Publications

03 Mar 2009
First Look

First Look: March 3, 2009

credulity, and perverse incentives and suspect behavior on the part of issuers, rating agencies, and borrowers. Cross-cultural Research in Organizational Behavior Authors:Heidi K. Gardner and P. Christopher Earley Periodical:In The SAGE... View Details

Keywords: Martha Lagace

2010
Chapter

Deferred Acceptance Algorithms: History, Theory, Practice

The deferred acceptance algorithm proposed by Gale and Shapley (1962) has had a profound influence on market design, both directly, by being adapted into practical matching mechanisms, and indirectly, by raising new theoretical questions. Deferred acceptance algorithms... View Details

Keywords: Labor; Market Design; Marketplace Matching; Failure; Mathematical Methods

March 2008
Article

What Have We Learned from Market Design?

This essay discusses some things we have learned about markets, in the process of designing marketplaces to fix market failures. To work well, marketplaces have to provide thickness, i.e. they need to attract a large enough proportion of the potential participants in... View Details

Keywords: Risk Management; Market Design; Market Participation; Market Transactions; Failure; Safety

2007
Working Paper

The New Market for Federal Judicial Law Clerks

By: Christopher Avery, Christine Jolls, Richard Posner and Alvin E. Roth

In the past, judges have often hired applicants for judicial clerkships as early as the beginning of the second year of law school for positions commencing approximately two years down the road. In the new hiring regime for federal judicial law clerks, by contrast,... View Details

Keywords: Law; Education; Employment; Selection and Staffing; Marketplace Matching

March 2008
Article

Deferred Acceptance Algorithms: History, Theory, Practice, and Open Questions

The deferred acceptance algorithm proposed by Gale and Shapley (1962) has had a profound influence on market design, both directly, by being adapted into practical matching mechanisms, and, indirectly, by raising new theoretical questions. Deferred acceptance... View Details

Keywords: History; Market Design; Labor; System; Practice; Performance; Theory; Boston; New York (city, NY)

2007
Working Paper

Deferred Acceptance Algorithms: History, Theory, Practice, and Open Questions

The deferred acceptance algorithm proposed by Gale and Shapley (1962) has had a profound influence on market design, both directly, by being adapted into practical matching mechanisms, and, indirectly, by raising new theoretical questions. Deferred acceptance... View Details

Keywords: Education; Marketplace Matching; Market Design; Mathematical Methods; Theory; Practice

15 Sep 2009
First Look

First Look: September 15

consequences of these changes and shifts for the firm's success, strategy, and organization. A Choice Prediction Competition, for Choices from Experience and from Description Authors:Ido Erev, Eyal Ert, Alvin View Details

Keywords: Martha Lagace

04 May 2010
First Look

First Look: May 4

and Why? Authors:Stephen Leider and Alvin E. Roth Publication:Journal of Transplantation 10 (May 2010): 1221-1227 Abstract The shortage of transplant kidneys has spurred debate... View Details

Keywords: Martha Lagace

2015
Chapter

Is Experimental Economics Living Up to Its Promise?

The question that is the title of this essay already suggests that experimental economics has at least reached a sufficient state of maturity that we can try to take stock of its progress and consider how that progress matches the anticipations we may have had for the... View Details

Keywords: Economics; History; Science

2010
Working Paper

Marketplace Institutions Related to the Timing of Transactions

This paper describes the unraveling of transaction dates in several markets, including the labor markets for new lawyers hired by large law firms and for gastroenterology fellows, and the market for post-season college football bowls. Together these will illustrate... View Details

Keywords: Talent and Talent Management; Market Timing; Market Transactions; Marketplace Matching; Competitive Strategy

Article

Kidneys for Sale: Who Disapproves, and Why?

By: Stephen Leider and Alvin E. Roth

The shortage of transplant kidneys has spurred debate about legalizing monetary payments to donors to increase the number of available kidneys. However, buying and selling organs faces widespread disapproval. We survey a representative sample of Americans to assess... View Details

Keywords: Moral Sensibility; Policy; Health; Market Transactions; Attitudes; Trust

2009
Chapter

The Effects of a Central Clearinghouse on Job Placement, Wages, and Hiring Practices

By: Muriel Niederle and Alvin E. Roth

New gastroenterologists participated in a labor market clearinghouse (a "match") from 1986 through the late 1990s, after which the match was abandoned. This provides an opportunity to study the effects of a match by observing the differences in the outcomes and... View Details

Keywords: Labor; Market Timing; Marketplace Matching; Failure

2012
Working Paper

The Need for (long) Chains in Kidney Exchange

By: Itai Ashlagi, David Gamarnik, Michael A. Rees and Alvin E. Roth

It has been previously shown that for sufficiently large pools of patient-donor pairs, (almost) efficient kidney exchange can be achieved by using at most 3-way cycles, i.e., by using cycles among no more than 3 patient-donor pairs. However, as kidney exchange has... View Details

Keywords: Networks; Complexity; Performance Efficiency; Medical Specialties; Health Care and Treatment; Philanthropy and Charitable Giving

2007
Working Paper

What Have We Learned From Market Design?

This essay discusses some things we have learned about markets, in the process of designing marketplaces to fix market failures. To work well, marketplaces have to provide thickness, i.e. they need to attract a large enough proportion of the potential participants in... View Details

Keywords: Market Design; Market Participation; Market Transactions; Risk and Uncertainty; Safety

October 2007
Article

The Art of Designing Markets

Traditionally, markets have been viewed as simply the confluence of supply and demand. But to function properly, they must be able to attract a sufficient number of buyers and sellers, induce participants to make their preferences clear, and overcome congestion by... View Details

Keywords: Market Design; Market Participation; Market Transactions; Information Technology; Internet and the Web