Filter Results:
(64)
Show Results For
- All HBS Web (87)
- Faculty Publications (35)
Show Results For
- All HBS Web (87)
- Faculty Publications (35)
Sort by
- Research Summary
'Optimal Incentive Contracts under Inequity Aversion' (with Achim Wambach) ), 2005
We analyze the Moral Hazard problem, assuming that the agent is inequity averse. Our results differ from conventional contract theory and are more in line with empirical findings than these standard results. Our key findings are: Inequity aversion alters the structure... View Details
- September–October 2013
- Article
The Role of Organizational Scope and Governance in Strengthening Private Monitoring
By: Lamar Pierce and Michael W. Toffel
Governments and other organizations often outsource activities to achieve cost savings from market competition. Yet such benefits are often accompanied by poor quality resulting from moral hazard, which can be particularly onerous when outsourcing the monitoring and... View Details
Keywords: Crime and Corruption; Decision Choices and Conditions; Corporate Accountability; Governance Compliance; Policy; Management Practices and Processes; Demand and Consumers; Market Design; Market Entry and Exit; Market Transactions; Service Delivery; Service Operations; Business Processes; Organizational Structure; Performance Effectiveness; Performance Expectations; Practice; Transportation; Transportation Industry; Service Industry; United States; New York (state, US)
Pierce, Lamar, and Michael W. Toffel. "The Role of Organizational Scope and Governance in Strengthening Private Monitoring." Organization Science 24, no. 5 (September–October 2013): 1558–1584. (Winner of the NBS Research Impact on Practice Award from the Academy of Management (AOM) and Network for Business Sustainability (NBS))
- December 2024
- Article
Are Bankruptcy Professional Fees Excessively High?
By: Samuel Antill
Chapter 7 is the most popular bankruptcy system for U.S. firms and individuals. Chapter 7 professional fees are substantial. Theoretically, high fees might be an unavoidable cost of incentivizing professionals. I test this empirically. I study trustees, the most... View Details
Antill, Samuel. "Are Bankruptcy Professional Fees Excessively High?" Review of Financial Studies 37, no. 12 (December 2024): 3595–3647. (RFS Rising Scholar Best Paper Award; Lead Article and Editor's Choice.)
- Article
Household Bargaining and Excess Fertility: An Experimental Study in Zambia
By: Nava Ashraf, Erica Field and Jean Lee
We posit that household decision-making over fertility is characterized by moral hazard due to the fact that most contraception can only be perfectly observed by the woman. Using an experiment in Zambia that varied whether women were given access to contraceptives... View Details
Ashraf, Nava, Erica Field, and Jean Lee. "Household Bargaining and Excess Fertility: An Experimental Study in Zambia." American Economic Review 104, no. 7 (July 2014). (Online Appendix.)
- 2013
- Other Unpublished Work
Household Bargaining and Excess Fertility: An Experimental Study in Zambia
By: Nava Ashraf, Erica Field and Jean Lee
We posit that household decision-making over fertility is characterized by moral hazard due to the fact that most contraception can only be perfectly observed by the woman. Using an experiment in Zambia that varied whether women were given access to contraceptives... View Details
Ashraf, Nava, Erica Field, and Jean Lee. "Household Bargaining and Excess Fertility: An Experimental Study in Zambia." September 2013. (2nd revision resubmitted, American Economic Review.)
- April 2011
- Article
Ownership Structure and the Cost of Corporate Borrowing
By: Chen Lin, Yue Ma, Paul Malatesta and Yuhai Xuan
This article identifies an important channel through which excess control rights affect firm value. Using a new, hand-collected data set on corporate ownership and control of 3,468 firms in 22 countries during the 1996-2008 period, we find that the cost of debt... View Details
Keywords: Borrowing and Debt; Cash Flow; Cost; Financing and Loans; Governance Controls; Ownership Stake; Business and Shareholder Relations
Lin, Chen, Yue Ma, Paul Malatesta, and Yuhai Xuan. "Ownership Structure and the Cost of Corporate Borrowing." Journal of Financial Economics 100, no. 1 (April 2011): 1–23. (Lead Article. First Place Winner of the 2011 Jensen Prize for the Best Paper in the Areas of Corporate Finance and Organizations published in the Journal of Financial Economics.)
- 2010
- Working Paper
Agency Revisited
By: Ramon Casadesus-Masanell and Daniel F. Spulber
The article presents a comprehensive overview of the principal-agent model that emphasizes the role of trust in the agency relationship. The analysis demonstrates that the legal remedy for breach of duty can result in a full-information efficient outcome eliminating... View Details
Casadesus-Masanell, Ramon, and Daniel F. Spulber. "Agency Revisited." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 10-082, March 2010.
