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- All HBS Web
(359)
- Faculty Publications (98)
- 2017
- Working Paper
Cooperative Strategic Games
By: Elon Kohlberg and Abraham Neyman
We examine a solution concept, called the “value," for n-person strategic games. In applications, the value provides an a-priori assessment of the monetary worth of a player's position in a strategic game, comprising not only the player's contribution to the total... View Details
Keywords: Game Theory
Kohlberg, Elon, and Abraham Neyman. "Cooperative Strategic Games." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 17-075, February 2017.
- July 16, 2016
- Article
A Game Theoretic Model for Resource Allocation Among Countermeasures with Multiple Attributes
By: Elisabeth C. Paulson, Igor Linkov and Jeffrey Keisler
We study a strategic, two-player, sequential game between an attacker and defender. The defender must allocate resources amongst possible countermeasures and across possible targets. The attacker then chooses a type of threat and a target to attack. This paper proposes... View Details
Paulson, Elisabeth C., Igor Linkov, and Jeffrey Keisler. "A Game Theoretic Model for Resource Allocation Among Countermeasures with Multiple Attributes." European Journal of Operational Research 252, no. 2 (July 16, 2016): 610–622.
- 2016
- Other Teaching and Training Material
Organizational Behavior Reading: Decision Making
By: Francesca Gino, Max Bazerman and Katherine Shonk
This Reading argues that decision making is systematically flawed and introduces methods to improve decision-making effectiveness. The Essential Reading section covers the rational decision-making model and three important ideas that challenge it: Herbert Simon's... View Details
Gino, Francesca, Max Bazerman, and Katherine Shonk. "Organizational Behavior Reading: Decision Making." Core Curriculum Readings Series. Boston, MA: Harvard Business Publishing 8383, 2016. Electronic.
- Article
Third-party Punishment as a Costly Signal of Trustworthiness
By: Jillian J. Jordan, Moshe Hoffman, Paul Bloom and David G. Rand
Third-party punishment (TPP), in which unaffected observers punish selfishness, promotes cooperation by deterring defection. But why should individuals choose to bear the costs of punishing? We present a game theoretic model of TPP as a costly signal of... View Details
Jordan, Jillian J., Moshe Hoffman, Paul Bloom, and David G. Rand. "Third-party Punishment as a Costly Signal of Trustworthiness." Nature 530, no. 7591 (2016): 473–476.
- 2016
- Chapter
Deriving an Optimally Deceptive Policy in Two-Player Iterated Games
By: Elisabeth Paulson and Christopher Griffin
We formulate the problem of determining an optimally deceptive strategy in a repeated game framework. We assume that two players are engaged in repeated play. During an initial time period, Player 1 may deceptively train his opponent to expect a specific strategy. The... View Details
Paulson, Elisabeth, and Christopher Griffin. "Deriving an Optimally Deceptive Policy in Two-Player Iterated Games." In Proceedings of 2016 American Control Conference. IEEE Press, 2016. (Developed with Booz Allen Hamilton.)
- 2015
- Other Teaching and Training Material
Competitive Strategies Marketing Reading
By: Jill Avery and Sunil Gupta
Core Curriculum Readings in Marketing cover the fundamental concepts, theories, and frameworks that business students must study.
This Reading illuminates the dynamics of companies in competition and offers a process for planning and executing marketing... View Details
This Reading illuminates the dynamics of companies in competition and offers a process for planning and executing marketing... View Details
Keywords: Competitive Strategy
Avery, Jill, and Sunil Gupta. "Competitive Strategies Marketing Reading." Core Curriculum Readings Series. Boston: Harvard Business School Publishing 8158, 2015.
- 2015
- Working Paper
The Cooperative Solution of Stochastic Games
By: Elon Kohlberg and Abraham Neyman
Building on the work of Nash, Harsanyi, and Shapley, we define a cooperative solution for strategic games that takes account of both the competitive and the cooperative aspects of such games. We prove existence in the general (NTU) case and uniqueness in the TU... View Details
Kohlberg, Elon, and Abraham Neyman. "The Cooperative Solution of Stochastic Games." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 15-071, March 2015.
