Kirby, William C. "Intercultural Connections and Chinese Development: External and Internal Spheres of Modern China's Foreign Relations." In China's Quest for Modernization: A Historical Perspective, edited by Frederic Wakeman and Wang Xi, 219–248. Berkeley: University of California, Berkeley, Institute of East Asian Studies, 1997. (published first in Zhongguo xiandaihua wenti [Issues of Chinese modernization] (Shanghai: Fudan daxue chubanshe, 1994))

Gulati, Ranjay, and Marlo Goetting. "Cisco Business Councils (2007): Unifying a Functional Enterprise with an Internal Governance System (TN)." Harvard Business School Teaching Note 410-126, June 2010.

Mintz, Ofer, Imran S. Currim, and Rohit Deshpandé. "National Customer Orientation: A Framework, Propositions and Agenda for Future Research." European Journal of Marketing 56, no. 4 (April 2022): 1014–1041.

Segel, Arthur I., and Chad M. Carr. "The Paris Opera Hotel." Harvard Business School Case 212-003, June 2012. (Revised September 2015.)

Kirby, William C., and Marijk C. van der Wende. "A Global Dialogue on Liberal Arts and Sciences: Re-engagement, Re-imagination, and Experimentation." Chap. 1 in Experiences in Liberal Arts and Science Education from America, Europe, and Asia: A Dialogue Across Continents, edited by William C. Kirby and Marijk C. van der Wende, 1–16. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016.

Esty, Benjamin C., Carla Chavich, and Aldo Sesia. "An Overview of Project Finance and Infrastructure Finance—2014 Update." Harvard Business School Background Note 214-083, June 2014. (Revised July 2014.)

Roe, Mark J., and Jordan I. Siegel. "Political Instability: Effects on Financial Development, Roots in the Severity of Economic Inequality." Journal of Comparative Economics 39, no. 3 (September 2011): 279–309. (We here bring forward strong evidence that political instability impedes financial development, with its variation a primary determinant of differences in financial development around the world. As such, it needs to be added to the short list of major determinants of financial development. First, structural conditions first postulated by Engerman and Sokoloff (2002) as generating long-term inequality are shown here empirically to be exogenous determinants of political instability. Second, that exogenously-determined political instability in turn holds back financial development, even when we control for factors prominent in the last decade's cross-country studies of financial development. The findings indicate that inequality-perpetuating conditions that result in political instability are fundamental roadblocks for international organizations like the World Bank that seek to promote financial development. The evidence here includes country fixed effect regressions and an instrumental model inspired by Engerman and Sokoloff's (2002) work, which to our knowledge has not yet been used in finance and which is consistent with current tests as valid instruments. Four conventional measures of national political instability — Alesina and Perotti's (1996) well-known index of instability, a subsequent index derived from Banks' (2005) work, and two indices of managerial perceptions of nation-by-nation political instability — persistently predict a wide range of national financial development outcomes for recent decades. Political instability's significance is time consistent in cross-sectional regressions back to the 1960's, the period when the key data becomes available, robust in both country fixed-effects and instrumental variable regressions, and consistent across multiple measures of instability and of financial development. Overall, the results indicate the existence of an important channel running from structural inequality to political instability, principally in nondemocratic settings, and then to financial backwardness. The robust significance of that channel extends existing work demonstrating the importance of political economy explanations for financial development and financial backwardness. It should help to better understand which policies will work for financial development, because political instability has causes, cures, and effects quite distinct from those of many of the key institutions most studied in the past decade as explaining financial backwardness.)

Shih, Willy, and Dawn Lau. "Myanmar: Special Economic Zones." Harvard Business School Case 620-027, October 2019. (Revised February 2021.)

Brautigam, Deborah, and Meg Rithmire. "The Chinese Debt Trap Is a Myth: The Narrative Wrongfully Portrays Both Beijing and the Developing Countries It Deals With." The Atlantic (website) (February 6, 2021).