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Show Results For
- All HBS Web
(1,551)
- People (1)
- News (221)
- Research (1,154)
- Events (6)
- Multimedia (6)
- Faculty Publications (740)
- 04 Nov 2012
- News
A Capitalist's Dilemma, Whoever Wins on Tuesday
- March 2008 (Revised April 2010)
- Case
Ashdown Contracting
By: Joseph B. Lassiter III and Firas Alkhatib
Ashdown's "growth" plan called for Mustafa Khalaf to leave his job as Chief Operating Officer (COO) of Ashdown Contracting and to focus his attention on the growth of a separate business entity, Ashdown Pipeline, where Ashdown believed the greatest potential for the... View Details
Keywords: Entrepreneurship; Leadership; Growth and Development Strategy; Management Succession; Market Entry and Exit; Business Strategy
Lassiter, Joseph B., III, and Firas Alkhatib. "Ashdown Contracting." Harvard Business School Case 808-120, March 2008. (Revised April 2010.)
- August 22, 1998
- Article
The New Moral Contract
By: Sumantra Ghoshal and Christopher Bartlett
Ghoshal, Sumantra, and Christopher Bartlett. "The New Moral Contract." Business Today (August 22, 1998), 106–111.
- 2008
- Working Paper
Contracting for Servicizing
Servicizing, a novel business practice that sells product functionality rather than products, has been touted as an environmentally beneficial business practice. This paper describes how servicizing transactions mitigate some problems associated with sales... View Details
Keywords: Customer Focus and Relationships; Contracts; Market Transactions; Service Delivery; Service Operations; Sales
Toffel, Michael W. "Contracting for Servicizing." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 08-063, February 2008. (February 2008.)
- May 2009
- Article
When Contracts Destroy Trust
By: Deepak Malhotra
Contracts exist to foster trust, but they can actually do the opposite. Overly detailed contracts leave no room for spontaneous acts of kindness to create goodwill between parties; too-rigid contracts leave parties unable to respond to the unanticipated; and, strangely... View Details
Malhotra, Deepak. "When Contracts Destroy Trust." Harvard Business Review 87, no. 5 (May 2009): 25.
- Forthcoming
- Article
Transitory and Permanent Cash Flow Shocks in Debt Contract Design
By: Le Ma, Anywhere Sikochi and Yajun Xiao
We examine how lenders design contracts to account for transitory and permanent cash flow shocks facing borrowers. We find that volatile transitory cash flow shocks are associated with fewer liquidity covenants, indicating financial flexibility that enables firms to... View Details
Keywords: Debt Covenants; Cash Flow Shocks; Debt Contracting; Likelihood Of Default; Cash Flow; System Shocks
Ma, Le, Anywhere Sikochi, and Yajun Xiao. "Transitory and Permanent Cash Flow Shocks in Debt Contract Design." Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis (forthcoming). (Pre-published online February 25, 2025.)
- 2024
- Working Paper
Transitory and Permanent Cash Flow Shocks in Debt Contract Design
By: Le Ma, Anywhere Sikochi and Yajun Xiao
We examine how lenders design contracts to account for transitory and permanent cash flow shocks facing borrowers. We find that volatile transitory cash flow shocks are associated with fewer liquidity covenants, indicating financial flexibility that enables firms to... View Details
Keywords: Debt Covenants; Cash Flow Shocks; Debt Contracting; Likelihood Of Default; Cash Flow; System Shocks
Ma, Le, Anywhere Sikochi, and Yajun Xiao. "Transitory and Permanent Cash Flow Shocks in Debt Contract Design." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 22-026, October 2021. (Revised February 2024. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Conditional Accept.)
The Contract Year Phenomenon in the Corner Office: An Analysis of Firm Behavior During CEO Contract Renewals
This paper investigates how executive employment contracts influence corporate financial policies during the final year of the contract term, using a new, hand-collected data set of CEO employment agreements. On the one hand, the impending... View Details
- Article
Renegotiation and the Form of Efficient Contracts
By: Jerry R. Green and J. J. Laffont
Two parties may agree to a mutually binding contract that will govern their behavior after an uncertain event becomes known. As there is no agent who can both observe this uncertain outcome and enforce the contract, contingent agreements are precluded. However, the... View Details
Green, Jerry R., and J. J. Laffont. "Renegotiation and the Form of Efficient Contracts." Annales d'économie et de statistique, nos. 25-26 (January–June 1992): 123–150.
