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- Faculty Publications (40)
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- All HBS Web (79)
- Faculty Publications (40)
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- June 2012
- Article
A Reexamination of Tunneling and Business Groups: New Data and New Methods
By: Jordan I. Siegel and Prithwiraj Choudhury
One of the most rigorous methodologies in the corporate governance literature uses firms' reactions to industry shocks to characterize the quality of governance. This methodology can produce the wrong answer unless one considers the ways firms compete. Because... View Details
Keywords: Corporate Governance; Mergers And Acquisitions; Business Economics; Firm Organization; Firm Performance; Groups and Teams; Analytics and Data Science
Siegel, Jordan I., and Prithwiraj Choudhury. "A Reexamination of Tunneling and Business Groups: New Data and New Methods." Review of Financial Studies 25, no. 6 (June 2012): 1763–1798.
- September 2009
- Article
Labor Market Institutions and Global Strategic Adaptation: Evidence from Lincoln Electric
By: Jordan I. Siegel and Barbara Zepp Larson
Although one of the central questions in the global strategy field is how multinational firms successfully navigate multiple and often conflicting institutional environments, we know relatively little about the effect of conflicting labor market institutions on... View Details
Keywords: Institutions; Labor Market; Complementarity; Global Strategy; Multinational Firms and Management; Governing Rules, Regulations, and Reforms; Labor Unions; Laws and Statutes; Operations; Organizational Change and Adaptation; Manufacturing Industry
Siegel, Jordan I., and Barbara Zepp Larson. "Labor Market Institutions and Global Strategic Adaptation: Evidence from Lincoln Electric." Management Science 55, no. 9 (September 2009): 1527–1546. (Although one of the central questions in the global strategy field is how multinational firms successfully navigate multiple and often conflicting institutional environments, we know relatively little about the effect of conflicting labor market institutions on multinational firms' strategic choice and operating performance. With its decision to invest in manufacturing operations in nearly every one of the world's largest welding
markets, Lincoln Electric offers us a quasi-experiment. We leverage a unique data set covering 1996–2006 that combines data on each host country's labor market institutions with data on each subsidiary's strategic choices and historical operating performance. We find that Lincoln Electric performed significantly better in countries with labor laws and regulations supporting manufacturers' interests and in countries that allowed the free
use of both piecework and a discretionary bonus. Furthermore, we find that in countries with labor market institutions unfriendly to manufacturers, Lincoln Electric was still able to overcome most (although not all) of the institutional distance by what we term flexible intermediate adaptation.)
- September 2011
- Article
Political Instability: Effects on Financial Development, Roots in the Severity of Economic Inequality
By: Mark J. Roe and Jordan I. Siegel
We here bring forward strong evidence that political instability impedes financial development, with its variation a primary determinant of differences in financial development around the world. As such, it needs to be added to the short list of major determinants of... View Details
Keywords: Financial Development; Political Instability; Government and Politics; Finance; Growth and Development; Economics; Equality and Inequality
Roe, Mark J., and Jordan I. Siegel. "Political Instability: Effects on Financial Development, Roots in the Severity of Economic Inequality." Journal of Comparative Economics 39, no. 3 (September 2011): 279–309. (We here bring forward strong evidence that political instability impedes financial development, with its variation a primary determinant of differences in financial development around the world. As such, it needs to be added to the short list of major determinants of financial development. First, structural conditions first postulated by
Engerman and Sokoloff (2002) as generating long-term inequality are shown here empirically to be exogenous determinants of political instability. Second, that exogenously-determined political instability in turn holds back financial development, even when we control for factors prominent in the last decade's cross-country studies of
financial development. The findings indicate that inequality-perpetuating conditions that result in political instability are fundamental roadblocks for international organizations like the World Bank that seek to promote financial development. The evidence here includes country fixed effect regressions and an instrumental model inspired by Engerman and Sokoloff's (2002) work, which to our knowledge has not yet been used in finance and which is consistent with current tests as valid instruments. Four conventional measures of national political instability — Alesina and Perotti's (1996) well-known index of instability, a subsequent index derived from Banks' (2005) work,
and two indices of managerial perceptions of nation-by-nation political instability — persistently predict a wide range of national financial development outcomes for recent decades. Political instability's significance is time consistent in cross-sectional regressions back to the 1960's, the period when the key data becomes available, robust
in both country fixed-effects and instrumental variable regressions, and consistent across multiple measures of instability and of financial development. Overall, the results indicate the existence of an important channel running from structural inequality to political instability, principally in nondemocratic settings, and then to financial
backwardness. The robust significance of that channel extends existing work demonstrating the importance of political economy explanations for financial development and financial backwardness. It should help to better understand which policies will work for financial development, because political instability has causes, cures, and effects quite distinct from those of many of the key institutions most studied in the past decade as explaining financial backwardness.)
