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Show Results For
- All HBS Web
(692)
- News (94)
- Research (511)
- Events (2)
- Multimedia (5)
- Faculty Publications (212)
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- 02 Nov 2009
- Research & Ideas
Shareholders Need a Say on Pay
particular tool put forward in reforms is the idea of "say on pay," which gives shareholders a non-binding vote on executive compensation and severance packages. The Obama administration has... View Details
- 2017
- Working Paper
What Else Do Shareholders Want? Shareholder Proposals Contested by Firm Management
By: Eugene F. Soltes, Suraj Srinivasan and Rajesh Vijayaraghavan
Shareholder proposals provide investors an opportunity to exercise their decision rights within firms, but managers can seek permission from the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to dismiss proposals. We find that managers seek to exclude 39% of all proposals... View Details
Soltes, Eugene F., Suraj Srinivasan, and Rajesh Vijayaraghavan. "What Else Do Shareholders Want? Shareholder Proposals Contested by Firm Management." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 16-132, May 2016. (Revised October 2017.)
- summer 1992
- Article
Shareholder Trading Practices and Corporate Investment Horizons
By: Kenneth A. Froot, André Perold and J. Stein
Keywords: Institutional Investing; Market Efficiency; Behavioral Finance; Equities; Stock Market; Indexing; Financial Markets; Asset Pricing
Froot, Kenneth A., André Perold, and J. Stein. "Shareholder Trading Practices and Corporate Investment Horizons." Continental Bank Journal of Applied Corporate Finance 5, no. 2 (summer 1992): 42–58.
- 04 Mar 2014
- Working Paper Summaries
Consequences to Directors of Shareholder Activism
- 2024
- Working Paper
Voting Rules, Turnout, and Economic Policies
By: Enrico Cantoni, Vincent Pons and Jérôme Schäfer
In recent years, voter ID laws and convenience voting have generated heated partisan debates. To shed light on these policy issues, we survey the recent evidence on the institutional determinants and effects of voter turnout and broaden the perspective beyond the most... View Details
Cantoni, Enrico, Vincent Pons, and Jérôme Schäfer. "Voting Rules, Turnout, and Economic Policies." NBER Working Paper Series, No. 32941, September 2024.
- August 2015 (Revised September 2015)
- Case
Shareholder Activists and Corporate Strategy
By: David Collis and Ashley Hartman
By 2015, there had been an upsurge in activist shareholders arguing for radical changes in companies' corporate strategies. Personalities like Carl Icahn, Bill Ackman, and Daniel Loeb were feared and loathed in some quarters, celebrated in others. With nearly $120... View Details
Keywords: Scope; Activist Investors; Spin-offs; Synergy; Diversification; Consolidation; Hedge Fund; Corporate Strategy
Collis, David, and Ashley Hartman. "Shareholder Activists and Corporate Strategy." Harvard Business School Case 716-403, August 2015. (Revised September 2015.)
- 2012
- Other Unpublished Work
The Efficacy of Shareholder Voting: Evidence from Equity Compensation Plans
By: Ian D. Gow, Christopher S. Armstrong and David F. Larcker
This study examines the effects of shareholder support for equity compensation plans on subsequent chief executive officer (CEO) compensation. Using cross-sectional regression, instrumental variable, and regression discontinuity research designs, we find little... View Details
- 27 May 2019
- Working Paper Summaries
Voting Trusts and Antitrust: Rethinking the Role of Shareholder Rights and Private Litigation in Public Regulation, 1880s to 1930s
- 28 Apr 2003
- Research & Ideas
Shareholders Key to Corporate Reform
voting information accumulates, shareholder organizations such as Institutional Shareholder Services could use the balloting data to create... View Details
- 05 Mar 2008
- Working Paper Summaries
Board of Directors’ Responsiveness to Shareholders: Evidence from Shareholder Proposals
- Article
Laws versus Contracts: Legal Origins, Shareholder Protections, and Ownership Concentration in Brazil, 1890–1950
By: Aldo Musacchio
This article examines some of the institutional conditions that facilitated the development of equity markets in Brazil. A critical factor was the addition of protections for investors to corporate bylaws, which enabled relatively large corporations in Brazil to... View Details
Keywords: Voting; Equity; Financial Markets; Investment; Governance Controls; Business History; Ownership Stake; Brazil
Musacchio, Aldo. "Laws versus Contracts: Legal Origins, Shareholder Protections, and Ownership Concentration in Brazil, 1890–1950." Business History Review 82, no. 3 (Fall 2008): 445–473.
- 2008
- Working Paper
Laws vs. Contracts: Legal Origins, Shareholder Protections, and Ownership Concentration in Brazil, 1890–1950
By: Aldo Musacchio
The early development of large multidivisional corporations in Latin America required much more than capable managers, new technologies, and large markets. Behind such corporations was a market for capital in which entrepreneurs had to attract investors to buy either... View Details
Keywords: Voting; Entrepreneurship; Investment; Governance Controls; Contracts; Laws and Statutes; Ownership Stake; Brazil
Musacchio, Aldo. "Laws vs. Contracts: Legal Origins, Shareholder Protections, and Ownership Concentration in Brazil, 1890–1950." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 08-053, January 2008.
