Siegel, Jordan I. Comment on "The Rise and Fall of the Widely Held Firm: A History of Corporate Ownership in Canada." A History of Corporate Governance around the World: Family Business Groups to Professional Managers, edited by Randall K. Morck. University of Chicago Press, 2006.

Licht, Amir, and Jordan I. Siegel. "The Social Dimensions of Entrepreneurship." In Oxford Handbook of Entrepreneurship, edited by Mark Casson, Bernard Yeung, Anuradha Basu, and Nigel Wadeson. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006.

Siegel, Jordan I., and Lynn Pyun. "Microsoft in Korea." Harvard Business School Case 713-522, April 2013. (Revised November 2013.)

Siegel, Jordan I. "Grupo Bimbo." Harvard Business School Case 707-521, March 2007. (Revised August 2009.)

Siegel, Jordan I. "Edelnor (A)." Harvard Business School Case 707-473, February 2007. (Revised June 2009.)

Siegel, Jordan I., and James Jinho Chang. "Samsung Electronics." Harvard Business School Case 705-508, June 2005. (Revised February 2009.)

Siegel, Jordan I. "Contingent Political Capital and International Alliances: Evidence from South Korea." Administrative Science Quarterly 52, no. 4 (December 2007): 621 – 666. (Though prior research has suggested that a company's ties to political networks have only a positive value or no value, this study examines whether political network ties can also be a significant liability for companies. Analyzing South Korea as a representative emerging economy, I find that being tied through elite sociopolitical networks to the regime in power significantly increased the rate at which South Korean companies formed cross-border strategic alliances, but also that being tied through elite sociopolitical networks to the political enemies of the regime in power significantly decreased that rate. Results show that an unexpected change in political regime could quickly change a political liability into an asset and that network ties continued to be important determinants of cross-border alliance activity as South Korea proceeded with liberalization. The present study sheds further light on the so-called dark side of embeddedness by focusing on who is negatively targeted by having the "wrong friends" at the wrong time. Just as positive ties can lead to favor exchange and other benefits for companies, negative ties can lead companies to be the victims of discrimination, resource exclusion, and even occasional expropriation and sabotage between rival sociopolitical networks.)

Siegel, Jordan I. "Measuring the Value of Political Connections After Liberalization: Some Thoughts on Theoretical Constructs and Improved Research Design." In Global Corporate Evolution: Looking Inward or Looking Outward, edited by Michael A. Trick. Carnegie-Mellon International Management Series. Pittsburgh: Carnegie Mellon University Press, 2004.

Siegel, Jordan I., and Prithwiraj Choudhury. "A Reexamination of Tunneling and Business Groups: New Data and New Methods." Review of Financial Studies 25, no. 6 (June 2012).

Siegel, Jordan I., and Prithwiraj Choudhury. "A Reexamination of Tunneling and Business Groups: New Data and New Methods." Review of Financial Studies 25, no. 6 (June 2012): 1763–1798.

Roe, Mark J., and Jordan I. Siegel. "Political Instability: Effects on Financial Development, Roots in the Severity of Economic Inequality." Journal of Comparative Economics 39, no. 3 (September 2011): 279–309. (We here bring forward strong evidence that political instability impedes financial development, with its variation a primary determinant of differences in financial development around the world. As such, it needs to be added to the short list of major determinants of financial development. First, structural conditions first postulated by Engerman and Sokoloff (2002) as generating long-term inequality are shown here empirically to be exogenous determinants of political instability. Second, that exogenously-determined political instability in turn holds back financial development, even when we control for factors prominent in the last decade's cross-country studies of financial development. The findings indicate that inequality-perpetuating conditions that result in political instability are fundamental roadblocks for international organizations like the World Bank that seek to promote financial development. The evidence here includes country fixed effect regressions and an instrumental model inspired by Engerman and Sokoloff's (2002) work, which to our knowledge has not yet been used in finance and which is consistent with current tests as valid instruments. Four conventional measures of national political instability — Alesina and Perotti's (1996) well-known index of instability, a subsequent index derived from Banks' (2005) work, and two indices of managerial perceptions of nation-by-nation political instability — persistently predict a wide range of national financial development outcomes for recent decades. Political instability's significance is time consistent in cross-sectional regressions back to the 1960's, the period when the key data becomes available, robust in both country fixed-effects and instrumental variable regressions, and consistent across multiple measures of instability and of financial development. Overall, the results indicate the existence of an important channel running from structural inequality to political instability, principally in nondemocratic settings, and then to financial backwardness. The robust significance of that channel extends existing work demonstrating the importance of political economy explanations for financial development and financial backwardness. It should help to better understand which policies will work for financial development, because political instability has causes, cures, and effects quite distinct from those of many of the key institutions most studied in the past decade as explaining financial backwardness.)

Siegel, Jordan I., and Barbara Zepp Larson. "Labor Market Institutions and Global Strategic Adaptation: Evidence from Lincoln Electric." Management Science 55, no. 9 (September 2009): 1527–1546. (Although one of the central questions in the global strategy field is how multinational firms successfully navigate multiple and often conflicting institutional environments, we know relatively little about the effect of conflicting labor market institutions on multinational firms' strategic choice and operating performance. With its decision to invest in manufacturing operations in nearly every one of the world's largest welding markets, Lincoln Electric offers us a quasi-experiment. We leverage a unique data set covering 1996–2006 that combines data on each host country's labor market institutions with data on each subsidiary's strategic choices and historical operating performance. We find that Lincoln Electric performed significantly better in countries with labor laws and regulations supporting manufacturers' interests and in countries that allowed the free use of both piecework and a discretionary bonus. Furthermore, we find that in countries with labor market institutions unfriendly to manufacturers, Lincoln Electric was still able to overcome most (although not all) of the institutional distance by what we term flexible intermediate adaptation.)