Filter Results:
(833)
Show Results For
- All HBS Web
(833)
- News (134)
- Research (616)
- Events (8)
- Multimedia (1)
- Faculty Publications (276)
Show Results For
- All HBS Web
(833)
- News (134)
- Research (616)
- Events (8)
- Multimedia (1)
- Faculty Publications (276)
- 2008
- Working Paper
Unravelling in Two-Sided Matching Markets and Similarity of Preferences
By: Hanna Halaburda
This paper investigates the causes and welfare consequences of unravelling in two-sided matching markets. It shows that similarity of preferences is an important factor driving unravelling. In particular, it shows that under the ex-post stable mechanism (the mechanism... View Details
Halaburda, Hanna. "Unravelling in Two-Sided Matching Markets and Similarity of Preferences." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 09-068, November 2008.
- Article
Strategy-Proofness of Worker-Optimal Matching with Continuously Transferable Utility
By: Ravi Jagadeesan, Scott Duke Kominers and Ross Rheingans-Yoo
We give a direct proof of one-sided strategy-proofness for worker-firm matching under continuously transferable utility. A new “Lone Wolf” theorem (Jagadeesan et al., 2017) for settings with transferable utility allows us to adapt the method of proving one-sided... View Details
Keywords: Matching; Strategy-proofness; Lone Wolf Theorem; Rural Hospitals Theorem; Mechanism Design; Marketplace Matching
Jagadeesan, Ravi, Scott Duke Kominers, and Ross Rheingans-Yoo. "Strategy-Proofness of Worker-Optimal Matching with Continuously Transferable Utility." Games and Economic Behavior 108 (March 2018): 287–294.
- Article
Unravelling in Two-Sided Matching Markets and Similarity of Preferences
This paper investigates the causes and welfare consequences of unravelling in two-sided matching markets. It shows that similarity of preferences is an important factor driving unravelling. In particular, it shows that under the ex-post stable mechanism (the mechanism... View Details
Halaburda, Hanna. "Unravelling in Two-Sided Matching Markets and Similarity of Preferences." Games and Economic Behavior 69, no. 2 (July 2010): 365–393.
- June 1999
- Case
Matching Dell (A)
By: Jan W. Rivkin, Michael E. Porter, Charles E. Bruin, Markus Chappel, Thomas M Galizia and Laila J Worrell
After years of success with its vaunted "Direct Model" for computer manufacturing, marketing, and distribution, Dell Computer Corp. faces efforts by competitors to match its strategy. This case describes the evolution of the personal computer industry, Dell's strategy,... View Details
Rivkin, Jan W., Michael E. Porter, Charles E. Bruin, Markus Chappel, Thomas M Galizia, and Laila J Worrell. "Matching Dell (A)." Harvard Business School Case 799-158, June 1999.
- February 1985
- Article
Common and Conflicting Interests in Two-Sided Matching Markets
By: A. E. Roth
Roth, A. E. "Common and Conflicting Interests in Two-Sided Matching Markets." European Economic Review 27, no. 1 (February 1985): 75–96.
- August 1988
- Article
Interior Points in the Core of Two-Sided Matching Markets
By: A. E. Roth and M. Sotomayor
Keywords: Markets
Roth, A. E., and M. Sotomayor. "Interior Points in the Core of Two-Sided Matching Markets." Journal of Economic Theory 45 (August 1988): 85–101.
- 01 Dec 2020
- News
Well Matched
Serena Ventures, a fund backed by Williams with an emphasis on startups that make diverse leadership and inclusivity a priority. Rapaport manages a portfolio of close to 60 early-stage investments focused on companies in the health, lifestyle, and fintech sectors. To... View Details
- April 1996
- Article
The National Resident Matching Program as a Labor Market
By: A. E. Roth
Roth, A. E. "The National Resident Matching Program as a Labor Market." JAMA, the Journal of the American Medical Association 275, no. 13 (April 1996): 1054–1056.
- 2010
- Working Paper
Matching with Couples: Stability and Incentives in Large Markets
By: Fuhito Kojima, Parag A. Pathak and Alvin E. Roth
Kojima, Fuhito, Parag A. Pathak, and Alvin E. Roth. "Matching with Couples: Stability and Incentives in Large Markets." NBER Working Paper Series, No. 16028, May 2010.
- Article
An Invitation to Market Design
By: Scott Duke Kominers, Alexander Teytelboym and Vincent P. Crawford
Market design seeks to translate economic theory and analysis into practical solutions to real-world problems. By redesigning both the rules that guide market transactions and the infrastructure that enables those transactions to take place, market designers can... View Details
Keywords: Matching; Trading; Scrip; Liquidity; Efficiency; Equity; Allocation Rules; Marketplaces; Market Design; Marketplace Matching; Auctions
Kominers, Scott Duke, Alexander Teytelboym, and Vincent P. Crawford. "An Invitation to Market Design." Oxford Review of Economic Policy 33, no. 4 (Winter 2017): 541–571.