- October 2013 (Revised September 2014)
- Case
The TELUS Share Conversion Proposal
By: Lucy White, Benjamin C. Esty and Lisa Mazzanti
On February 21, 2013, TELUS announced a proposal to convert the firm's non-voting shares into voting shares on a one-to-one basis, thereby eliminating the firm's dual class structure. Shareholders were scheduled to vote on the proposal at the firm's annual general... View Details
Keywords: Proxy Contest; Proxy Battle; Proxy Advisor; ISS; Glass Lewis & Co.; Hedge Fund; Short Selling; Share Lending; Telecommunications; Voting Rights; Empty Voting; Equity Decoupling; Share Unification; Dual Class Shares; Canada; Exchange Ratio; Shareholder Activism; Shareholder Votes; Investment Activism; Public Equity; Capital Structure; Investment Return; Corporate Governance; Corporate Finance; Ownership Stake; Business and Shareholder Relations; Valuation; Telecommunications Industry; Canada; British Columbia; United States; New York (city, NY)
White, Lucy, Benjamin C. Esty, and Lisa Mazzanti. "The TELUS Share Conversion Proposal." Harvard Business School Case 214-001, October 2013. (Revised September 2014.)
- February 2025
- Case
Align Partners and SM Entertainment: Korean Shareholder Activism Meets K-Pop (A)
By: Charles CY Wang and Billy Chan
For years, institutional investors had experienced very limited success in influencing the management of listed companies through shareholder activist campaigns in Korea. The common practice of circular ownership and public resentment toward foreign shareholder... View Details
- March 2014 (Revised May 2014)
- Teaching Note
The TELUS Share Conversion Proposal
By: Lucy White and Benjamin C. Esty
On February 21, 2013, TELUS announced a proposal to convert the firm's non-voting shares into voting shares on a one-to-one basis, thereby eliminating the firm's dual class structure. Shareholders were scheduled to vote on the proposal at the firm's annual general... View Details
Keywords: Proxy Contest; Proxy Battle; Proxy Advisor; ISS; Glass Lewis & Co.; Hedge Fund; Short Selling; Share Lending; Telecommunications; Voting Rights; Empty Voting; Equity Decoupling; Share Unification; Dual Class Shares; Canada; Exchange Ratio; Shareholder Activism; Shareholder Votes; Investment Activism; Public Equity; Capital Structure; Investment Return; Corporate Governance; Corporate Finance; Ownership Stake; Business and Shareholder Relations; Valuation; Telecommunications Industry; Canada; British Columbia; United States; New York (city, NY)
- 19 Mar 2014
- Working Paper Summaries
The Use of Broker Votes to Reward Brokerage Firms’ and Their Analysts’ Research Activities
- February 2025
- Supplement
Align Partners and SM Entertainment: Korean Shareholder Activism Meets K-Pop (B)
By: Charles CY Wang and Billy Chan
For years, institutional investors had experienced very limited success in influencing the management of listed companies through shareholder activist campaigns in Korea. The common practice of circular ownership and public resentment toward foreign shareholder... View Details
- Article
The Use of Broker Votes to Reward Brokerage Firms' and Their Analysts' Research Activities
By: David A. Maber, Boris Groysberg and Paul M. Healy
In traditional markets, the price mechanism directs the flow of resources and governs the process through which supply and demand are brought into equilibrium. In the investment-research industry, broker votes perform these functions. Using detailed clinical data from... View Details
Maber, David A., Boris Groysberg, and Paul M. Healy. "The Use of Broker Votes to Reward Brokerage Firms' and Their Analysts' Research Activities." Harvard Business School Working Knowledge (March 19, 2014).
- February 2013
- Article
Does Shareholder Proxy Access Improve Firm Value? Evidence from the Business Roundtable Challenge
By: Bo Becker, Guhan Subramanian and Daniel B. Bergstresser
We use the Business Roundtable's challenge to the SEC's 2010 proxy access rule as a natural experiment to measure the value of shareholder proxy access. We find that firms that would have been most vulnerable to proxy access, as measured by institutional ownership and... View Details
Becker, Bo, Guhan Subramanian, and Daniel B. Bergstresser. "Does Shareholder Proxy Access Improve Firm Value? Evidence from the Business Roundtable Challenge." Journal of Law & Economics 56, no. 1 (February 2013): 127–160.
- 2007
- Other Unpublished Work
Say on Pay Vote and CEO Compensation: Evidence from the UK
By: Fabrizio Ferri and David Maber
In this study, we examine the effect on CEO pay of new legislation introduced in the United Kingdom (UK) at the end of 2002 that requires publicly-traded firms to submit an executive remuneration report to a non-binding shareholder vote ("say on pay") at the annual... View Details