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Show Results For
- All HBS Web
(1,640)
- People (1)
- News (225)
- Research (1,236)
- Events (6)
- Multimedia (6)
- Faculty Publications (828)
- Fast Answer
Government Contracts
How do I find government contracts? The following resources can be used to find government contracts issued to a company. USAspending.gov ... View Details
- 2008
- Working Paper
Contracting for Servicizing
Servicizing, a novel business practice that sells product functionality rather than products, has been touted as an environmentally beneficial business practice. This paper describes how servicizing transactions mitigate some problems associated with sales... View Details
Keywords: Customer Focus and Relationships; Contracts; Market Transactions; Service Delivery; Service Operations; Sales
Toffel, Michael W. "Contracting for Servicizing." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 08-063, February 2008. (February 2008.)
- Forthcoming
- Article
Transitory and Permanent Cash Flow Shocks in Debt Contract Design
By: Le Ma, Anywhere Sikochi and Yajun Xiao
We examine how lenders design contracts to account for transitory and permanent cash flow shocks facing borrowers. We find that volatile transitory cash flow shocks are associated with fewer liquidity covenants, indicating financial flexibility that enables firms to... View Details
Keywords: Debt Covenants; Cash Flow Shocks; Debt Contracting; Likelihood Of Default; Cash Flow; System Shocks
Ma, Le, Anywhere Sikochi, and Yajun Xiao. "Transitory and Permanent Cash Flow Shocks in Debt Contract Design." Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis (forthcoming). (Pre-published online February 25, 2025.)
- March 2010
- Article
Contractibility and Contract Design in Strategic Alliances
By: Josh Lerner and Ulrike Malmendier
Earlier version distributed as National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 11292. View Details
Lerner, Josh, and Ulrike Malmendier. "Contractibility and Contract Design in Strategic Alliances." American Economic Review 100, no. 1 (March 2010): 214–246.
- 2012
- Working Paper
Relational Contracts and Organizational Capabilities
By: R. Gibbons and R. Henderson
A large literature identifies unique organizational capabilities as a potent source of competitive advantage, yet our knowledge of why capabilities fail to diffuse more rapidly-particularly in situations in which competitors apparently have strong incentives to adopt... View Details
Keywords: Competitive Advantage; Motivation and Incentives; Management Practices and Processes; Contracts; Competency and Skills; Relationships; Complexity
Gibbons, R., and R. Henderson. "Relational Contracts and Organizational Capabilities." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 12-061, January 2012.
- February 1998
- Background Note
Contracting and Control in Venture Capital
By: Paul A. Gompers
Discusses the control mechanisms and contracts utilized by venture capitalists. The emphasis is on understanding potential conflicts of interest and how the contracts mitigate those conflicts. View Details
Keywords: Venture Capital; Governance Controls; Contracts; Business or Company Management; Conflict of Interests
Gompers, Paul A. "Contracting and Control in Venture Capital." Harvard Business School Background Note 298-067, February 1998.
- Article
Real Effects of Relational Contracts
By: Steven Blader, Claudine Gartenberg, Rebecca Henderson and Andrea Pratt
How important are factors such as "firm culture" and "employee engagement" in driving firm performance? Increasing evidence from a wide range of fields suggests that productivity differs widely across firms, even after the inclusion of careful controls for factors such... View Details
Blader, Steven, Claudine Gartenberg, Rebecca Henderson, and Andrea Pratt. "Real Effects of Relational Contracts." American Economic Review: Papers and Proceedings 105, no. 5 (May 2015): 452–456.
- Research Summary
Anti-Competitive Financial Contracting
Joint work with Giacinta Cestone, Institut d'Analisi Economica, Barcelona
This paper presents the first model where entry deterrence takes place through financial rather than product-market channels. In standard models of the interaction between product and... View Details
- September–October 2012
- Article
Relational Contracts and Organizational Capabilities
By: Robert Gibbons and Rebecca Henderson
A large literature identifies unique organizational capabilities as a potent source of competitive advantage, yet our knowledge of why capabilities fail to diffuse more rapidly—particularly in situations in which competitors apparently have strong incentives to adopt... View Details
Gibbons, Robert, and Rebecca Henderson. "Relational Contracts and Organizational Capabilities." Organization Science 23, no. 5 (September–October 2012): 1350–1364.
- June 1983
- Article
A Comparison of Tournaments and Contracts
By: Jerry R. Green and Nancy Stokey
Tournaments, reward structures based on rank order, are compared with individual contracts in a model with one risk-neutral principal and many risk-averse agents. Each agent's output is a stochastic function of his effort level plus an additive shock term that is... View Details
Green, Jerry R., and Nancy Stokey. "A Comparison of Tournaments and Contracts." Journal of Political Economy 91, no. 3 (June 1983): 349–364.
