Filter Results:
(280)
Show Results For
- All HBS Web (357)
- Faculty Publications (147)
Show Results For
- All HBS Web (357)
- Faculty Publications (147)
Sort by
- 2017
- Working Paper
Cooperative Strategic Games
By: Elon Kohlberg and Abraham Neyman
We examine a solution concept, called the “value," for n-person strategic games. In applications, the value provides an a-priori assessment of the monetary worth of a player's position in a strategic game, comprising not only the player's contribution to the total... View Details
Keywords: Game Theory
Kohlberg, Elon, and Abraham Neyman. "Cooperative Strategic Games." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 17-075, February 2017.
- 1999
- Chapter
On the Role of Reinforcement Learning in Experimental Games: The Cognitive Game Theory Approach
By: Ido Erev and A. E. Roth
- 08 Apr 2015
- Working Paper Summaries
The Cooperative Solution of Stochastic Games
Keywords: by Elon Kohlberg & Abraham Neyman
- April 1987 (Revised April 1992)
- Background Note
Games of Strategy: An Introduction
An introduction to the formal analysis of strategic situations. Ideas of game trees, backwards induction, and dominated strategies are introduced. The methods of backwards induction to find optimal strategies is related to the method of successive eliminations of... View Details
Krishna, Vijay. "Games of Strategy: An Introduction." Harvard Business School Background Note 187-159, April 1987. (Revised April 1992.)
- January 1982
- Background Note
Constant Sum Games
By: Elon Kohlberg
Keywords: Game Theory
Kohlberg, Elon. "Constant Sum Games." Harvard Business School Background Note 182-113, January 1982.
- 03 Mar 2017
- Working Paper Summaries
Cooperative Strategic Games
- December 1984
- Article
The Evolution of the Labor Market for Medical Interns and Residents: A Case Study in Game Theory
By: A. E. Roth
Roth, A. E. "The Evolution of the Labor Market for Medical Interns and Residents: A Case Study in Game Theory." Journal of Political Economy 92, no. 6 (December 1984): 991–1016.
- 2015
- Working Paper
The Cooperative Solution of Stochastic Games
By: Elon Kohlberg and Abraham Neyman
Building on the work of Nash, Harsanyi, and Shapley, we define a cooperative solution for strategic games that takes account of both the competitive and the cooperative aspects of such games. We prove existence in the general (NTU) case and uniqueness in the TU... View Details
Kohlberg, Elon, and Abraham Neyman. "The Cooperative Solution of Stochastic Games." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 15-071, March 2015.
- Teaching Interest
Economics
Instructor, Harvard Kennedy School of Government, MPA Mid-Career Summer Program View Details
- 24 Jul 2000
- Research & Ideas
Value Maximization and Stakeholder Theory
communities, governmental officials, "and, under some interpretations, the environment, terrorists, blackmailers, and thieves.") But by failing to specify how managers should make the necessary tradeoffs among competing interests, writes Jensen, advocates of... View Details
Keywords: by Michael C. Jensen
- 2011
- Working Paper
Better-reply Dynamics in Deferred Acceptance Games
In this paper we address the question of learning in a two-sided matching mechanism that utilizes the deferred acceptance algorithm. We consider a repeated matching game where at each period agents observe their match and have the opportunity to revise their strategy... View Details
Keywords: Learning; Marketplace Matching; Outcome or Result; Game Theory; Mathematical Methods; Strategy
Haeringer, Guillaume, and Hanna Halaburda. "Better-reply Dynamics in Deferred Acceptance Games." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 11-126, June 2011.
- 2008
- Working Paper
Gender in Job Negotiations: A Two-Level Game
By: Hannah Riley Bowles and Kathleen L. McGinn
We propose a two-level-game (Putnam, 1988) perspective on gender in job negotiations. At Level 1, candidates negotiate with the employers. At Level 2, candidates negotiate with domestic partners. In order to illuminate the interplay between these two levels, we review... View Details
Bowles, Hannah Riley, and Kathleen L. McGinn. "Gender in Job Negotiations: A Two-Level Game." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 08-095, May 2008.