- February 2015
- Article
Location Choices under Strategic Interactions
By: Juan Alcacer, Cristian Dezso and Minyuan Zhao
The literature on location choices has mostly emphasized the impact of location and firm characteristics. However, most industries with a significant presence of multi-location firms are oligopolistic in nature, which suggests that strategic interaction among firms... View Details
Keywords: Location Strategies; Multinational Strategy; Oligopolistic Competition; Firm Heterogeneity; Geographic Location; Multinational Firms and Management; Balance and Stability; Decision Choices and Conditions; Game Theory
Alcacer, Juan, Cristian Dezso, and Minyuan Zhao. "Location Choices under Strategic Interactions." Strategic Management Journal 36, no. 2 (February 2015): 197–215.
- 2015
- Chapter
Negotiations: Statistical Aspects
'Negotiation analysis' seeks to develop prescriptive theory and useful advice for negotiators and third parties. It generally emphasizes the parties' underlying interests, alternatives to negotiated agreement, approaches to productively manage the inherent tension... View Details
Sebenius, James K. "Negotiations: Statistical Aspects." In International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences. 2nd ed. Edited by James D. Wright, 430–436. London: Elsevier, 2015.
- Article
Heuristics Guide the Implementation of Social Preferences in One-Shot Prisoner's Dilemma Experiments
By: Jillian J. Jordan, Valerio Capraro and David G. Rand
Cooperation in one-shot anonymous interactions is a widely documented aspect of human behavior. Here we shed light on the motivations behind this behavior by experimentally exploring cooperation in a one-shot continuous-strategy Prisoner’s Dilemma (i.e. one-shot... View Details
Jordan, Jillian J., Valerio Capraro, and David G. Rand. "Heuristics Guide the Implementation of Social Preferences in One-Shot Prisoner's Dilemma Experiments." Art. 6790. Scientific Reports 4 (2014).
- 2014
- Working Paper
The NTU-Value of Stochastic Games
By: Elon Kohlberg and Abraham Neyman
Since the seminal paper of Shapley, the theory of stochastic games has been developed in many different directions. However, there has been practically no work on the interplay between stochastic games and cooperative game theory. Our purpose here is to make a first... View Details
Kohlberg, Elon, and Abraham Neyman. "The NTU-Value of Stochastic Games." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 15-014, September 2014.
- Article
Analyzing Scrip Systems
By: Kris Johnson, David Simchi-Levi and Peng Sun
Scrip systems provide a nonmonetary trade economy for exchange of resources. We model a scrip system as a stochastic game and study system design issues on selection rules to match potential trade partners over time. We show the optimality of one particular rule in... View Details
Keywords: "Repeated Games"; Stochastic Trust Game; Dynamic Program; P2P Lending; Scrip Systems; Artificial Currency; Non-monetary Trade Economies; Marketplace Matching; Currency; Operations; Game Theory
Johnson, Kris, David Simchi-Levi, and Peng Sun. "Analyzing Scrip Systems." Operations Research 62, no. 3 (May–June 2014): 524–534.
- Article
Delayed-Response Strategies in Repeated Games with Observation Lags
By: Drew Fudenberg, Yuhta Ishii and Scott Duke Kominers
We extend the folk theorem of repeated games to two settings in which players' information about others' play arrives with stochastic lags. In our first model, signals are almost-perfect if and when they do arrive, that is, each player either observes an almost-perfect... View Details
Fudenberg, Drew, Yuhta Ishii, and Scott Duke Kominers. "Delayed-Response Strategies in Repeated Games with Observation Lags." Journal of Economic Theory 150 (March 2014): 487–514.
- July 2013
- Technical Note
Competition Simulator Exercise: Questions
In the Competition Simulator Exercise, students explore through trial and error some important economic foundations of competitive strategy and managerial economics. In particular, the simulator lets students explore horizontal differentiation with and without price... View Details
Keywords: Economics Of Strategy; Economics Of Competition; Competition; Economics; Game Theory; Competitive Strategy; Marketing Strategy
Van den Steen, Eric. "Competition Simulator Exercise: Questions." Harvard Business School Technical Note 714-406, July 2013.
