the method of proving one-sided... View Details

Keywords: Matching; Strategy-proofness; Lone Wolf Theorem; Rural Hospitals Theorem; Mechanism Design; Marketplace Matching

2008
Working Paper

Unravelling in Two-Sided Matching Markets and Similarity of Preferences

By: Hanna Halaburda

This paper investigates the causes and welfare consequences of unravelling in two-sided matching markets. It shows that similarity of preferences is an important factor driving unravelling. In particular, it shows that under the ex-post stable mechanism (the mechanism... View Details

Keywords: Market Participation; Two-Sided Platforms; Marketplace Matching; Mathematical Methods

19 Mar 2018
Working Paper Summaries

Lone Wolves in Competitive Equilibria

Keywords: by Ravi Jagadeesan, Scott Duke Kominers, and Ross Rheingans-Yoo

2017
Working Paper

Lone Wolves in Competitive Equilibria

By: Ravi Jagadeesan, Scott Duke Kominers and Ross Rheingans-Yoo

This paper develops a class of equilibrium-independent predictions of competitive equilibrium with indivisibilities. Specifically, we prove an analogue of the “Lone Wolf Theorem” of classical matching theory, showing that when utility is perfectly transferable, any... View Details

Keywords: Indivisibilities; Matching; Lone Wolf Theorem; Marketplace Matching; Theory

May 2014
Article

Investment Incentives in Labor Market Matching

By: John William Hatfield, Fuhito Kojima and Scott Duke Kominers

We provide an illustration of how the design of labor market clearing mechanisms can affect incentives for human capital acquisition. Specifically, we extend the labor market matching model (with discrete transfers) of Kelso and Crawford (1982) to incorporate the... View Details

Keywords: Human Capital; Marketplace Matching

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2008
Working Paper

Competition and Resource Sensitivity in Marriage and Roommate Markets

By: Bettina-Elisabeth Klaus

We consider one-to-one matching markets in which agents can either be matched as pairs or remain single. In these so-called roommate markets agents are consumers and resources at the same time. We investigate two new properties that capture the effect a newcomer has on... View Details

Keywords: Competition; Marketplace Matching

2010
Working Paper

Unraveling Results from Comparable Demand and Supply: An Experimental Investigation

By: Muriel Niederle, Alvin E. Roth and M. Utku Unver

Markets sometimes unravel, with offers becoming inefficiently early. Often this is attributed to competition arising from an imbalance of demand and supply, typically excess demand for workers. However this presents a puzzle, since unraveling can only occur when firms... View Details

Keywords: Labor; Marketplace Matching; Quality; Competition; Balance and Stability

2008
Working Paper

'Fair Marriages:' An Impossibility

By: Bettina-Elisabeth Klaus

For the classical marriage model (introduced in Gale and Shapley, 1962) efficiency and envy-freeness are not always compatible, i.e., fair matchings do not always exist. However, for many allocation of indivisible goods models (see Velez, 2008, and references therein),... View Details

Keywords: Marketplace Matching; Fairness

2015
Working Paper

Stability, Strategy-Proofness, and Cumulative Offer Mechanisms

By: John William Hatfield, Scott Duke Kominers and Alexander Westkamp

We consider the setting of many-to-one matching with contracts, where firms may demand multiple contracts but each worker desires at most one contract. We introduce three novel conditions—observable substitutability, observable size monotonicity,... View Details

Keywords: Matching With Contracts; Stability; Strategy-proofness; Substitutability; Size Monotonicity; Cumulative Offer Mechanism; Contracts; Market Design; Marketplace Matching; Balance and Stability

1990
Chapter

Two-Sided Matching Markets: An Overview of Some Theory and Empirical Evidence

Keywords: Marketplace Matching; Two-Sided Platforms; Mathematical Methods

September 2019
Article

Optimizing Reserves in School Choice: A Dynamic Programming Approach

By: Franklyn Wang, Ravi Jagadeesan and Scott Duke Kominers

We introduce a new model of school choice with reserves in which a social planner is constrained by a limited supply of reserve seats and tries to find an optimal matching according to a social welfare function. We construct the optimal distribution of reserves via a... View Details

Keywords: Matching; Reserves; Dynamic Programming; Marketplace Matching; Mathematical Methods

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Article

Landing the First Job: The Value of Intermediaries in Online Hiring

By: Christopher Stanton and Catherine Thomas

Online markets for remote labor services allow workers and firms to contract with each other directly. Despite this, intermediaries—called outsourcing agencies—have emerged in these markets. This paper shows that agencies signal to employers that inexperienced workers... View Details

Keywords: Marketplace Matching; Agency Theory

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June 2023
Exercise

Clash of Two Giants Simulation Exercise Instructions

By: Feng Zhu and Marco Iansiti

Many markets are organized around platforms that connect consumers with complimentary applications and services. These platforms are two-sided because both sides - consumers and those providing applications or services - need access to the same platform to interact. A... View Details

Keywords: Platform Strategies; Technology Platform; Customer Acquisition; Network Effects; Digital Platforms; Marketplace Matching; Strategy

2021
Working Paper

Deep Learning for Two-Sided Matching

By: Sai Srivatsa Ravindranatha, Zhe Feng, Shira Li, Jonathan Ma, Scott Duke Kominers and David Parkes

We initiate the use of a multi-layer neural network to model two-sided matching and to explore the design space between strategy-proofness and stability. It is well known that both properties cannot be achieved simultaneously but the efficient frontier in this design... View Details

Keywords: Strategy-proofness; Deep Learning; Two-Sided Platforms; Marketplace Matching; Balance and Stability

01 Oct 1998
News

A Business World Gone Global

Today, even small firms dare to think globally and invest accordingly - closing deals in Dubai has become almost as commonplace as doing business in Dubuque, thanks to quantum leaps in travel and transport, geopolitics, and communications. With the new global View Details

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