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- All HBS Web (85)
- Faculty Publications (35)
Show Results For
- All HBS Web (85)
- Faculty Publications (35)
- March 1994
- Case
Fremont Financial Corporation (B)
Fremont has a third option to finance its loan portfolio, which involves securitizing and selling the small-business loans into the capital markets. Emphasizes asymmetric information and moral hazard problems involved in designing an asset securitization. When used in... View Details
Sirri, Erik R., and Ann Zeitung. "Fremont Financial Corporation (B)." Harvard Business School Case 294-099, March 1994.
- March 1994
- Case
Fremont Financial Corporation (A)
Fremont Financial is an asset-based lender to middle-market companies. This case considers two options for Fremont to raise capital to finance its loan portfolio. Fremont can: 1) extend its existing bank line of credit, or 2) issue commercial paper through a special... View Details
Sirri, Erik R., and Ann Zeitung. "Fremont Financial Corporation (A)." Harvard Business School Case 294-098, March 1994.
- February 1994
- Case
Fremont Financial Corporation
Fremont Financial is an asset-based lender to middle-market companies. The firm has three options to raise capital to finance its loan portfolio. Fremont can (1) extend its existing bank line of credit, (2) issue commercial paper through a special purpose-conduit, or... View Details
Sirri, Erik R., and Ann Zeitung. "Fremont Financial Corporation." Harvard Business School Case 294-054, February 1994.
- Research Summary
Optimal Contracts under Inequity Aversion with Voluntary Enforcement (with Tilman Borgers)
We analyze contract structure and efficiency in a Moral Hazard model with possibly fairminded agent and principal when the contract is not automatically enforced but this is a voluntary choice by the contracting parties independently. We find that no penalizing... View Details
- 21 Sep 2017
- HBS Seminar
Nicholas Argyres, Washington University in St Louis
- September–October 2013
- Article
The Role of Organizational Scope and Governance in Strengthening Private Monitoring
By: Lamar Pierce and Michael W. Toffel
Governments and other organizations often outsource activities to achieve cost savings from market competition. Yet such benefits are often accompanied by poor quality resulting from moral hazard, which can be particularly onerous when outsourcing the monitoring and... View Details
Keywords: Crime and Corruption; Decision Choices and Conditions; Corporate Accountability; Governance Compliance; Policy; Management Practices and Processes; Demand and Consumers; Market Design; Market Entry and Exit; Market Transactions; Service Delivery; Service Operations; Business Processes; Organizational Structure; Performance Effectiveness; Performance Expectations; Practice; Transportation; Transportation Industry; Service Industry; United States; New York (state, US)
Pierce, Lamar, and Michael W. Toffel. "The Role of Organizational Scope and Governance in Strengthening Private Monitoring." Organization Science 24, no. 5 (September–October 2013): 1558–1584. (Winner of the NBS Research Impact on Practice Award from the Academy of Management (AOM) and Network for Business Sustainability (NBS))
- 07 Oct 2015
- HBS Seminar
Florian Ederer, Assistant Professor of Economics, Yale School of Management
- Research Summary
'Optimal Incentive Contracts under Inequity Aversion' (with Achim Wambach) ), 2005
We analyze the Moral Hazard problem, assuming that the agent is inequity averse. Our results differ from conventional contract theory and are more in line with empirical findings than these standard results. Our key findings are: Inequity aversion alters the structure... View Details
- December 2024
- Article
Are Bankruptcy Professional Fees Excessively High?
By: Samuel Antill
Chapter 7 is the most popular bankruptcy system for U.S. firms and individuals. Chapter 7 professional fees are substantial. Theoretically, high fees might be an unavoidable cost of incentivizing professionals. I test this empirically. I study trustees, the most... View Details
Antill, Samuel. "Are Bankruptcy Professional Fees Excessively High?" Review of Financial Studies 37, no. 12 (December 2024): 3595–3647. (RFS Rising Scholar Best Paper Award; Lead Article and Editor's Choice.)
- Article
Household Bargaining and Excess Fertility: An Experimental Study in Zambia
By: Nava Ashraf, Erica Field and Jean Lee
We posit that household decision-making over fertility is characterized by moral hazard due to the fact that most contraception can only be perfectly observed by the woman. Using an experiment in Zambia that varied whether women were given access to contraceptives... View Details
Ashraf, Nava, Erica Field, and Jean Lee. "Household Bargaining and Excess Fertility: An Experimental Study in Zambia." American Economic Review 104, no. 7 (July 2014). (Online Appendix.)