- Research Summary
Physician vs. Patient Incentives in Prescription Drug Choice
The market for medical care involves interactions among patients, providers, and the insurers who pay for the care of their enrollees. The division of responsibilities creates scope for agency costs and moral hazard in the physician's treatment choice.... View Details
- 2024
- Working Paper
FinTech & Financial Frictions: The Rise of Revenue-Based Financing
We use data from a major South African payment processor to study how digital payments mitigate asymmetric information challenges in small business “revenue-based financing” contracts, which tie repayment schedules to future revenue. Eight months post-financing,... View Details
Russel, Dominic, Claire Shi, and Rowan Clarke. "FinTech & Financial Frictions: The Rise of Revenue-Based Financing." SSRN Working Paper Series, July 2024.
- Research Summary
Crises and Capital Requirements in Banking
previously entitled: The Role of Capital Adequacy Requirements in Sound Banking Systems
Joint work with Alan Morrison, Saïd Business School, Oxford.
We analyse a... View Details
- 2009
- Working Paper
An Ounce of Prevention: The Power of Public Risk Management in Stabilizing the Financial System
By: David A. Moss
The magnitude of the current financial crisis reflects the failure of an economic and regulatory philosophy that had proved increasingly influential in policy circles over the past three decades.
This paper suggests (1) that contrary to the prevailing wisdom,... View Details
Keywords: Financial Crisis; Financial Institutions; Governing Rules, Regulations, and Reforms; Risk Management; Business and Government Relations; Balance and Stability
Moss, David A. "An Ounce of Prevention: The Power of Public Risk Management in Stabilizing the Financial System." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 09-087, January 2009.
- Research Summary
Level Playing Fields in International Financial Regulation
Joint work with Alan Morrison, Saïd Business School, Oxford.
We study a model of featuring two economies with adverse selection of and moral hazard by bankers. We demonstrate... View Details
- 10 Feb 2009
- First Look
First Look: February 10, 2009
passes. Based on this analysis, one major step that is necessary now to help ensure financial stability in the future is to identify and regulate "systemically significant" institutions on an ongoing basis, rather than simply in the heat of a crisis. To guard... View Details
Keywords: Martha Lagace
- August 2014
- Article
Incentives in a Stage-Gate Process
By: Raul O. Chao, Kenneth C. Lichtendahl and Yael Grushka-Cockayne
Many large organizations use a stage‐gate process to manage new product development projects. In a typical stage‐gate process project managers learn about potential ideas from research and exert effort in development while senior executives make intervening go/no‐go... View Details
Chao, Raul O., Kenneth C. Lichtendahl, and Yael Grushka-Cockayne. "Incentives in a Stage-Gate Process." Production and Operations Management 23, no. 8 (August 2014): 1286–1298.
- 04 May 2009
- Working Paper Summaries
An Ounce of Prevention: The Power of Public Risk Management in Stabilizing the Financial System
- 2016
- Working Paper
Controlling Versus Enabling — Online Appendix
By: Andrei Hagiu and Julian Wright
Section 1 of this online appendix contains the proof of the technical Lemma (Lemma 2) used in the Proof of Lemma 1 in the main paper, which states that Ω* (.) is continuous and differentiable at R*. Section 2 provides the linear example with cost differences between... View Details
Hagiu, Andrei, and Julian Wright. "Controlling Versus Enabling — Online Appendix." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 16-004, July 2015. (Revised July 2016.)
- 16 Sep 2008
- First Look
First Look: September 16, 2008
design changes. It describes trade-offs associated with several major policy decisions, including whether to hold firms physically or financially responsible for the recovery of their products, when to impose recycling fees, whether to include disposal and View Details
- 18 Jun 2013
- First Look
First Look: June 18
Publications 2006 Emotion Review The Power of the Cognition/Emotion Distinction for Morality By: Bazerman, Max H., Francesca Gino, Lisa L. Shu, and Chia-Jung Tsay Abstract—No abstract available. Publisher's link:... View Details
Keywords: Anna Secino
- 24 Feb 2021
- Lessons from the Classroom
What History's Biggest Wars Teach Us About Leading in Peace
a cataclysmic war. Consider a conflict from an opponent’s viewpoint The wars Malhotra examines in his “War & Peace” course illustrate the hazards of drawing lessons from too few salient experiences, of failing to properly diagnose the... View Details
Keywords: by Lane Lambert
- 06 Aug 2019
- Cold Call Podcast
Super Bowl Ads Sell Products, but Do They Sell Brands?
some conflict or challenge that they overcome, and you have to have a moral of the story, like what's the message we're trying to convey? That's actually surprisingly easy to do in 30 or 60 seconds. Some people, obviously, are better at... View Details