- June 2012
- Article
A Reexamination of Tunneling and Business Groups: New Data and New Methods
By: Jordan I. Siegel and Prithwiraj Choudhury
One of the most rigorous methodologies in the corporate governance literature uses firms' reactions to industry shocks to characterize the quality of governance. This methodology can produce the wrong answer unless one considers the ways firms compete. Because... View Details
Siegel, Jordan I., and Prithwiraj Choudhury. "A Reexamination of Tunneling and Business Groups: New Data and New Methods." Review of Financial Studies 25, no. 6 (June 2012).
- 04 May 2010
- First Look
First Look: May 4
Reexamination of Tunneling and Business Groups: New Data and New Methods Authors:Jordan I. Siegel and Prithwiraj Choudhury Abstract The last decade of corporate governance research has been focused in large... View Details
Keywords: Martha Lagace
- 07 Apr 2009
- First Look
First Look: April 7, 2009
Lincoln Electric Authors:Jordan I. Siegel and Barbara Zepp Larson Publication:Management Science(forthcoming) Abstract Although one of the central questions in the global strategy field is how multinational... View Details
Keywords: Martha Lagace
- 23 Feb 2011
- First Look
First Look: Feb. 23
unavailable at this time. Publisher's Link: http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/title~db=all~content=t927286744 Political Instability: Effects on Financial Development, Roots in the Severity of Economic Inequality Authors:Mark J. Roe and View Details
Keywords: Sean Silverthorne
- March 2013
- Case
Jazzed Up: A Global Strategy Manga (Graphic Novel)
By: Jordan I. Siegel and Jordan I. Siegel
Siegel, Jordan I. "Jazzed Up: A Global Strategy Manga (Graphic Novel)." Harvard Business School Case 713-514, March 2013.
- September 2009
- Article
Is There a Better Commitment Mechanism than Cross-Listings for Emerging Economy Firms? Evidence from Mexico
By: Jordan I. Siegel
The last decade of work in corporate governance has shown that weak legal institutions at the country level hinder firms in emerging economies from accessing finance and technology affordably. To attract outside resources, these firms must often use external... View Details
Keywords: Commitment; Inter-organizational Relationships; Emerging Markets; Economics; International Political Economy; Economy; Business Ventures; Information; Mexico
Siegel, Jordan I. "Is There a Better Commitment Mechanism than Cross-Listings for Emerging Economy Firms? Evidence from Mexico." Journal of International Business Studies 40, no. 7 (September 2009): 1171–1191. (The last decade of work in corporate governance has shown that weak legal institutions at the country level hinder firms in emerging economies from accessing finance and technology affordably. To attract outside resources, these firms must often use external commitments for repayment. Research suggests that a common commitment mechanism is to borrow US securities laws, which involves listing the emerging economy firm's shares on a US exchange. This paper uses a quasi-natural experiment from Mexico to examine the conditions under which forming a strategic alliance with a foreign multinational firm is actually a superior mechanism for ensuring good corporate governance.)
- 06 Apr 2010
- First Look
First Look: April 6
and Business Groups: New Data and New Methods Authors: Jordan I. Siegel and Prithwiraj Choudhury Abstract The last decade of corporate governance research has been focused in... View Details
Keywords: Martha Lagace
- 23 Apr 2013
- First Look
First Look: April 23
http://hbr.org/2013/04/using-the-crowd-as-an-innovation-partner/ar/1 2006 The Small Worlds of Corporate Governance The Small Worlds of Business Groups: Liberalization and Network Dynamics By: Brookfield, Jon, Sea-Jin Chang, Israel Drori, Shmuel Ellis, Sergio G.... View Details
Keywords: Sean Silverthorne
- March 2013
- Teaching Note
Jazzed Up: A Global Strategy Manga (Graphic Novel) — Instructor Version
By: Jordan I. Siegel
- April 2010
- Teaching Note
Global Talent Management at Novartis (TN)
By: Jordan I. Siegel
Teaching Note for 708486. View Details
- March 2007 (Revised October 2008)
- Teaching Note
Grupo Bimbo (TN)
By: Jordan I. Siegel
Teaching note to 707521. View Details
- February 2007 (Revised January 2009)
- Supplement
Edelnor (B)
By: Jordan I. Siegel
Siegel, Jordan I. "Edelnor (B)." Harvard Business School Supplement 707-530, February 2007. (Revised January 2009.)
- March 2013
- Background Note
Deliberative Democracy and the Case Method
By: Jordan I. Siegel
Siegel, Jordan I. "Deliberative Democracy and the Case Method." Harvard Business School Background Note 713-517, March 2013.
- March 2007 (Revised March 2013)
- Teaching Note
Edelnor (TN) (A) and (B)
By: Jordan I. Siegel
Teaching note to 707473 and 707530. View Details
- November 2010
- Teaching Note
Databank in Africa (TN)
By: Jordan I. Siegel
Teaching Note for 708478. View Details