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Show Results For
- All HBS Web
(973)
- News (197)
- Research (651)
- Events (7)
- Multimedia (5)
- Faculty Publications (309)
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- May 2016
- Article
Planned Opportunism: Using Weak Signals to Spur Innovations
By: Vijay Govindarajan
Govindarajan, Vijay. "Planned Opportunism: Using Weak Signals to Spur Innovations." Harvard Business Review 94, no. 5 (May 2016): 54–61.
- January 2023
- Article
The Dark Side of Machiavellian Rhetoric: Signaling in Reward-Based Crowdfunding Performance
By: Goran Calic, Rene Arseneault and Maryam Ghasemaghaei
In this study, we explore the impact of Machiavellian rhetoric on fundraising within the increasingly important context of online crowdfunding. The “all-or-nothing” funding model used by the world’s largest crowdfunding platform, Kickstarter, may be an attractive... View Details
Calic, Goran, Rene Arseneault, and Maryam Ghasemaghaei. "The Dark Side of Machiavellian Rhetoric: Signaling in Reward-Based Crowdfunding Performance." Journal of Business Ethics 182, no. 3 (January 2023): 875–896.
- 19 Jul 2011
- Working Paper Summaries
Signaling to Partially Informed Investors in the Newsvendor Model
- June 2013
- Article
Signals across Multiple Networks: How Venture Capital and Alliance Networks Affect Interorganizational Collaboration
By: Umit Ozmel, Jeffrey J. Reuer and Ranjay Gulati
In this paper, we examine the contingent effects of signals generated by different types of networks on new ventures' formation of future strategic alliances. We argue that the signaling value of a given tie in reducing adverse selection is more pronounced when another... View Details
Ozmel, Umit, Jeffrey J. Reuer, and Ranjay Gulati. "Signals across Multiple Networks: How Venture Capital and Alliance Networks Affect Interorganizational Collaboration." Academy of Management Journal 56, no. 3 (June 2013): 852–866.
- July–August 2024
- Article
Doing More with Less: Overcoming Ineffective Long-Term Targeting Using Short-Term Signals
By: Ta-Wei Huang and Eva Ascarza
Firms are increasingly interested in developing targeted interventions for customers with the best response,
which requires identifying differences in customer sensitivity, typically through the conditional average treatment
effect (CATE) estimation. In theory, to... View Details
Keywords: Long-run Targeting; Heterogeneous Treatment Effect; Statistical Surrogacy; Customer Churn; Field Experiments; Consumer Behavior; Customer Focus and Relationships; AI and Machine Learning; Marketing Strategy
Huang, Ta-Wei, and Eva Ascarza. "Doing More with Less: Overcoming Ineffective Long-Term Targeting Using Short-Term Signals." Marketing Science 43, no. 4 (July–August 2024): 863–884.
- March 2015
- Article
Signaling to Partially Informed Investors in the Newsvendor Model
By: William Schmidt, Vishal Gaur, Richard Lai and Ananth Raman
We investigate a puzzling phenomenon in which firms make investment decisions that purposefully do not maximize expected profits. Using an extension to the newsvendor model, we focus on a relatively common scenario in which the firm's investor has imperfect information... View Details
Schmidt, William, Vishal Gaur, Richard Lai, and Ananth Raman. "Signaling to Partially Informed Investors in the Newsvendor Model." Production and Operations Management 24, no. 3 (March 2015): 383–401.
- 2011
- Other Unpublished Work
Lords of the Harvest: Third-Party Signaling and Regulatory Approval of Genetically Modified Organisms
By: Shon R. Hiatt and Sangchan Park
Little is known about the factors that influence regulatory agencies' decision making. We posit that regulatory agencies are influenced by the firms they regulate, but not exclusively via political influence as is argued in the traditional regulatory-capture... View Details
- September 1990
- Article
Competition on Many Fronts: A Stackelberg Signaling Equilibrium
By: Jerry R. Green and Jean-Jacques Laffont
An economic agent, the incumbent, is operating in many environments at the same time. These may be locations, markets, or specific activities. He is informed of the particular conditions relevant to each situation. His action in each case is observable by another... View Details
Green, Jerry R., and Jean-Jacques Laffont. "Competition on Many Fronts: A Stackelberg Signaling Equilibrium." Games and Economic Behavior 2, no. 3 (September 1990): 247–272.
- June 2014
- Article
The Red Sneakers Effect: Inferring Status and Competence from Signals of Nonconformity
By: Silvia Bellezza, Francesca Gino and Anat Keinan
We examine how people react to nonconforming behaviors, such as entering a luxury boutique wearing gym clothes rather than an elegant outfit or wearing red sneakers in a professional setting. Nonconforming behaviors, as costly and visible signals, can act as a... View Details
Bellezza, Silvia, Francesca Gino, and Anat Keinan. "The Red Sneakers Effect: Inferring Status and Competence from Signals of Nonconformity." Journal of Consumer Research 41, no. 1 (June 2014): 35–54. (Finalist, 2017 Best Article Award for a paper published in JCR in 2014.))
- August 2003
- Article
Approaching and Avoiding Linda: Motor Signals Influence the Conjunction Effect
By: Jason Riis and N. Schwarz
Riis, Jason, and N. Schwarz. "Approaching and Avoiding Linda: Motor Signals Influence the Conjunction Effect." Social Cognition 21, no. 4 (August 2003).
