Publications
Publications
Show Results For
- All HBS Web
(211)
- Faculty Publications (75)
- Article
The Job Market for New Economists: A Market Design Perspective
By: Peter A. Coles, John Cawley, Phillip B. Levine, Muriel Niederle, Alvin E. Roth and John J. Siegfried
This paper, written by the members of the American Economic Association (AEA) Ad Hoc Committee on the Job Market, provides an overview of the market for new Ph.D. economists. It describes the role of the AEA in the market and focuses in particular on two mechanisms... View Details
- 2010
- Working Paper
The Job Market for New Economists: A Market Design Perspective
By: Peter A. Coles, John Cawley, Phillip B. Levine, Muriel Niederle, Alvin E. Roth and John J. Siegfried
This paper provides an overview of the market for new Ph.D. economists. It describes the role of the American Economic Association (AEA) in the market and focuses in particular on two mechanisms adopted in recent years at the suggestion of our committee. First, job... View Details
- Article
Kidneys for Sale: Who Disapproves, and Why?
By: Stephen Leider and Alvin E. Roth
The shortage of transplant kidneys has spurred debate about legalizing monetary payments to donors to increase the number of available kidneys. However, buying and selling organs faces widespread disapproval. We survey a representative sample of Americans to assess... View Details
- 2010
- Working Paper
Matching with Couples: Stability and Incentives in Large Markets
By: Fuhito Kojima, Parag A. Pathak and Alvin E. Roth
- 2010
- Working Paper
Unraveling Results from Comparable Demand and Supply: An Experimental Investigation
By: Muriel Niederle, Alvin E. Roth and M. Utku Unver
Markets sometimes unravel, with offers becoming inefficiently early. Often this is attributed to competition arising from an imbalance of demand and supply, typically excess demand for workers. However this presents a puzzle, since unraveling can only occur when firms... View Details
- Article
A Choice Prediction Competition for Market Entry Games: An Introduction
By: Ido Erev, Eyal Ert and Alvin E. Roth
A choice prediction competition is organized that focuses on decisions from experience in market entry games (http://sites.google.com/site/gpredcomp/ and http://www.mdpi.com/si/games/predict-behavior/). The competition is based on two experiments: An estimation... View Details
- January 2010
- Journal Article
A Choice Prediction Competition: Choices from Experience and from Description
By: Ido Erev, Eyal Ert, Alvin E. Roth, Ernan E. Haruvy, Stefan Herzog, Robin Hau, Ralph Hertwig, Terrence Steward, Robert West and Christian Lebiere
Erev, Ert, and Roth organized three choice prediction competitions focused on three related choice tasks: one-shot decisions from description (decisions under risk), one-shot decisions from experience, and repeated decisions from experience. Each competition was based... View Details
- 2010
- Chapter
Deferred Acceptance Algorithms: History, Theory, Practice
By: Alvin E. Roth
The deferred acceptance algorithm proposed by Gale and Shapley (1962) has had a profound influence on market design, both directly, by being adapted into practical matching mechanisms, and indirectly, by raising new theoretical questions. Deferred acceptance algorithms... View Details
- December 2009
- Article
Strategy-proofness versus Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences: Redesigning the NYC High School Match
By: Atila Abdulkadiroglu, Parag A. Pathak and Alvin E. Roth
The design of the New York City (NYC) High School match involved tradeoffs among efficiency, stability, and strategy-proofness that raise new theoretical questions. We analyze a model with indifferences—ties—in school preferences. Simulations with field data and the... View Details
- 2009
- Chapter
The Effects of a Central Clearinghouse on Job Placement, Wages, and Hiring Practices
By: Muriel Niederle and Alvin E. Roth
New gastroenterologists participated in a labor market clearinghouse (a "match") from 1986 through the late 1990s, after which the match was abandoned. This provides an opportunity to study the effects of a match by observing the differences in the outcomes and... View Details
- August 2009
- Article
Market Culture: How Rules Governing Exploding Offers Affect Market Performance
By: Muriel Niederle and Alvin E. Roth
- 2009
- Working Paper
Unraveling Results from Comparable Demand and Supply: An Experimental Investigation
By: Muriel Niederle, Alvin E. Roth and M. Utku Unver
Markets sometimes unravel, with offers becoming inefficiently early. Often this is attributed to competition arising from an imbalance of demand and supply, typically excess demand for workers. However this presents a puzzle, since unraveling can only occur when firms... View Details
- 2009
- Working Paper
Strategy-proofness versus Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences: Redesigning the New York City High School Match
By: Atila Abdulkadiroglu, Parag A. Pathak and Alvin E. Roth
- Article
If You Are Offered the Right of First Refusal, Should You Accept? An Investigation of Contract Design
By: Brit Grosskopf and Alvin E. Roth
- August 2008
- Article
The Gastroenterology Fellowship Match: The First Two Years
By: Muriel Niederle, Deborah D. Proctor and Alvin E. Roth
- 2008
- Working Paper
Unraveling Yields Inefficient Matchings: Evidence from Post-season College Football Bowls
By: Guillaume R. Frechette, Alvin E. Roth and M. Utku Unver
Many markets have "unraveled" and experienced inefficient, early, dispersed transactions, and subsequently developed institutions to delay transaction timing. However, it has previously proved difficult to measure and identify the resulting efficiency gains. Prior to... View Details
- June 2008
- Case
Kidney Matchmakers
By: Brian J. Hall and Nicole Bennett
In this case we look at the design and development of an unconventional market, where neither money nor traditional "goods" are exchanged. Kidney exchange is an idea pioneered by HBS professor and market designer Alvin Roth and a small group of innovative doctors. This... View Details
- March 2008
- Article
Deferred Acceptance Algorithms: History, Theory, Practice, and Open Questions
By: Alvin E. Roth
The deferred acceptance algorithm proposed by Gale and Shapley (1962) has had a profound influence on market design, both directly, by being adapted into practical matching mechanisms, and, indirectly, by raising new theoretical questions. Deferred acceptance... View Details
Keywords: History; Market Design; Labor; System; Practice; Performance; Theory; Boston; New York (city, NY)
- March 2008
- Article
What Have We Learned from Market Design?
By: Alvin E. Roth
This essay discusses some things we have learned about markets, in the process of designing marketplaces to fix market failures. To work well, marketplaces have to provide thickness, i.e. they need to attract a large enough proportion of the potential participants in... View Details
Keywords: Risk Management; Market Design; Market Participation; Market Transactions; Failure; Safety
- 2008
- Chapter
Matching and Market Design
By: Muriel Niederle, Alvin E. Roth and Tayfun Sonmez
Matching is the part of economics concerned with who transacts with whom and how. Models of matching, starting with the Gale-Shapley deferred acceptance algorithm, have been particularly useful in studying labour markets and in helping design clearinghouses to fix... View Details