Publications

The deferred acceptance algorithm proposed by Gale and Shapley (1962) has had a profound influence on market design, both directly, by being adapted into practical matching mechanisms, and indirectly, by raising new theoretical questions. Deferred acceptance algorithms... View Details

Keywords: Labor; Market Design; Marketplace Matching; Failure; Mathematical Methods

2007
Working Paper

The New Market for Federal Judicial Law Clerks

By: Christopher Avery, Christine Jolls, Richard Posner and Alvin E. Roth

In the past, judges have often hired applicants for judicial clerkships as early as the beginning of the second year of law school for positions commencing approximately two years down the road. In the new hiring regime for federal judicial law clerks, by contrast,... View Details

Keywords: Law; Education; Employment; Selection and Staffing; Marketplace Matching

March 2008
Article

Deferred Acceptance Algorithms: History, Theory, Practice, and Open Questions

The deferred acceptance algorithm proposed by Gale and Shapley (1962) has had a profound influence on market design, both directly, by being adapted into practical matching mechanisms, and, indirectly, by raising new theoretical questions. Deferred acceptance... View Details

Keywords: History; Market Design; Labor; System; Practice; Performance; Theory; Boston; New York (city, NY)

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2007
Working Paper

Deferred Acceptance Algorithms: History, Theory, Practice, and Open Questions

The deferred acceptance algorithm proposed by Gale and Shapley (1962) has had a profound influence on market design, both directly, by being adapted into practical matching mechanisms, and, indirectly, by raising new theoretical questions. Deferred acceptance... View Details

Keywords: Education; Marketplace Matching; Market Design; Mathematical Methods; Theory; Practice

2014
Working Paper

College Admissions as Non-Price Competition: The Case of South Korea

By: Christopher Avery, Alvin E. Roth and Soohyung Lee

This paper examines non-price competition among colleges to attract highly qualified students, exploiting the South Korean setting where the national government sets rules governing applications. We identify some basic facts about the behavior of colleges before and... View Details

Keywords: Competition; Higher Education; Policy; Government and Politics; Education Industry; South Korea

Web

Health Care - Faculty & Research

Publications Faculty Michael E. Porter Regina E. Herzlinger Robert S. Kaplan Robert S. Huckman Amy C. Edmondson Richard G. Hamermesh John A. Quelch Alvin View Details

04 May 2010
First Look

First Look: May 4

and Why? Authors:Stephen Leider and Alvin E. Roth Publication:Journal of Transplantation 10 (May 2010): 1221-1227 Abstract The shortage of transplant kidneys has spurred debate... View Details

Keywords: Martha Lagace

2015
Chapter

Is Experimental Economics Living Up to Its Promise?

The question that is the title of this essay already suggests that experimental economics has at least reached a sufficient state of maturity that we can try to take stock of its progress and consider how that progress matches the anticipations we may have had for the... View Details

Keywords: Economics; History; Science

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2010
Working Paper

Marketplace Institutions Related to the Timing of Transactions

This paper describes the unraveling of transaction dates in several markets, including the labor markets for new lawyers hired by large law firms and for gastroenterology fellows, and the market for post-season college football bowls. Together these will illustrate... View Details

Keywords: Talent and Talent Management; Market Timing; Market Transactions; Marketplace Matching; Competitive Strategy

2012
Working Paper

The Need for (long) Chains in Kidney Exchange

By: Itai Ashlagi, David Gamarnik, Michael A. Rees and Alvin E. Roth

It has been previously shown that for sufficiently large pools of patient-donor pairs, (almost) efficient kidney exchange can be achieved by using at most 3-way cycles, i.e., by using cycles among no more than 3 patient-donor pairs. However, as kidney exchange has... View Details

Keywords: Networks; Complexity; Performance Efficiency; Medical Specialties; Health Care and Treatment; Philanthropy and Charitable Giving

2007
Working Paper

What Have We Learned From Market Design?

This essay discusses some things we have learned about markets, in the process of designing marketplaces to fix market failures. To work well, marketplaces have to provide thickness, i.e. they need to attract a large enough proportion of the potential participants in... View Details

Keywords: Market Design; Market Participation; Market Transactions; Risk and Uncertainty; Safety

March 2008
Article

What Have We Learned from Market Design?

This essay discusses some things we have learned about markets, in the process of designing marketplaces to fix market failures. To work well, marketplaces have to provide thickness, i.e. they need to attract a large enough proportion of the potential participants in... View Details

Keywords: Risk Management; Market Design; Market Participation; Market Transactions; Failure; Safety