- 2005
- Dissertation
Voluntary Environmental Management Initiatives: Smoke Signals or Smoke Screens?
Toffel, Michael W. "Voluntary Environmental Management Initiatives: Smoke Signals or Smoke Screens?" Diss., University of California, Berkeley, December 2005. (Winner of Academy of Management. Social Issues in Management Division. Best Dissertation Award presented by Academy of Management. Nominated for Academy of Management. Organizations and Natural Environment Division. Best Dissertation Award presented by Academy of Management. 2005.)
- 2010
- Article
I May Not Agree With You, but I Trust You: Caring About Social Issues Signals Integrity
By: Julian Zlatev
What characteristics of an individual signal trustworthiness to other people? I propose that individuals who care about contentious social issues signal to observers that they have integrity and thus can be trusted. Critically, this signal conveys trustworthiness... View Details
Zlatev, Julian. "I May Not Agree With You, but I Trust You: Caring About Social Issues Signals Integrity." Psychological Science 30, no. 6 (June 2019): 880–892.
- November 2006
- Background Note
Technical Game Theory Note #5: Private Information and Signaling Models
By: Dennis A. Yao
Discusses private information and signaling. View Details
- 2020
- Article
How Signal Intensity of Behavioral Orientations Affects Crowdfunding Performance: The Role of Entrepreneurial Orientation in Crowdfunding Business Ventures
By: Goran Calic and Anton Shevchenko
Backers assess a crowdfunding campaign description not merely for a project’s capacity to deliver a reward, but also for the manner in which that reward is delivered. Viewed through the lens of signalling theory, crowdfunding performance depends on the signals of... View Details
Keywords: Crowdfunding; Entrepreneurial Finance; Entrepreneurship; Consumer Behavior; Communication Strategy
Calic, Goran, and Anton Shevchenko. "How Signal Intensity of Behavioral Orientations Affects Crowdfunding Performance: The Role of Entrepreneurial Orientation in Crowdfunding Business Ventures." Journal of Business Research 115 (2020): 204–220.
- 2021
- Working Paper
False Signaling and Personal Moral Failings: Two Distinct Pathways to Hypocrisy with Unequal Moral Weight
By: Jillian J. Jordan and Roseanna Sommers
Moral engagement is a key feature of human nature: we hold moral values, condemn those who violate those values, and attempt to adhere to them ourselves. Yet moral engagement can make us appear hypocritical if we fail to behave morally. When does moral engagement risk... View Details
Keywords: Moral Engagement; Hypocrite; Dishonesty; Moral Values; Moral Sensibility; Behavior; Values and Beliefs
Jordan, Jillian J., and Roseanna Sommers. "False Signaling and Personal Moral Failings: Two Distinct Pathways to Hypocrisy with Unequal Moral Weight." Working Paper, January 2021.
- Article
Third-Party Punishment as a Costly Signal of High Continuation Probabilities in Repeated Games
By: Jillian J. Jordan and David G. Rand
Why do individuals pay costs to punish selfish behavior, even as third-party observers? A large body of research suggests that reputation plays an important role in motivating such third-party punishment (TPP). Here we focus on a recently proposed reputation-based... View Details
Jordan, Jillian J., and David G. Rand. "Third-Party Punishment as a Costly Signal of High Continuation Probabilities in Repeated Games." Journal of Theoretical Biology 421 (May 21, 2017): 189–202.
- spring 1989
- Article
Sensitivity, Precision and Linear Aggregation of Signals for Performance Evaluation
By: R. Banker and S. Datar
Keywords: Performance
Banker, R., and S. Datar. "Sensitivity, Precision and Linear Aggregation of Signals for Performance Evaluation." Journal of Accounting Research 27, no. 1 (spring 1989): 21–39.
- 15 May 2010
- Conference Presentation
From Costly Signals to Enhancement Signs: An Introduction and Qualitative Study
- November 2007
- Article
Standing Out from the Crowd: The Visibility-Enhancing Effects of IPO-related Signals on Alliance Formation by Entrepreneurial Firms
By: Tim Pollock and Ranjay Gulati
In this study, we explore how multiple signals related to entrepreneurial companies at the time of their initial public offering (IPO) influence the firms' ability to acquire non-financial resources over time. Specifically, the study looks at how signals based on... View Details
Keywords: Entrepreneurship; Venture Capital; Initial Public Offering; Investment; Alliances; Risk and Uncertainty; Power and Influence
Pollock, Tim, and Ranjay Gulati. "Standing Out from the Crowd: The Visibility-Enhancing Effects of IPO-related Signals on Alliance Formation by Entrepreneurial Firms." Strategic Organization 5, no. 4 (November 2007). (A shorter version of this paper appeared in Academy of Management Best Papers Proceedings, pp. 11-16, 2002.)
- 2008
- Working Paper
Signaling Firm Performance Through Financial Statement Presentation: An Analysis Using Special Items
By: Edward J. Riedl and Suraj Srinivasan
This paper investigates whether managers' presentation of special items within the financial statements reflects economic performance or opportunism. Specifically, we assess special items presented as a separate line item on the income statement (income statement... View Details
Keywords: Financial Reporting; Financial Statements; Decision Choices and Conditions; Corporate Disclosure; Performance
Riedl, Edward J., and Suraj Srinivasan. "Signaling Firm Performance Through Financial Statement Presentation: An Analysis Using Special Items." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 09-031, September 2008. (Conditionally accepted at Contemporary Accounting Research.)