- 2013
- Other Unpublished Work
Household Bargaining and Excess Fertility: An Experimental Study in Zambia
By: Nava Ashraf, Erica Field and Jean Lee
We posit that household decision-making over fertility is characterized by moral hazard due to the fact that most contraception can only be perfectly observed by the woman. Using an experiment in Zambia that varied whether women were given access to contraceptives... View Details
Ashraf, Nava, Erica Field, and Jean Lee. "Household Bargaining and Excess Fertility: An Experimental Study in Zambia." September 2013. (2nd revision resubmitted, American Economic Review.)
- April 2011
- Article
Ownership Structure and the Cost of Corporate Borrowing
By: Chen Lin, Yue Ma, Paul Malatesta and Yuhai Xuan
This article identifies an important channel through which excess control rights affect firm value. Using a new, hand-collected data set on corporate ownership and control of 3,468 firms in 22 countries during the 1996-2008 period, we find that the cost of debt... View Details
Keywords: Borrowing and Debt; Cash Flow; Cost; Financing and Loans; Governance Controls; Ownership Stake; Business and Shareholder Relations
Lin, Chen, Yue Ma, Paul Malatesta, and Yuhai Xuan. "Ownership Structure and the Cost of Corporate Borrowing." Journal of Financial Economics 100, no. 1 (April 2011): 1–23. (Lead Article. First Place Winner of the 2011 Jensen Prize for the Best Paper in the Areas of Corporate Finance and Organizations published in the Journal of Financial Economics.)
- 2010
- Working Paper
Agency Revisited
By: Ramon Casadesus-Masanell and Daniel F. Spulber
The article presents a comprehensive overview of the principal-agent model that emphasizes the role of trust in the agency relationship. The analysis demonstrates that the legal remedy for breach of duty can result in a full-information efficient outcome eliminating... View Details
Casadesus-Masanell, Ramon, and Daniel F. Spulber. "Agency Revisited." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 10-082, March 2010.
- 2024
- Working Paper
FinTech & Financial Frictions: The Rise of Revenue-Based Financing
We use data from a major South African payment processor to study how digital payments mitigate asymmetric information challenges in small business “revenue-based financing” contracts, which tie repayment schedules to future revenue. Eight months post-financing,... View Details
Russel, Dominic, Claire Shi, and Rowan Clarke. "FinTech & Financial Frictions: The Rise of Revenue-Based Financing." SSRN Working Paper Series, July 2024.
- Research Summary
Physician vs. Patient Incentives in Prescription Drug Choice
The market for medical care involves interactions among patients, providers, and the insurers who pay for the care of their enrollees. The division of responsibilities creates scope for agency costs and moral hazard in the physician's treatment choice.... View Details
- Research Summary
Crises and Capital Requirements in Banking
previously entitled: The Role of Capital Adequacy Requirements in Sound Banking Systems
Joint work with Alan Morrison, Saïd Business School, Oxford.
We analyse a... View Details
- 2009
- Working Paper
An Ounce of Prevention: The Power of Public Risk Management in Stabilizing the Financial System
By: David A. Moss
The magnitude of the current financial crisis reflects the failure of an economic and regulatory philosophy that had proved increasingly influential in policy circles over the past three decades.
This paper suggests (1) that contrary to the prevailing wisdom,... View Details
Keywords: Financial Crisis; Financial Institutions; Governing Rules, Regulations, and Reforms; Risk Management; Business and Government Relations; Balance and Stability
Moss, David A. "An Ounce of Prevention: The Power of Public Risk Management in Stabilizing the Financial System." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 09-087, January 2009.
- Research Summary
Level Playing Fields in International Financial Regulation
Joint work with Alan Morrison, Saïd Business School, Oxford.
We study a model of featuring two economies with adverse selection of and moral hazard by bankers. We demonstrate... View Details
- 10 Feb 2009
- First Look
First Look: February 10, 2009
passes. Based on this analysis, one major step that is necessary now to help ensure financial stability in the future is to identify and regulate "systemically significant" institutions on an ongoing basis, rather than simply in the heat of a crisis. To guard... View Details
Keywords: Martha Lagace
- August 2014
- Article
Incentives in a Stage-Gate Process
By: Raul O. Chao, Kenneth C. Lichtendahl and Yael Grushka-Cockayne
Many large organizations use a stage‐gate process to manage new product development projects. In a typical stage‐gate process project managers learn about potential ideas from research and exert effort in development while senior executives make intervening go/no‐go... View Details
Chao, Raul O., Kenneth C. Lichtendahl, and Yael Grushka-Cockayne. "Incentives in a Stage-Gate Process." Production and Operations Management 23, no. 8 (August 2014): 1286–1298.