- 20 Jul 2021
- News
Rewriting the Social Contract
- 2014
- Working Paper
The Contract Year Phenomenon in the Corner Office: An Analysis of Firm Behavior During CEO Contract Renewals
By: Ping Liu and Yuhai Xuan
This paper investigates how executive employment contracts influence corporate financial policies during the final year of the contract term, using a new, hand-collected data set of CEO employment agreements. On the one hand, the impending expiration of fixed-term... View Details
Liu, Ping, and Yuhai Xuan. "The Contract Year Phenomenon in the Corner Office: An Analysis of Firm Behavior During CEO Contract Renewals." Working Paper, April 2014.
- 23 Jan 2018
- Working Paper Summaries
Transaction Costs and the Duration of Contracts
Keywords: by Alexander MacKay
- March 2000
- Article
The Structure of Licensing Contracts
Keywords: Contracts
Anand, B., and T. Khanna. "The Structure of Licensing Contracts." Journal of Industrial Economics 48, no. 1 (March 2000): 103–35. (Formerly titled "Intellectual Property Rights and Contract Structure.")
- 26 Jun 2007
- Working Paper Summaries
Contracting in the Self-reporting Economy
- September–October 2012
- Article
Relational Contracts and Organizational Capabilities
By: Robert Gibbons and Rebecca Henderson
A large literature identifies unique organizational capabilities as a potent source of competitive advantage, yet our knowledge of why capabilities fail to diffuse more rapidly—particularly in situations in which competitors apparently have strong incentives to adopt... View Details
Gibbons, Robert, and Rebecca Henderson. "Relational Contracts and Organizational Capabilities." Organization Science 23, no. 5 (September–October 2012): 1350–1364.
- 14 Feb 2012
- Working Paper Summaries
Relational Contracts and Organizational Capabilities
Keywords: by R. Gibbons & R. Henderson
- 2011
- Article
'Deprival Value' vs. 'Fair Value' Measurement for Contract Liabilities: How to Resolve the 'Revenue Recognition' Conundrum
By: Joanne Horton, Richard H. Macve and George Serafeim
Revenue recognition and measurement principles can conflict with liability recognition and measurement principles. We explore here under different market conditions when the two measurement approaches coincide and when they conflict. We show that where entities expect... View Details
Keywords: Fair Value; Deprival Value; Contract Liabilities; Fair Value Accounting; Measurement and Metrics; Profit; Revenue Recognition; Assets; Performance Evaluation; Contracts
Horton, Joanne, Richard H. Macve, and George Serafeim. "'Deprival Value' vs. 'Fair Value' Measurement for Contract Liabilities: How to Resolve the 'Revenue Recognition' Conundrum." Accounting and Business Research 41, no. 5 (2011): 491–514.
- February 1998
- Background Note
Contracting and Control in Venture Capital
By: Paul A. Gompers
Discusses the control mechanisms and contracts utilized by venture capitalists. The emphasis is on understanding potential conflicts of interest and how the contracts mitigate those conflicts. View Details
Keywords: Venture Capital; Governance Controls; Contracts; Business or Company Management; Conflict of Interests
Gompers, Paul A. "Contracting and Control in Venture Capital." Harvard Business School Background Note 298-067, February 1998.
- 2025
- Working Paper
Pulp Friction: The Value of Quantity Contracts in Decentralized Markets
By: Olivier Darmouni, Simon Essig Aberg and Juha Tolvanen
Firms in decentralized markets often trade using quantity contracts, agreements that specify quantity prior to the point of sale. These contracts are valuable because they provide quantity assurance, as trading frictions could prevent a buyer and seller from matching... View Details
Keywords: Decentralized Markets; Trading Frictions; Market Structure; Transaction Costs; Contracts; Market Transactions; Pulp and Paper Industry
Darmouni, Olivier, Simon Essig Aberg, and Juha Tolvanen. "Pulp Friction: The Value of Quantity Contracts in Decentralized Markets." Working Paper, May 2025.
- 2012
- Working Paper
Relational Contracts and Organizational Capabilities
By: R. Gibbons and R. Henderson
A large literature identifies unique organizational capabilities as a potent source of competitive advantage, yet our knowledge of why capabilities fail to diffuse more rapidly-particularly in situations in which competitors apparently have strong incentives to adopt... View Details
Keywords: Competitive Advantage; Motivation and Incentives; Management Practices and Processes; Contracts; Competency and Skills; Relationships; Complexity
Gibbons, R., and R. Henderson. "Relational Contracts and Organizational Capabilities." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 12-061, January 2012.