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Show Results For
- All HBS Web
(2,405)
- People (2)
- News (474)
- Research (1,602)
- Events (17)
- Multimedia (6)
- Faculty Publications (837)
- June 2019
- Article
Fraud Allegations and Government Contracting
By: Jonas Heese and Gerardo Pérez Cavazos
This paper examines whether fraud allegations affect firms’ contracting with the government. Using a dataset of whistleblower allegations brought under the False Claims Act against firms accused of defrauding the government, we find that federal agencies do not reduce... View Details
Keywords: Whistleblower; Fraud Allegations; False Claims Act; Government Contracting; Risk Allocation; Government and Politics; Contracts; Crime and Corruption; Risk and Uncertainty; Business and Government Relations
Heese, Jonas, and Gerardo Pérez Cavazos. "Fraud Allegations and Government Contracting." Journal of Accounting Research 57, no. 3 (June 2019): 675–719.
- 2020
- Working Paper
Contract Duration and the Costs of Market Transactions
By: Alexander MacKay
The optimal duration of a supply contract balances the costs of reselecting a supplier against the costs of being matched to an inefficient supplier when the contract lasts too long. I develop a structural model of contract duration that captures this tradeoff and... View Details
Keywords: Vertical Relationships; Transaction Costs; Contract Duration; Identification; Supply Chain; Cost; Contracts; Auctions; Mathematical Methods
MacKay, Alexander. "Contract Duration and the Costs of Market Transactions." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 18-058, December 2017. (Revised May 2020. Direct download.)
- May 2012
- Article
Contracting with Heterogeneous Externalities
By: Shai Bernstein and Eyal Winter
Bernstein, Shai, and Eyal Winter. "Contracting with Heterogeneous Externalities." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 4, no. 2 (May 2012): 50–76.
- May 2017
- Article
Stable and Strategy-Proof Matching with Flexible Allotments
By: John William Hatfield, Scott Duke Kominers and Alexander Westkamp
We introduce a framework of matching with flexible allotments that can be used to model firms with cross-division hiring restrictions. Our framework also allows us to nest some prior models of matching with distributional constraints. Building upon our recent work on... View Details
Hatfield, John William, Scott Duke Kominers, and Alexander Westkamp. "Stable and Strategy-Proof Matching with Flexible Allotments." American Economic Review 107, no. 5 (May 2017): 214–219.
- December 2009
- Article
Strategy-proofness versus Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences: Redesigning the NYC High School Match
By: Atila Abdulkadiroglu, Parag A. Pathak and Alvin E. Roth
The design of the New York City (NYC) High School match involved tradeoffs among efficiency, stability, and strategy-proofness that raise new theoretical questions. We analyze a model with indifferences—ties—in school preferences. Simulations with field data and the... View Details
Keywords: Decision Choices and Conditions; Secondary Education; Marketplace Matching; Performance Efficiency; Mathematical Methods; Motivation and Incentives; Strategy; Balance and Stability
Abdulkadiroglu, Atila, Parag A. Pathak, and Alvin E. Roth. "Strategy-proofness versus Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences: Redesigning the NYC High School Match." American Economic Review 99, no. 5 (December 2009). (AER links to access the Appendix and Downloadable Data Set.)
- 2020
- Working Paper
No Line Left Behind: Assortative Matching Inside the Firm
By: Achyuta Adhvaryu, Vittorio Bassi, Anant Nyshadham and Jorge Tamayo
How do firms pair workers with managers, and which constraints affect the allocation of labor within the firm? We characterize the sorting pattern of managers to workers in a large readymade garment manufacturer in India and then explore potential drivers of the... View Details
Keywords: Assortative Matching; Productivity; Global Buyers; Readymade Garments; Management; Employees; Performance Productivity
Adhvaryu, Achyuta, Vittorio Bassi, Anant Nyshadham, and Jorge Tamayo. "No Line Left Behind: Assortative Matching Inside the Firm." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 20-103, March 2020.
- Article
Bilateral Contracts
By: Jerry R. Green and Seppo Honkapohja
A mathematical characterization of self-enforcing bilateral contracts is given. Contracts where both parties exercise some control over the quantity traded can sometimes be superior to contracts that rest control entirely with one side. Some qualitative characteristics... View Details
Green, Jerry R., and Seppo Honkapohja. "Bilateral Contracts." Journal of Mathematical Economics 11, no. 2 (1983): 171–187.
