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- All HBS Web
(1,593)
- People (1)
- News (221)
- Research (1,151)
- Events (6)
- Multimedia (6)
- Faculty Publications (740)
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- Forthcoming
- Article
Transitory and Permanent Cash Flow Shocks in Debt Contract Design
By: Le Ma, Anywhere Sikochi and Yajun Xiao
We examine how lenders design contracts to account for transitory and permanent cash flow shocks facing borrowers. We find that volatile transitory cash flow shocks are associated with fewer liquidity covenants, indicating financial flexibility that enables firms to... View Details
Keywords: Debt Covenants; Cash Flow Shocks; Debt Contracting; Likelihood Of Default; Cash Flow; System Shocks
Ma, Le, Anywhere Sikochi, and Yajun Xiao. "Transitory and Permanent Cash Flow Shocks in Debt Contract Design." Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis (forthcoming). (Pre-published online February 25, 2025.)
- Article
Renegotiation and the Form of Efficient Contracts
By: Jerry R. Green and J. J. Laffont
Two parties may agree to a mutually binding contract that will govern their behavior after an uncertain event becomes known. As there is no agent who can both observe this uncertain outcome and enforce the contract, contingent agreements are precluded. However, the... View Details
Green, Jerry R., and J. J. Laffont. "Renegotiation and the Form of Efficient Contracts." Annales d'économie et de statistique, nos. 25-26 (January–June 1992): 123–150.
- August 22, 1998
- Article
The New Moral Contract
By: Sumantra Ghoshal and Christopher Bartlett
Ghoshal, Sumantra, and Christopher Bartlett. "The New Moral Contract." Business Today (August 22, 1998), 106–111.
- 2008
- Working Paper
Contracting for Servicizing
Servicizing, a novel business practice that sells product functionality rather than products, has been touted as an environmentally beneficial business practice. This paper describes how servicizing transactions mitigate some problems associated with sales... View Details
Keywords: Customer Focus and Relationships; Contracts; Market Transactions; Service Delivery; Service Operations; Sales
Toffel, Michael W. "Contracting for Servicizing." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 08-063, February 2008. (February 2008.)
- March 2000
- Article
The Structure of Licensing Contracts
Keywords: Contracts
Anand, B., and T. Khanna. "The Structure of Licensing Contracts." Journal of Industrial Economics 48, no. 1 (March 2000): 103–35. (Formerly titled "Intellectual Property Rights and Contract Structure.")
- 23 Jan 2018
- Working Paper Summaries
Transaction Costs and the Duration of Contracts
Keywords: by Alexander MacKay
- 26 Jun 2007
- Working Paper Summaries
Contracting in the Self-reporting Economy
- 2023
- Working Paper
Pulp Friction: The Value of Quantity Contracts in Decentralized Markets
By: Olivier Darmouni, Simon Essig Aberg and Juha Tolvanen
Firms in decentralized markets often trade using quantity contracts, agreements that specify quantity prior to the point of sale. These contracts are valuable because they provide quantity assurance, as trading frictions could prevent a buyer and seller from matching... View Details
Keywords: Decentralized Markets; Trading Frictions; Market Structure; Transaction Costs; Contracts; Market Transactions; Pulp and Paper Industry
Darmouni, Olivier, Simon Essig Aberg, and Juha Tolvanen. "Pulp Friction: The Value of Quantity Contracts in Decentralized Markets." Working Paper, December 2023.
- 2012
- Working Paper
Relational Contracts and Organizational Capabilities
By: R. Gibbons and R. Henderson
A large literature identifies unique organizational capabilities as a potent source of competitive advantage, yet our knowledge of why capabilities fail to diffuse more rapidly-particularly in situations in which competitors apparently have strong incentives to adopt... View Details
Keywords: Competitive Advantage; Motivation and Incentives; Management Practices and Processes; Contracts; Competency and Skills; Relationships; Complexity
Gibbons, R., and R. Henderson. "Relational Contracts and Organizational Capabilities." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 12-061, January 2012.
- June 1983
- Article
A Comparison of Tournaments and Contracts
By: Jerry R. Green and Nancy Stokey
Tournaments, reward structures based on rank order, are compared with individual contracts in a model with one risk-neutral principal and many risk-averse agents. Each agent's output is a stochastic function of his effort level plus an additive shock term that is... View Details
Green, Jerry R., and Nancy Stokey. "A Comparison of Tournaments and Contracts." Journal of Political Economy 91, no. 3 (June 1983): 349–364.