- June 2013 (Revised November 2022)
- Exercise
Competition Simulator Exercise
In the Competition Simulator Exercise, students explore through trial and error some important economic foundations of competitive strategy and managerial economics. In particular, the nine simulator exercises let students explore horizontal differentiation with and... View Details
Keywords: Competition; Economics; Game Theory; Competitive Strategy; Learning; Mathematical Methods; Analysis
Van den Steen, Eric J. "Competition Simulator Exercise." Harvard Business School Exercise 713-804, June 2013. (Revised November 2022.)
- June 2013 (Revised March 2014)
- Technical Note
Strategic Complements and Substitutes
The framework of strategic complements and substitutes can help companies anticipate competitors' responses. It is particularly helpful in deciding on price- or capacity-commitments (or pre-emption), but it can provide more general guidance for analyzing the potential... View Details
Keywords: Competition; Strategic Substitutes; Strategic Complements; Puppy Dog Strategy; Competitive Strategy; Game Theory; Strategy; Economics
Van den Steen, Eric. "Strategic Complements and Substitutes." Harvard Business School Technical Note 713-542, June 2013. (Revised March 2014.)
- June–July 2013
- Article
Firm Rivalry, Knowledge Accumulation, and MNE Location Choices
By: Juan Alcacer, Cristian Deszo and Minyuan Zhao
The international business (IB) literature has mostly emphasized the impact of location and firm characteristics on location choices. However, industries with a significant presence of multinational enterprises (MNEs) are oligopolistic in nature, which suggests that... View Details
Keywords: Geographic Location; Competition; Multinational Firms and Management; Knowledge Acquisition; Game Theory; Global Strategy
Alcacer, Juan, Cristian Deszo, and Minyuan Zhao. "Firm Rivalry, Knowledge Accumulation, and MNE Location Choices." Special Issue on The Multinational in Geographic Space. Journal of International Business Studies 44, no. 5 (June–July 2013): 504–520.
- June 2012 (Revised July 2013)
- Exercise
Competition Simulator Exercise: Instructions
In the Competition Simulator Exercise, students explore through trial and error some important economic foundations of competitive strategy and managerial economics. In particular, the nine simulator exercises let students explore horizontal differentiation with and... View Details
Van den Steen, Eric. "Competition Simulator Exercise: Instructions." Harvard Business School Exercise 712-498, June 2012. (Revised July 2013.)
- February 2012
- Article
Walking the Talk in Multiparty Bargaining: An Experimental Investigation
By: Kathleen L. McGinn, Katherine L. Milkman and Markus Noth
We study the framing effects of communication on payoffs in multiparty bargaining. Communication has been shown to be more truthful and revealing than predicted in equilibrium. Because talk is preference revealing, it may effectively frame bargaining around a logic of... View Details
Keywords: Competition; Negotiation Process; Fairness; Negotiation Types; Interpersonal Communication; Game Theory; Cooperation
McGinn, Kathleen L., Katherine L. Milkman, and Markus Noth. "Walking the Talk in Multiparty Bargaining: An Experimental Investigation." Journal of Economic Psychology 33, no. 1 (February 2012).
- June 2011
- Article
Truth in Giving: Experimental Evidence on the Welfare Effects of Informed Giving to the Poor
By: Christina Fong and Felix Oberholzer-Gee
It is often difficult for donors to predict the value of charitable giving because they know little about the persons who receive their help. This concern is particularly acute when making contributions to organizations that serve heterogeneous populations. While we... View Details
Keywords: Philanthropy and Charitable Giving; Policy; Information; Knowledge Acquisition; Game Theory; Prejudice and Bias; Poverty; Welfare
Fong, Christina, and Felix Oberholzer-Gee. "Truth in Giving: Experimental Evidence on the Welfare Effects of Informed Giving to the Poor." Special Issue on Charitable Giving and Fundraising Journal of Public Economics 95, nos. 5-6 (June 2011): 436–444.