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  • 09 Jan 2018
  • First Look

First Look at New Research and Ideas, January 9, 2018

yes. Download working paper: https://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Pages/item.aspx?num=50771 Strategy-Proofness of Worker-Optimal Matching with Continuously Transferable Utility By: Jagadeesan, Ravi, Scott Duke Kominers, and Ross Rheingans-Yoo... View Details
Keywords: Sean Silverthorne
  • 25 Jul 2017
  • First Look

First Look at New Research and Ideas: July 25, 2017

unintentionally undermined the intended admissions policy—led to the elimination of Boston’s walk zones. Publisher's link: https://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Pages/item.aspx?num=52937 May 2017 American Economic Review Stable and Strategy-Proof... View Details
Keywords: Carmen Nobel
  • 05 Sep 2017
  • First Look

First Look at New Research and Ideas, September 5, 2017

creating opportunities for norm reinforcement. Publisher's link: https://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Pages/item.aspx?num=52457 Strategy-Proofness of Worker-Optimal Matching with Continuously Transferable Utility By: Jagadeesan, Ravi, Scott Duke... View Details
Keywords: Sean Silverthorne
  • 20 Feb 2018
  • First Look

First Look at New Research and Ideas, February 20, 2018

to raise additional capital. Publisher's link: https://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Pages/item.aspx?num=53962 forthcoming Games and Economic Behavior Strategy-Proofness of Worker-Optimal Matching with Continuously Transferable Utility By:... View Details
Keywords: Sean Silverthorne
  • 13 Jun 2017
  • First Look

First Look at New Research and Ideas, June 13

strategy-proof mechanism, but so are other mechanisms. We show that TTC is constrained-optimal in the following sense: TTC minimizes justified envy among all Pareto efficient and strategy-proof mechanisms... View Details
Keywords: Sean Silverthorne
  • 08 May 2007
  • First Look

First Look: May 8, 2007

school is sufficient to produce the set of student optimal stable matchings. Our main theoretical result is that a student-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism that breaks indifferences the same way at every school is not dominated by any other mechanism that is... View Details
Keywords: Martha Lagace