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Show Results For
- All HBS Web
(879)
- News (220)
- Research (545)
- Events (7)
- Multimedia (10)
- Faculty Publications (362)
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- 2008
- Working Paper
Stability and Nash Implementation in Matching Markets with Couples
By: Claus-Jochen Haake and Bettina-Elisabeth Klaus
We consider two-sided matching markets with couples. First, we extend a result by Klaus and Klijn (2005, Theorem 3.3) and show that for any weakly responsive couples market there always exists a "double stable" matching, i.e., a matching that is stable for the couples... View Details
Haake, Claus-Jochen, and Bettina-Elisabeth Klaus. "Stability and Nash Implementation in Matching Markets with Couples." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 09-017, August 2008.
- 2015
- Working Paper
Stability, Strategy-Proofness, and Cumulative Offer Mechanisms
By: John William Hatfield, Scott Duke Kominers and Alexander Westkamp
We consider the setting of many-to-one matching with contracts, where firms may
demand multiple contracts but each worker desires at most one contract. We introduce
three novel conditions—observable substitutability, observable size monotonicity,... View Details
Keywords: Matching With Contracts; Stability; Strategy-proofness; Substitutability; Size Monotonicity; Cumulative Offer Mechanism; Contracts; Market Design; Marketplace Matching; Balance and Stability
Hatfield, John William, Scott Duke Kominers, and Alexander Westkamp. "Stability, Strategy-Proofness, and Cumulative Offer Mechanisms." Working Paper, July 2015.
- 30 Sep 2009
- Research & Ideas
Harvard and HBS: The Next 100 Years
experiment" during a time of deep recession. In today's crowded marketplace of MBA programs, Harvard Business School remains distinctive. The intellectual agenda for Harvard Business School must become even more global. In coming... View Details
Keywords: Education
- 2014
- Working Paper
Hidden Substitutes
By: John William Hatfield and Scott Duke Kominers
In this paper, we show that preferences exhibiting some forms of complementarity
in fact have an underlying substitutable structure. Specifically, we show that some
preferences that are not substitutable in the setting of many-to-one matching with
contracts become... View Details
Keywords: Many-to-One Matching; Many-to-Many Matching; Stability; Substitutes; Matching With Contracts; Slot-Specific Priorities; Sherlock; Market Design; Contracts; Marketplace Matching; Balance and Stability
Hatfield, John William, and Scott Duke Kominers. "Hidden Substitutes." Working Paper, September 2014.
- 01 Jul 2014
- First Look
First Look: July 1
short-term debt. Publisher's link: http://www.people.hbs.edu/shanson/Comparative_Advantage_paper_20140623.pdf August 2013 Management Science Marketplace or Reseller? By: Hagiu, Andrei, and Julian Wright Abstract—Intermediaries can choose... View Details
Keywords: Carmen Nobel
- 14 May 2013
- First Look
First Look: May 14
platforms. Download working paper: https://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Pages/item.aspx?num=40488 Marketplace or Reseller? By: Hagiu, Andrei, and Julian Wright Abstract—An intermediary can choose between functioning as a marketplace, on which suppliers sell... View Details
Keywords: Sean Silverthorne
- 17 Apr 2017
- Research Event
The Most Pressing Issues for Platform Providers in the Sharing Economy
workflow, it’s very difficult to disintermediate,” Easterly said. Panelists also fielded this audience question: How do you overcome the challenges of introducing digital marketplaces in industries with slow technology adoption and rigid... View Details
- Article
Matching in Networks with Bilateral Contracts
By: John William Hatfield and Scott Duke Kominers
We introduce a model in which firms trade goods via bilateral contracts which specify a buyer, a seller, and the terms of the exchange. This setting subsumes (many-to-many) matching with contracts, as well as supply chain matching. When firms' relationships do not... View Details
Hatfield, John William, and Scott Duke Kominers. "Matching in Networks with Bilateral Contracts." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 4, no. 1 (February 2012): 176–208.
- 19 Sep 2017
- Working Paper Summaries
An Invitation to Market Design
.ExternalClass535E8B0AB65740BCB51D3AB82FC0F8CE p.MsoNormal, .ExternalClass535E8B0AB65740BCB51D3AB82FC0F8CE li.MsoNormal, .ExternalClass535E8B0AB65740BCB51D3AB82FC0F8CE div.MsoNormal... View Details
- 14 Jun 2017
- Working Paper Summaries
Minimizing Justified Envy in School Choice: The Design of New Orleans' OneApp
- December 2018
- Article
Reserve Design: Unintended Consequences and the Demise of Boston's Walk Zones
By: Umut Dur, Scott Duke Kominers, Parag A. Pathak and Tayfun Sönmez
Admissions policies often use reserves to grant certain applicants higher priority for some (but not all) available seats. Boston’s school choice system, for example, reserved half of each school’s seats for local neighborhood applicants while leaving the other half... View Details
Keywords: Neighborhoods; Equal Access; School Choice; Affirmative Action; Desegregation; Marketplace Matching; Fairness; Local Range; Education; Policy
Dur, Umut, Scott Duke Kominers, Parag A. Pathak, and Tayfun Sönmez. "Reserve Design: Unintended Consequences and the Demise of Boston's Walk Zones." Journal of Political Economy 126, no. 6 (December 2018): 2457–2479.
