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Show Results For
- All HBS Web
(2,922)
- People (3)
- News (518)
- Research (1,912)
- Events (12)
- Multimedia (6)
- Faculty Publications (1,026)
- January 1976 (Revised May 1976)
- Case
Daisy (D): Designing a Test Market
Star, Steven H., and Nancy J. Davis. "Daisy (D): Designing a Test Market." Harvard Business School Case 576-137, January 1976. (Revised May 1976.)
- November 2023
- Article
Algorithmic Mechanism Design with Investment
By: Mohammad Akbarpour, Scott Duke Kominers, Kevin Michael Li, Shengwu Li and Paul Milgrom
We study the investment incentives created by truthful mechanisms that allocate resources using approximation algorithms. Some approximation algorithms guarantee nearly 100% of the optimal welfare, but have only a zero guarantee when one bidder can invest before... View Details
Akbarpour, Mohammad, Scott Duke Kominers, Kevin Michael Li, Shengwu Li, and Paul Milgrom. "Algorithmic Mechanism Design with Investment." Econometrica 91, no. 6 (November 2023): 1969–2003.
- January 2017
- Article
Contract Design and Stability in Many-to-Many Matching
By: John William Hatfield and Scott Duke Kominers
We develop a model of many-to-many matching with contracts that subsumes as special cases many-to-many matching markets and buyer/seller markets with heterogeneous and indivisible goods. In our setting, substitutable preferences are sufficient to guarantee the... View Details
Keywords: Many-to-Many Matching; Stability; Substitutes; Contract Design; Contracts; Marketplace Matching; Balance and Stability
Hatfield, John William, and Scott Duke Kominers. "Contract Design and Stability in Many-to-Many Matching." Games and Economic Behavior 101 (January 2017): 78–97.
- March 12, 2021
- Article
Market Design to Accelerate COVID-19 Vaccine Supply
By: Juan Camilo Castillo, Amrita Ahuja, Susan Athey, Arthur Baker, Eric Budish, Tasneem Chipty, Rachel Glennerster, Scott Duke Kominers, Michael Kremer, Greg Larson, Jean Lee, Canice Prendergast, Christopher M. Snyder, Alex Tabarrok, Brandon Joel Tan and Witold Wiecek
Build more capacity, and stretch what we already have. View Details
Keywords: COVID-19; Vaccine; Health Pandemics; Health Care and Treatment; Market Design; Supply Chain
Castillo, Juan Camilo, Amrita Ahuja, Susan Athey, Arthur Baker, Eric Budish, Tasneem Chipty, Rachel Glennerster, Scott Duke Kominers, Michael Kremer, Greg Larson, Jean Lee, Canice Prendergast, Christopher M. Snyder, Alex Tabarrok, Brandon Joel Tan, and Witold Wiecek. "Market Design to Accelerate COVID-19 Vaccine Supply." Science 371, no. 6534 (March 12, 2021).
- January 2018 (Revised February 2018)
- Technical Note
Making Markets
Explains how to identify and capitalize on marketplace design opportunities. Defines markets and marketplaces and describes the basic functions of each. Discusses attributes (e.g., heterogeneity of participants' preferences and asymmetry in available information) that... View Details
Keywords: Marketplaces; Two-Sided Markets; Entrepreneurship; Market Design; Digital Platforms; Marketplace Matching; Market Participation; Market Transactions; Market Entry and Exit; Digital Platforms; Auctions
Eisenmann, Thomas R., and Scott Duke Kominers. "Making Markets." Harvard Business School Technical Note 818-096, January 2018. (Revised February 2018.)
- June 2021
- Article
Making Marketplaces Safe: Dominant Individual Rationality and Applications to Market Design
By: Benjamin N. Roth and Ran I. Shorrer
Often market designers cannot force agents to join a marketplace rather than using pre-existing institutions. We propose a new desideratum for marketplace design that guarantees the safety of participation: Dominant Individual Rationality (DIR). A marketplace is DIR if... View Details
Roth, Benjamin N., and Ran I. Shorrer. "Making Marketplaces Safe: Dominant Individual Rationality and Applications to Market Design." Management Science 67, no. 6 (June 2021).