- Research Summary
Optimal Contracting with Reciprocal Agents
(with Florian Englmaier) (Job Market Paper)
Abstract: Empirically, compensation systems often seem to generate substantial effort despite weak incentives. We consider reciprocal motivations as a source of incentives. We solve for the optimal... View Details
- 14 Feb 2012
- Working Paper Summaries
Relational Contracts and Organizational Capabilities
Keywords: by R. Gibbons & R. Henderson
- 2008
- Working Paper
Stable Many-to-Many Matchings with Contracts
By: Bettina-Elisabeth Klaus and Markus Walzl
We consider several notions of setwise stability for many-to-many matching markets with contracts and provide an analysis of the relations between the resulting sets of stable allocations for general, substitutable, and strongly substitutable preferences. Apart from... View Details
Klaus, Bettina-Elisabeth, and Markus Walzl. "Stable Many-to-Many Matchings with Contracts." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 09-046, September 2008.
- May 2005 (Revised January 2006)
- Background Note
Note on Forward Contracts and Swaps
Introduces forward contracts and derives graphically through basic arbitrage principles the spot-forward parity. Introduces swap contracts as simply a portfolio of forward contracts. Also covers briefly the mathematics behind swaps as an extension of spot-forward... View Details
Keywords: Financial Instruments
Chacko, George C., Peter A. Hecht, Vincent Dessain, and Anders Sjoman. "Note on Forward Contracts and Swaps." Harvard Business School Background Note 205-118, May 2005. (Revised January 2006.)
- 2006
- Working Paper
Discretion in Agency Contracts
By: Nabil Al-Najjar and Ramon Casadesus-Masanell
Al-Najjar, Nabil, and Ramon Casadesus-Masanell. "Discretion in Agency Contracts." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 02-015, September 2001.
- Article
Renegotiation and the Form of Efficient Contracts
By: Jerry R. Green and J. J. Laffont
Two parties may agree to a mutually binding contract that will govern their behavior after an uncertain event becomes known. As there is no agent who can both observe this uncertain outcome and enforce the contract, contingent agreements are precluded. However, the... View Details
Green, Jerry R., and J. J. Laffont. "Renegotiation and the Form of Efficient Contracts." Annales d'économie et de statistique, nos. 25-26 (January–June 1992): 123–150.
- July 31, 2017
- Article
A Commitment Contract to Achieve Virologic Suppression in Poorly Adherent Patients with HIV/AIDS
By: Marcella Alsan, John Beshears, Wendy S. Armstrong, James J. Choi, Brigitte C. Madrian, Minh Ly T. Nguyen, Carlos Del Rio, David Laibson and Vincent C. Marconi
Objective: Assess whether a commitment contract informed by behavioral economics leads to persistent virologic suppression among HIV-positive patients with poor antiretroviral therapy (ART) adherence.
Design: Single-center pilot randomized clinical trial and a... View Details
Keywords: Adherence; Antiretroviral Therapy; Behavioral Economics; Commitment Contract; Financial Incentives; HIV-1 Virologic Suppression; Health Disorders; Motivation and Incentives
Alsan, Marcella, John Beshears, Wendy S. Armstrong, James J. Choi, Brigitte C. Madrian, Minh Ly T. Nguyen, Carlos Del Rio, David Laibson, and Vincent C. Marconi. "A Commitment Contract to Achieve Virologic Suppression in Poorly Adherent Patients with HIV/AIDS." AIDS 31, no. 12 (July 31, 2017): 1765–1769.
- 2014
- Working Paper
The Contract Year Phenomenon in the Corner Office: An Analysis of Firm Behavior During CEO Contract Renewals
By: Ping Liu and Yuhai Xuan
This paper investigates how executive employment contracts influence corporate financial policies during the final year of the contract term, using a new, hand-collected data set of CEO employment agreements. On the one hand, the impending expiration of fixed-term... View Details
Liu, Ping, and Yuhai Xuan. "The Contract Year Phenomenon in the Corner Office: An Analysis of Firm Behavior During CEO Contract Renewals." Working Paper, April 2014.
- November 1980
- Case
Norton Co.: Polish Contract
Capon, Noel. "Norton Co.: Polish Contract." Harvard Business School Case 581-046, November 1980.
The Contract Year Phenomenon in the Corner Office: An Analysis of Firm Behavior During CEO Contract Renewals
This paper investigates how executive employment contracts influence corporate financial policies during the final year of the contract term, using a new, hand-collected data set of CEO employment agreements. On the one hand, the impending... View Details