- 2008
- Working Paper
Stable Many-to-Many Matchings with Contracts
By: Bettina-Elisabeth Klaus and Markus Walzl
We consider several notions of setwise stability for many-to-many matching markets with contracts and provide an analysis of the relations between the resulting sets of stable allocations for general, substitutable, and strongly substitutable preferences. Apart from... View Details
Klaus, Bettina-Elisabeth, and Markus Walzl. "Stable Many-to-Many Matchings with Contracts." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 09-046, September 2008.
- 14 Feb 2013
- News
Wagaroo: A matching market for pet dogs from responsible sources
- October 1991
- Article
Power Balance and the Rationality of Outcomes in Matching Markets
By: H. Sondak and M. H. Bazerman
Keywords: Markets
Sondak, H., and M. H. Bazerman. "Power Balance and the Rationality of Outcomes in Matching Markets." Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 50, no. 1 (October 1991): 1–23.
- July 2021
- Article
Outsourcing Tasks Online: Matching Supply and Demand on Peer-to-Peer Internet Platforms
By: Zoë Cullen and Chiara Farronato
We study the growth of online peer-to-peer markets. Using data from TaskRabbit, an expanding marketplace for domestic tasks at the time of our study, we show that growth varies considerably across cities. To disentangle the potential drivers of growth, we look... View Details
Keywords: Two-sided Market; Two-sided Platforms; Peer-to-peer Markets; Platform Strategy; Sharing Economy; Platform Growth; Internet and the Web; Digital Platforms; Strategy; Market Design; Network Effects
Cullen, Zoë, and Chiara Farronato. "Outsourcing Tasks Online: Matching Supply and Demand on Peer-to-Peer Internet Platforms." Management Science 67, no. 7 (July 2021): 3985–4003.
- 22 May 2007
- Working Paper Summaries
Strategy-Proofness versus Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences: Redesigning the NYC High School Match
- November 2003 (Revised September 2021)
- Case
Ivar Kreuger and the Swedish Match Empire
By: Geoffrey Jones and Ingrid Vargas
Taught in Evolution of Global Business. Globalization and corporate fraud are the central themes of this case on the international growth of Swedish Match in the interwar years. Between 1913 and 1932, Ivar Kreuger, known as the "Swedish Match King," built a small,... View Details
Keywords: History; International Finance; Globalized Firms and Management; Crime and Corruption; Ethics; Monopoly; Business and Government Relations; Sweden
Jones, Geoffrey, and Ingrid Vargas. "Ivar Kreuger and the Swedish Match Empire." Harvard Business School Case 804-078, November 2003. (Revised September 2021.)
- 2021
- Working Paper
Deep Learning for Two-Sided Matching
By: Sai Srivatsa Ravindranatha, Zhe Feng, Shira Li, Jonathan Ma, Scott Duke Kominers and David Parkes
We initiate the use of a multi-layer neural network to model two-sided matching and to explore the design space between strategy-proofness and stability. It is well known that both properties cannot be achieved simultaneously but the efficient frontier in this design... View Details
Keywords: Strategy-proofness; Deep Learning; Two-Sided Platforms; Marketplace Matching; Balance and Stability
Srivatsa Ravindranatha, Sai, Zhe Feng, Shira Li, Jonathan Ma, Scott Duke Kominers, and David Parkes. "Deep Learning for Two-Sided Matching." Working Paper, July 2021.
- December 2009
- Article
Strategy-proofness versus Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences: Redesigning the NYC High School Match
By: Atila Abdulkadiroglu, Parag A. Pathak and Alvin E. Roth
The design of the New York City (NYC) High School match involved tradeoffs among efficiency, stability, and strategy-proofness that raise new theoretical questions. We analyze a model with indifferences—ties—in school preferences. Simulations with field data and the... View Details
Keywords: Decision Choices and Conditions; Secondary Education; Marketplace Matching; Performance Efficiency; Mathematical Methods; Motivation and Incentives; Strategy; Balance and Stability
Abdulkadiroglu, Atila, Parag A. Pathak, and Alvin E. Roth. "Strategy-proofness versus Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences: Redesigning the NYC High School Match." American Economic Review 99, no. 5 (December 2009). (AER links to access the Appendix and Downloadable Data Set.)
- April 1997
- Article
Turnaround Time and Bottlenecks in Market Clearing: Decentralized Matching in he Market for Clinical Psychologists
By: A. E. Roth and X. Xing
Roth, A. E., and X. Xing. "Turnaround Time and Bottlenecks in Market Clearing: Decentralized Matching in he Market for Clinical Psychologists." Journal of Political Economy 105 (April 1997): 284–329.
- Research Summary
What Happens when Agents Join Many-to-One Matching Market?
In their seminal book about matching theory, Roth and Sotomayor (1990) discuss (among other things) what happens in a one-to-one matching market when a new woman joins it. An elegant result shows that in this scenario there exists a non-empty set of men (related to a... View Details