- 2016
- Working Paper
Market Design for Altruistic Supply: Evidence from the Lab
By: Robert Slonim and Carmen Wang
Volunteer supply is widespread. Yet without a price, inefficiencies occur due to suppliers’ inability to coordinate with each other and with demand. In these contexts, we propose a market clearinghouse mechanism that improves efficiency if supply is altruistically... View Details
Keywords: Laboratory Experiments; Volunteering; Public Goods Provision; Market Design; Philanthropy and Charitable Giving; Economics
Slonim, Robert, and Carmen Wang. "Market Design for Altruistic Supply: Evidence from the Lab." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 16-112, March 2016.
- July 2021
- Article
Redistribution through Markets
By: Piotr Dworczak, Scott Duke Kominers and Mohammad Akbarpour
Policymakers frequently use price regulations as a response to inequality in the markets they control. In this paper, we examine the optimal structure of such policies from the perspective of mechanism design. We study a buyer-seller market in which agents have private... View Details
Keywords: Optimal Mechanism Design; Redistribution; Inequality; Welfare Theorems; Market Design; Equality and Inequality
Dworczak, Piotr, Scott Duke Kominers, and Mohammad Akbarpour. "Redistribution through Markets." Econometrica 89, no. 4 (July 2021): 1665–1698. (Authors' names are in certified random order.)
- March 2018 (Revised August 2018)
- Case
Matching Markets for Googlers
By: Bo Cowgill and Rembrand Koning
This case describes how Google designed and launched an internal matching market to assign individual workers with projects and managers. The case evaluates how marketplace design considerations—and several alternative staffing models—could affect the company’s goals... View Details
Keywords: People Analytics; Google; Labor Market; Staffing; Market Design; Marketplace Matching; Selection and Staffing; Goals and Objectives; Technology Industry; United States
Cowgill, Bo, and Rembrand Koning. "Matching Markets for Googlers." Harvard Business School Case 718-487, March 2018. (Revised August 2018.) (More about Bo Cowgill.)
- Article
The Market Design and Policy of Online Review Platforms
By: Benjamin Edelman
I present the institutions and incentives of online reviews, including attracting initial reviews, assuring truthful reviews of genuine experiences, and avoiding inflated or deceptive reviews. I also explore the competition and consumer protection concerns associated... View Details
Keywords: Reviews; Reputation; Platforms; Marketplaces; Deception; Market Design; Multi-Sided Platforms; Law; Online Technology; Information Technology Industry; Telecommunications Industry; Accommodations Industry; Retail Industry
Edelman, Benjamin. "The Market Design and Policy of Online Review Platforms." Oxford Review of Economic Policy 33, no. 4 (Winter 2017): 635–649.
- 2014
- Other Teaching and Training Material
Marketing Reading: Segmentation and Targeting
By: Sunil Gupta
This Reading introduces two of the integral parts of any marketing strategy: segmentation and targeting. It covers, first, all of the methods, techniques, and variables with which a business first uncovers the full range of its potential customers and then... View Details
Keywords: Behavioral Segmentation; Conjoint Analysis; Demographic Segmentation; Geographic Segmentation; Market Opportunities; Market Segmentation; Marketing; Marketing Strategy; Psychographic Segmentation; Unethical Marketing Practices; United States
Gupta, Sunil. "Marketing Reading: Segmentation and Targeting." Core Curriculum Readings Series. Boston: Harvard Business Publishing 8219, 2014.
- 2014
- Other Teaching and Training Material
Marketing Reading: Sales Force Design and Management (Teaching Note)
By: Doug J. Chung and Das Narayandas
Chung, Doug J., and Das Narayandas. "Marketing Reading: Sales Force Design and Management (Teaching Note)." Core Curriculum Readings Series. Boston: Harvard Business Publishing 8216, 2014.