- July 31, 2017
- Article
A Commitment Contract to Achieve Virologic Suppression in Poorly Adherent Patients with HIV/AIDS
By: Marcella Alsan, John Beshears, Wendy S. Armstrong, James J. Choi, Brigitte C. Madrian, Minh Ly T. Nguyen, Carlos Del Rio, David Laibson and Vincent C. Marconi
Objective: Assess whether a commitment contract informed by behavioral economics leads to persistent virologic suppression among HIV-positive patients with poor antiretroviral therapy (ART) adherence.
Design: Single-center pilot randomized clinical trial and a... View Details
Keywords: Adherence; Antiretroviral Therapy; Behavioral Economics; Commitment Contract; Financial Incentives; HIV-1 Virologic Suppression; Health Disorders; Motivation and Incentives
Alsan, Marcella, John Beshears, Wendy S. Armstrong, James J. Choi, Brigitte C. Madrian, Minh Ly T. Nguyen, Carlos Del Rio, David Laibson, and Vincent C. Marconi. "A Commitment Contract to Achieve Virologic Suppression in Poorly Adherent Patients with HIV/AIDS." AIDS 31, no. 12 (July 31, 2017): 1765–1769.
- 2015
- Working Paper
Stability, Strategy-Proofness, and Cumulative Offer Mechanisms
By: John William Hatfield, Scott Duke Kominers and Alexander Westkamp
We consider the setting of many-to-one matching with contracts, where firms may
demand multiple contracts but each worker desires at most one contract. We introduce
three novel conditions—observable substitutability, observable size monotonicity,... View Details
Keywords: Matching With Contracts; Stability; Strategy-proofness; Substitutability; Size Monotonicity; Cumulative Offer Mechanism; Contracts; Market Design; Marketplace Matching; Balance and Stability
Hatfield, John William, Scott Duke Kominers, and Alexander Westkamp. "Stability, Strategy-Proofness, and Cumulative Offer Mechanisms." Working Paper, July 2015.
- 22 May 2007
- Working Paper Summaries
Strategy-Proofness versus Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences: Redesigning the NYC High School Match
- 2013
- Article
Matching with Couples: Stability and Incentives in Large Markets
By: Fuhito Kojima, Parag A. Pathak and Alvin E. Roth
Accommodating couples has been a long-standing issue in the design of centralized labor market clearinghouses for doctors and psychologists, because couples view pairs of jobs as complements. A stable matching may not exist when couples are present. This article's main... View Details
Keywords: Market Design; Marketplace Matching; Balance and Stability; Jobs and Positions; Family and Family Relationships; Health Care and Treatment; Employment Industry; Health Industry
Kojima, Fuhito, Parag A. Pathak, and Alvin E. Roth. "Matching with Couples: Stability and Incentives in Large Markets." Quarterly Journal of Economics 128, no. 4 (November 2013): 1585–1632.
- Forthcoming
- Article
No Line Left Behind: Assortative Matching Inside the Firm
By: Achyuta Adhvaryu, Vittorio Bassi, Anant Nyshadham and Jorge Tamayo
How do firms pair workers with managers, and which constraints affect the allocation of labor within the firm? We characterize the sorting pattern of managers to workers in a large readymade garment manufacturer in India and then explore potential drivers of the... View Details
Keywords: Assortative Matching; Productivity; Global Buyers; Readymade Garments; Labor; Organizational Design; Performance Productivity; Fashion Industry
Adhvaryu, Achyuta, Vittorio Bassi, Anant Nyshadham, and Jorge Tamayo. "No Line Left Behind: Assortative Matching Inside the Firm." Review of Economics and Statistics (forthcoming). (Pre-published online October 29, 2024.)
- 2008
- Working Paper
Stability and Nash Implementation in Matching Markets with Couples
By: Claus-Jochen Haake and Bettina-Elisabeth Klaus
We consider two-sided matching markets with couples. First, we extend a result by Klaus and Klijn (2005, Theorem 3.3) and show that for any weakly responsive couples market there always exists a "double stable" matching, i.e., a matching that is stable for the couples... View Details
Haake, Claus-Jochen, and Bettina-Elisabeth Klaus. "Stability and Nash Implementation in Matching Markets with Couples." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 09-017, August 2008.