- 29 Jun 2011
- Working Paper Summaries
Better-reply Dynamics in Deferred Acceptance Games
Keywords: by Guillaume Haeringer & Hanna Halaburda
- 1998
- Chapter
Can Negotiators Outperform Game Theory?
By: M. H. Bazerman, R. Gibbons, L. Thompson and K. L. McGinn
Bazerman, M. H., R. Gibbons, L. Thompson, and K. L. McGinn. "Can Negotiators Outperform Game Theory?" Chap. 4 in Debating Rationality: Nonrational Aspects of Organizational Decision Making, edited by J. Halpern and R. N. Stern, 78–98. Ithaca, NY: ILR Press, 1998. (Reprinted in A. Rau, E. Sherman, & S. Peppet (Eds.), Processes of Dispute Resolution, Foundation Press, 2002.)
- October 2009
- Article
Negotiation Analysis: From Games to Inferences to Decisions to Deals
Exemplified by the pioneering work of Howard Raiffa and often expressed in the pages of the Negotiation Journal, the emergent prescriptive field of "negotiation analysis" progressively developed from Raiffa's early contributions to game theory and to his later... View Details
Keywords: Decision Choices and Conditions; Negotiation Participants; Negotiation Preparation; Negotiation Process; Negotiation Tactics; Game Theory
Sebenius, James K. "Negotiation Analysis: From Games to Inferences to Decisions to Deals." Negotiation Journal 25, no. 4 (October 2009): 449–465.
- 2016
- Chapter
Deriving an Optimally Deceptive Policy in Two-Player Iterated Games
By: Elisabeth Paulson and Christopher Griffin
We formulate the problem of determining an optimally deceptive strategy in a repeated game framework. We assume that two players are engaged in repeated play. During an initial time period, Player 1 may deceptively train his opponent to expect a specific strategy. The... View Details
Paulson, Elisabeth, and Christopher Griffin. "Deriving an Optimally Deceptive Policy in Two-Player Iterated Games." In Proceedings of 2016 American Control Conference. IEEE Press, 2016. (Developed with Booz Allen Hamilton.)
- Article
Delayed-Response Strategies in Repeated Games with Observation Lags
By: Drew Fudenberg, Yuhta Ishii and Scott Duke Kominers
We extend the folk theorem of repeated games to two settings in which players' information about others' play arrives with stochastic lags. In our first model, signals are almost-perfect if and when they do arrive, that is, each player either observes an almost-perfect... View Details
Fudenberg, Drew, Yuhta Ishii, and Scott Duke Kominers. "Delayed-Response Strategies in Repeated Games with Observation Lags." Journal of Economic Theory 150 (March 2014): 487–514.
- 2007
- Chapter
Negotiation Analysis: Between Decisions and Games
- 1985
- Chapter
Toward a Focal-Point Theory of Bargaining
By: A. E. Roth
Roth, A. E. "Toward a Focal-Point Theory of Bargaining." In Game-Theoretic Models of Bargaining, edited by A. E. Roth, 259–268. Cambridge University Press, 1985.
- July 16, 2016
- Article
A Game Theoretic Model for Resource Allocation Among Countermeasures with Multiple Attributes
By: Elisabeth C. Paulson, Igor Linkov and Jeffrey Keisler
We study a strategic, two-player, sequential game between an attacker and defender. The defender must allocate resources amongst possible countermeasures and across possible targets. The attacker then chooses a type of threat and a target to attack. This paper proposes... View Details
Paulson, Elisabeth C., Igor Linkov, and Jeffrey Keisler. "A Game Theoretic Model for Resource Allocation Among Countermeasures with Multiple Attributes." European Journal of Operational Research 252, no. 2 (July 16, 2016): 610–622.