- 24 Jul 2018
- First Look
New Research and Ideas, July 24, 2018
Market Design By: Roth, Alvin E. Abstract—Marketplaces are often small parts of large markets, and both markets and marketplaces come in many varieties. Market design seeks to understand what marketplaces... View Details
Keywords: Dina Gerdeman
- 14 Dec 2015
- Research & Ideas
Airbnb Hosts Discriminate Against African-American Guests
many online marketplaces of the so-called sharing economy. “To facilitate trust, many online platforms like Airbnb encourage sellers to provide personal profiles and even to post pictures of themselves” says HBS Associate Professor Ben... View Details
- May 2016
- Article
Matching with Slot-Specific Priorities: Theory
By: Scott Duke Kominers and Tayfun Sönmez
We introduce a two-sided, many-to-one matching with contracts model in which agents with unit demand match to branches that may have multiple slots available to accept contracts. Each slot has its own linear priority order over contracts; a branch chooses contracts by... View Details
Keywords: Matching With Contracts; Stability; Strategy-proofness; School Choice; Affirmative Action; Airline Seat Upgrades; Contracts; Market Design; Marketplace Matching; Balance and Stability
Kominers, Scott Duke, and Tayfun Sönmez. "Matching with Slot-Specific Priorities: Theory." Theoretical Economics 11, no. 2 (May 2016): 683–710.
- Article
Preference Signaling in Matching Markets
Many labor markets share three stylized facts: employers cannot give full attention to all candidates, candidates are ready to provide information about their preferences for particular employers, and employers value and are prepared to act on this information. In this... View Details
Keywords: Signaling; Matching; Cheap Talk; Congestion; Market Design; Marketplace Matching; Communication; Job Search
Coles, Peter A., Alexey Kushnir, and Muriel Niederle. "Preference Signaling in Matching Markets." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 5, no. 2 (May 2013): 99–134.
- 2007
- Working Paper
The New Market for Federal Judicial Law Clerks
By: Christopher Avery, Christine Jolls, Richard Posner and Alvin E. Roth
In the past, judges have often hired applicants for judicial clerkships as early as the beginning of the second year of law school for positions commencing approximately two years down the road. In the new hiring regime for federal judicial law clerks, by contrast,... View Details
- June 2023
- Exercise
Clash of Two Giants Simulation Exercise Instructions
By: Feng Zhu and Marco Iansiti
Many markets are organized around platforms that connect consumers with complimentary applications and services. These platforms are two-sided because both sides - consumers and those providing applications or services - need access to the same platform to interact. A... View Details
Keywords: Platform Strategies; Technology Platform; Customer Acquisition; Network Effects; Digital Platforms; Marketplace Matching; Strategy
Zhu, Feng, and Marco Iansiti. "Clash of Two Giants Simulation Exercise Instructions." Harvard Business School Exercise 623-092, June 2023.
- February 2024
- Article
An Economic Framework for Vaccine Prioritization
By: Mohammad Akbarpour, Eric Budish, Piotr Dworczak and Scott Duke Kominers
We propose an economic framework for determining the optimal allocation of a scarce supply of vaccines that become gradually available during a public health crisis, such as the Covid-19 pandemic. Agents differ in observable and unobservable characteristics, and the... View Details
Keywords: Vaccine; Fairness; Public Finance; Public Goods; Allocation Problems; Allocative Efficiency; Allocation Rules; Social Welfare; Pandemics; Inequality; COVID-19; COVID-19 Pandemic; Public Sector; Resource Allocation; Market Design; Marketplace Matching; Public Administration Industry
Akbarpour, Mohammad, Eric Budish, Piotr Dworczak, and Scott Duke Kominers. "An Economic Framework for Vaccine Prioritization." Quarterly Journal of Economics 139, no. 1 (February 2024): 359–417. (Authors' names are in certified random order.)
- 2017
- Working Paper
Minimizing Justified Envy in School Choice: The Design of New Orleans' OneApp
By: Atila Abdulkadiroglu, Yeon-Koo Che, Parag A. Pathak, Alvin E. Roth and Oliver Tercieux
In 2012, New Orleans Recovery School District (RSD) became the first U.S. district to unify charter and traditional public school admissions in a single-offer assignment mechanism known as OneApp. The RSD also became the first district to use a mechanism based on Top... View Details
Keywords: Education; Decision Choices and Conditions; Marketplace Matching; Mathematical Methods; Design
Abdulkadiroglu, Atila, Yeon-Koo Che, Parag A. Pathak, Alvin E. Roth, and Oliver Tercieux. "Minimizing Justified Envy in School Choice: The Design of New Orleans' OneApp." NBER Working Paper Series, No. 23265, March 2017.
- Article
On the Correspondence of Contracts to Salaries in (Many-to-Many) Matching
In this note, I extend the work of Echenique (2012) to show that a model of many-to-many matching with contracts may be embedded into a model of many-to-many matching with wage bargaining whenever (1) all agentsʼ preferences are substitutable and (2) the matching with... View Details
Keywords: Many-to-Many Matching; Stability; Substitutes; Contract Design; Unitarity; Market Design; Contracts; Marketplace Matching; Balance and Stability; Economics
Kominers, Scott Duke. "On the Correspondence of Contracts to Salaries in (Many-to-Many) Matching." Games and Economic Behavior 75, no. 2 (July 2012): 984–989.