- August, 2024
- Article
Absenteeism, Productivity, and Relational Contracts Inside the Firm
By: Achyuta Adhvaryu, Jean-François Gauthier, Anant Nyshadham and Jorge Tamayo
We study relational contracts among managers using a unique dataset that tracks transfers of workers across teams in Indian ready-made garment factories. We focus on how relational contracts help managers cope with worker absenteeism shocks, which are frequent, often... View Details
Keywords: Implicit Contracts; Productivity; Misallocation; Absenteeism; Supervisors; Readymade Garments; Performance Productivity; Employees; Relationships; Fashion Industry; India
Adhvaryu, Achyuta, Jean-François Gauthier, Anant Nyshadham, and Jorge Tamayo. "Absenteeism, Productivity, and Relational Contracts Inside the Firm." Journal of the European Economic Association 22, no. 4 (August, 2024): 1628–1677.
- 16 Nov 2010
- Lessons from the Classroom
Data.gov: Matching Government Data with Rapid Innovation
product development in firms and communities, co-wrote the case with former HBS professor Robert D. Austin and Yumi Yi to encourage further exploration of the benefits and tactics of open-data approaches. “ All agencies will have issues,... View Details
- July 2014 (Revised November 2014)
- Module Note
Responsibilities to Society: The Capitalist's Contract
By: Karthik Ramanna
Societies face many pressing challenges with serious implications for business leaders. These include pollution and climate change, poverty and income inequality, obesity and public health, and corruption and regulatory capture. This note presents a way of analyzing... View Details
Ramanna, Karthik. "Responsibilities to Society: The Capitalist's Contract." Harvard Business School Module Note 115-012, July 2014. (Revised November 2014.)
- October 2015
- Article
Managing the Performance Tradeoffs from Partner Integration: Implications of Contract Choice in R&D Projects
By: Alan MacCormack and Anant Mishra
Formal contracts represent an important governance instrument with which firms exercise control of and compensate partners in R&D projects. The specific type of contract used, however, can vary significantly across projects. In some, firms govern partnering... View Details
Keywords: ＂＂Partner Integration; Contract Choice; R＆D Project Management; Relational Contracts; Partnering Performance; Research and Development; Projects; Partners and Partnerships; Performance; Contracts
MacCormack, Alan, and Anant Mishra. "Managing the Performance Tradeoffs from Partner Integration: Implications of Contract Choice in R&D Projects." Production and Operations Management 24, no. 10 (October 2015): 1552–1569.
- 2007
- Working Paper
Strategy-proofness versus Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences: Redesigning the NYC High School Match
By: Atila Abdulkadiroglu and Alvin E. Roth
Abdulkadiroglu, Atila, Parag A. Pathak, and Alvin E. Roth. "Strategy-proofness versus Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences: Redesigning the NYC High School Match." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 07-076, April 2007.
- May 2021
- Article
Stability, Strategy-Proofness, and Cumulative Offer Mechanisms
By: John William Hatfield, Scott Duke Kominers and Alexander Westkamp
We consider the setting of many-to-one matching with contracts, where firms may demand multiple contracts, but each worker desires at most one contract. We introduce three novel conditions—observable substitutability, observable size monotonicity, and... View Details
Keywords: Matching With Contracts; Stability; Strategy-proofness; Substitutability; Size Monotonicity; Cumulative Offer Mechanism; Marketplace Matching; Balance and Stability
Hatfield, John William, Scott Duke Kominers, and Alexander Westkamp. "Stability, Strategy-Proofness, and Cumulative Offer Mechanisms." Review of Economic Studies 88, no. 3 (May 2021): 1457–1502.
- March 2018 (Revised August 2018)
- Case
Matching Markets for Googlers
By: Bo Cowgill and Rembrand Koning
This case describes how Google designed and launched an internal matching market to assign individual workers with projects and managers. The case evaluates how marketplace design considerations—and several alternative staffing models—could affect the company’s goals... View Details
Keywords: People Analytics; Google; Labor Market; Staffing; Market Design; Marketplace Matching; Selection and Staffing; Goals and Objectives; Technology Industry; United States
Cowgill, Bo, and Rembrand Koning. "Matching Markets for Googlers." Harvard Business School Case 718-487, March 2018. (Revised August 2018.) (More about Bo Cowgill.)