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Publications

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    • Faculty Publications  (27)

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    • All HBS Web  (321)
      • Faculty Publications  (27)

      Optimal Voting RulesRemove Optimal Voting Rules →

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      • January 1987
      • Article

      Posterior Implementability in a Two-person Decision Problem

      By: Jerry R. Green and Jean-Jacques Laffont
      When a decision rule is implemented using a Bayesian incentive compatible mechanism in which the messages are publicly observable, the players' information is augmented by their observation of each others' strategies. In this paper we study the set of Bayesian... View Details
      Keywords: Incentives; Commitment; Mechanism Design; Decision Making; Information
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      Green, Jerry R., and Jean-Jacques Laffont. "Posterior Implementability in a Two-person Decision Problem." Econometrica 55, no. 1 (January 1987): 69–94.
      • Article

      Optimal Capital-Gains Taxation under Limited Information

      By: Jerry R. Green and Eytan Sheshinski
      Taxation of capital gains at realization may distort individuals' decisions regarding holding or selling during an asset's lifetime. This creates the problem of designing a tax structure for capital gains so as to induce efficient patterns of holding and selling.... View Details
      Keywords: Capital Gains; Optimal Taxation; Taxation
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      Green, Jerry R., and Eytan Sheshinski. "Optimal Capital-Gains Taxation under Limited Information." Journal of Political Economy 86, no. 6 (December 1978): 1143–1158.
      • November 1976
      • Article

      Partial Equilibrium Approach to the Free-Rider Problem

      By: Jerry R. Green, Elon Kohlberg and Jean-Jacques Laffont
      Groves and others have shown that truthful answers concerning preferences for public goods can be elicited as dominant strategies if appropriate tax-subsidies rules are applied. This paper studies the statistical properties of the total revenues generated by one of the... View Details
      Keywords: Problems and Challenges
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      Green, Jerry R., Elon Kohlberg, and Jean-Jacques Laffont. "Partial Equilibrium Approach to the Free-Rider Problem." Journal of Public Economics 6, no. 4 (November 1976): 375–394.
      • Article

      On the Optimal Structure of Liability Laws

      By: Jerry R. Green
      We consider the control of tvo-party accidents through the use of liability rules that assign damages according to whether or not predetermined standards for care have been met. Particular emphasis is given to how the differential in the costs of accident avoidance... View Details
      Keywords: Legal Liability; Law
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      Green, Jerry R. "On the Optimal Structure of Liability Laws." Bell Journal of Economics 7, no. 2 (Fall 1976): 553–574.
      • Forthcoming
      • Article

      Catching Outliers: Committee Voting and the Limits of Consensus When Financing Innovation

      By: Andrey Malenko, Ramana Nanda, Matthew Rhodes-Kropf and Savitar Sundaresan
      We document that investment committees of major VCs use a voting rule where one partner `championing' an early-stage investment is sufficient to invest. Their stated reason for this rule is to `catch outliers'. The same VCs use a more conventional `majority' rule for... View Details
      Keywords: Optimal Voting Rules; Innovation and Invention; Venture Capital; Investment; Decision Making; Voting
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      Malenko, Andrey, Ramana Nanda, Matthew Rhodes-Kropf, and Savitar Sundaresan. "Catching Outliers: Committee Voting and the Limits of Consensus When Financing Innovation." Journal of Finance (forthcoming).
      • Research Summary

      Searching for a Corporate Savior: The Irrational Quest for Charismatic CEOs ( Princeton University Press, October 2002)

      By: Rakesh Khurana
      In this book, I argue that the external CEO labor market was born in a burst of rhetoric about wresting control of corporations away from a group of self-interested insiders, as senior managers in the era of managerial capitalism had come to be portrayed. The rationale... View Details
      • Research Summary

      Social Choice and Voting Rules

      By: Jerry R. Green

      This research program is based on the idea that good voting systems should take into account the frequency with which different choice problems arise. Traditional social choice theory requires properties over a fixed domain of choice problems but does not offer the... View Details

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