- Research Summary
Optimal Contracting with Reciprocal Agents
(with Florian Englmaier) (Job Market Paper)
Abstract: Empirically, compensation systems often seem to generate substantial effort despite weak incentives. We consider reciprocal motivations as a source of incentives. We solve for the optimal... View Details
- Article
Real Effects of Relational Contracts
By: Steven Blader, Claudine Gartenberg, Rebecca Henderson and Andrea Pratt
How important are factors such as "firm culture" and "employee engagement" in driving firm performance? Increasing evidence from a wide range of fields suggests that productivity differs widely across firms, even after the inclusion of careful controls for factors such... View Details
Blader, Steven, Claudine Gartenberg, Rebecca Henderson, and Andrea Pratt. "Real Effects of Relational Contracts." American Economic Review: Papers and Proceedings 105, no. 5 (May 2015): 452–456.
- 2011
- Article
'Deprival Value' vs. 'Fair Value' Measurement for Contract Liabilities: How to Resolve the 'Revenue Recognition' Conundrum
By: Joanne Horton, Richard H. Macve and George Serafeim
Revenue recognition and measurement principles can conflict with liability recognition and measurement principles. We explore here under different market conditions when the two measurement approaches coincide and when they conflict. We show that where entities expect... View Details
Keywords: Fair Value; Deprival Value; Contract Liabilities; Fair Value Accounting; Measurement and Metrics; Profit; Revenue Recognition; Assets; Performance Evaluation; Contracts
Horton, Joanne, Richard H. Macve, and George Serafeim. "'Deprival Value' vs. 'Fair Value' Measurement for Contract Liabilities: How to Resolve the 'Revenue Recognition' Conundrum." Accounting and Business Research 41, no. 5 (2011): 491–514.
- Research Summary
Anti-Competitive Financial Contracting
Joint work with Giacinta Cestone, Institut d'Analisi Economica, Barcelona
This paper presents the first model where entry deterrence takes place through financial rather than product-market channels. In standard models of the interaction between product and... View Details
- February 1998
- Background Note
Contracting and Control in Venture Capital
By: Paul A. Gompers
Discusses the control mechanisms and contracts utilized by venture capitalists. The emphasis is on understanding potential conflicts of interest and how the contracts mitigate those conflicts. View Details
Keywords: Venture Capital; Governance Controls; Contracts; Business or Company Management; Conflict of Interests
Gompers, Paul A. "Contracting and Control in Venture Capital." Harvard Business School Background Note 298-067, February 1998.
- December 1980 (Revised September 1985)
- Case
British Steel Corporation: The Korf Contract
By: John P. Kotter and John M. Stengrevics
Traces a complex resource allocation decision facing British Steel in 1975. Students study the influences on the various managers involved in making the decision. View Details
Keywords: Resource Allocation; Decision Making; Management Teams; Metals and Minerals; Steel Industry; United Kingdom
Kotter, John P., and John M. Stengrevics. "British Steel Corporation: The Korf Contract." Harvard Business School Case 481-110, December 1980. (Revised September 1985.)
- September–October 2012
- Article
Relational Contracts and Organizational Capabilities
By: Robert Gibbons and Rebecca Henderson
A large literature identifies unique organizational capabilities as a potent source of competitive advantage, yet our knowledge of why capabilities fail to diffuse more rapidly—particularly in situations in which competitors apparently have strong incentives to adopt... View Details
Gibbons, Robert, and Rebecca Henderson. "Relational Contracts and Organizational Capabilities." Organization Science 23, no. 5 (September–October 2012): 1350–1364.
- 14 Feb 2012
- Working Paper Summaries
Relational Contracts and Organizational Capabilities
Keywords: by R. Gibbons & R. Henderson
- 2008
- Working Paper
Stable Many-to-Many Matchings with Contracts
By: Bettina-Elisabeth Klaus and Markus Walzl
We consider several notions of setwise stability for many-to-many matching markets with contracts and provide an analysis of the relations between the resulting sets of stable allocations for general, substitutable, and strongly substitutable preferences. Apart from... View Details
Klaus, Bettina-Elisabeth, and Markus Walzl. "Stable Many-to-Many Matchings with Contracts." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 09-046, September 2008.