- Article
Holdout in the Assembly of Complements: A Problem for Market Design
By: Scott Duke Kominers and E. Glen Weyl
Holdout problems prevent private (voluntary and self-financing) assembly of complementary goods—such as land or dispersed spectrum—from many self-interested sellers. While mechanisms that fully respect sellers' property rights cannot alleviate these holdout problems,... View Details
Kominers, Scott Duke, and E. Glen Weyl. "Holdout in the Assembly of Complements: A Problem for Market Design." American Economic Review: Papers and Proceedings 102, no. 3 (May 2012): 360–365.
- September 2013
- Exercise
An Exercise in Designing a Travel Coffee Mug
By: Elie Ofek and Michael Norris
In recent years design has emerged as a critical factor in the success of many new products. This case exercise provides a hands-on way to experience the design process and offers a structured approach for incorporating key considerations that can aid in effective... View Details
Keywords: New Product Development; Innovation; Market Research; Competitive Positioning; Design; Product Development; Consumer Products Industry
Ofek, Elie, and Michael Norris. "An Exercise in Designing a Travel Coffee Mug." Harvard Business School Exercise 514-042, September 2013.
- January 1971 (Revised August 1984)
- Case
Dansk Designs Ltd.
Dansk Designs Ltd., a supplier of high quality, highly designed tableware products, plans to enter a new product area in housewares. Past growth and anticipated future expansion make organizational changes necessary. Overseas operations, design changes, supplier... View Details
Keywords: Organizational Change and Adaptation; Growth Management; Expansion; Organizational Structure; Consumer Products Industry
Rosenblum, John W. "Dansk Designs Ltd." Harvard Business School Case 371-288, January 1971. (Revised August 1984.)
- 29 Dec 2014
- News
Children’s tablet designed in Mass. hits market in March
- 11 Jun 2020
- Working Paper Summaries
Paying It Backward and Forward: Expanding Access to Convalescent Plasma Therapy Through Market Design
- September 2020 (Revised June 2023)
- Exercise
Artea: Designing Targeting Strategies
By: Eva Ascarza and Ayelet Israeli
This collection of exercises aims to teach students about 1)Targeting Policies; and 2)Algorithmic bias in marketing—implications, causes, and possible solutions. Part (A) focuses on A/B testing analysis and targeting. Parts (B),(C),(D) Introduce algorithmic bias. The... View Details
Keywords: Algorithmic Data; Race And Ethnicity; Experimentation; Promotion; ＂Marketing Analytics＂; Marketing And Society; Big Data; Privacy; Data-driven Management; Data Analytics; Data Analysis; E-Commerce Strategy; Discrimination; Targeted Advertising; Targeted Policies; Targeting; Pricing Algorithms; A/B Testing; Ethical Decision Making; Customer Base Analysis; Customer Heterogeneity; Coupons; Algorithmic Bias; Marketing; Race; Gender; Diversity; Customer Relationship Management; Marketing Communications; Advertising; Decision Making; Ethics; E-commerce; Analytics and Data Science; Retail Industry; Apparel and Accessories Industry; United States
Ascarza, Eva, and Ayelet Israeli. "Artea: Designing Targeting Strategies." Harvard Business School Exercise 521-021, September 2020. (Revised June 2023.)
- August 2023
- Article
Can Security Design Foster Household Risk-Taking?
By: Laurent Calvet, Claire Célérier, Paolo Sodini and Boris Vallée
This paper shows that securities with a non-linear payoff design can foster household risk-taking. We demonstrate this effect empirically by exploiting the introduction of capital guarantee products in Sweden from 2002 to 2007. The fast and broad adoption of these... View Details
Keywords: Financial Innovation; Household Finance; Structured Products; Stock Market Participation; Finance; Innovation and Invention; Household; Personal Finance; Risk and Uncertainty; Behavior; Market Participation
Calvet, Laurent, Claire Célérier, Paolo Sodini, and Boris Vallée. "Can Security Design Foster Household Risk-Taking?" Journal of Finance 78, no. 4 (August 2023): 1917–1966.