Filter Results:
(493)
Show Results For
- All HBS Web
(493)
- News (69)
- Research (381)
- Events (5)
- Multimedia (4)
- Faculty Publications (237)
Show Results For
- All HBS Web
(493)
- News (69)
- Research (381)
- Events (5)
- Multimedia (4)
- Faculty Publications (237)
- November 1985
- Case
Riverside and DEC--General Information
A negotiation exercise between Riverside Lumber Co. and the Division of Environmental Conservation about reducing the effects of effluent discharge in a river. Students are assigned to a role and receive confidential information including a scoring system detailing the... View Details
Lax, David A. "Riverside and DEC--General Information." Harvard Business School Case 186-125, November 1985.
- 11 Jun 2008
- Working Paper Summaries
Gender in Job Negotiations: A Two-Level Game
- 2009
- Working Paper
Walking the Talk in Multiparty Bargaining: An Experimental Investigation
By: Kathleen L. McGinn, Katherine L Milkman and Markus Noth
We study the framing effects of communication in multiparty bargaining. Communication has been shown to be more truthful and revealing than predicted in equilibrium. Because talk is preference-revealing, it may effectively frame bargaining around a logic of fairness or... View Details
Keywords: Equality and Inequality; Competition; Negotiation Process; Negotiation Types; Fairness; Interpersonal Communication; Game Theory; Cooperation
McGinn, Kathleen L., Katherine L Milkman, and Markus Noth. "Walking the Talk in Multiparty Bargaining: An Experimental Investigation." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 10-039, November 2009.
- 28 Mar 2017
- First Look
First Look at New Research, March 28
characterizations could be easily read to imply that one’s BATNA could not itself be a negotiated agreement. Second, and more seriously, common descriptions of one’s BATNA as the “best outside option, independent of the other side” needlessly limit its applicability,... View Details
Keywords: Sean Silverthorne
- October 2008
- Article
Gender in Job Negotiations: A Two-Level Game
By: Hannah Riley Bowles and Kathleen McGinn
We propose taking a two-level-game perspective on gender in job negotiations. At Level One, candidates negotiate with employers. At Level Two, candidates negotiate with household members. In order to illuminate the interplay between these two levels, we review research... View Details
Keywords: Perspective; Negotiation; Research; Organizational Culture; Body of Literature; Jobs and Positions; Gender; Labor
Bowles, Hannah Riley, and Kathleen McGinn. "Gender in Job Negotiations: A Two-Level Game." Negotiation Journal 24, no. 4 (October 2008): 393–410.
- 2022
- Working Paper
Credit and the Family: The Economic Consequences of Closing the Credit Gap of U.S. Couples
By: Olivia S. Kim
Closing disparities in credit access between spouses can help reduce consumption inequality in the household. The 2013 reversal of the Truth-in-Lending Act increased the borrowing capacity of secondary earners in equitable-distribution states but not in... View Details
Keywords: Household; Credit; Equality and Inequality; Income; Policy; Family and Family Relationships
Kim, Olivia S. "Credit and the Family: The Economic Consequences of Closing the Credit Gap of U.S. Couples." Working Paper, December 2022.
- 2008
- Working Paper
Gender in Job Negotiations: A Two-Level Game
By: Hannah Riley Bowles and Kathleen L. McGinn
We propose a two-level-game (Putnam, 1988) perspective on gender in job negotiations. At Level 1, candidates negotiate with the employers. At Level 2, candidates negotiate with domestic partners. In order to illuminate the interplay between these two levels, we review... View Details
Bowles, Hannah Riley, and Kathleen L. McGinn. "Gender in Job Negotiations: A Two-Level Game." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 08-095, May 2008.
- Research Summary
Intra-Household Decision Making
Professor Ashraf's research in intra-household decision making examines how households make financial and health decisions, particularly in the presence of asymmetric information or benefits.
"
- August 2007
- Column
Pitch Your Offer—and Close the Deal
By: Deepak Malhotra and Max H. Bazerman
The article offers several strategies on how to be a good negotiator and decision maker for business developments. The strategies that are presented were an extract from the book Negotiation Genius: How to Overcome Obstacles and Achieve Brilliant Results at the... View Details
Malhotra, Deepak, and Max H. Bazerman. "Pitch Your Offer—and Close the Deal." Negotiation 10, no. 8 (August 2007).
- Web
The Five Forces - Institute For Strategy And Competitiveness
Five Forces Threat of Substitute Products or Services Bargaining Power of Suppliers Bargaining Power of Buyers Threat of New Entrants Rivalry Among Existing Competitors The Five Forces is a framework for... View Details
- January 2013
- Article
The Fog of Negotiation: What Negotiators Can Learn from Military Doctrine
On the surface, warfare and negotiation may seem to be polar opposites. The objective in war is to defeat the enemy. In negotiation, the goal is to find a solution that satisfies all the parties. Not surprisingly, little cross-learning and exchange has occurred across... View Details
Wheeler, Michael A. "The Fog of Negotiation: What Negotiators Can Learn from Military Doctrine." Negotiation Journal 29, no. 1 (January 2013): 23–38.
- Article
Undermining Value-Based Purchasing — Lessons from the Pharmaceutical Industry
By: Leemore S. Dafny, Christopher Ody and Matt Schmitt
The analogy between value-based purchasing in pharmaceuticals and the new frontier of alternative payment models for health care providers is relatively straightforward. Insurers are increasingly demanding steep discounts from providers in exchange for inclusion in... View Details
Keywords: Drug Copayment Coupons; Prescription Drug Policy; Health Care and Treatment; Insurance; Cost; Policy; Pharmaceutical Industry
Dafny, Leemore S., Christopher Ody, and Matt Schmitt. "Undermining Value-Based Purchasing — Lessons from the Pharmaceutical Industry." New England Journal of Medicine 375, no. 21 (November 24, 2016): 2013–2015.
- Article
Non-verifiability, Costly Renegotiation, and Efficiency
By: Jerry R. Green and J. J. Laffont
We study the implications of the non verifiability of information for the allocation of resources and the bearing of risk in a two party relationship. We consider a two step approach. In step one the two parties define a non contingent contract which will be executed... View Details
Keywords: Negotiation
Green, Jerry R., and J. J. Laffont. "Non-verifiability, Costly Renegotiation, and Efficiency." Annales d'économie et de statistique, no. 36 (October–December 1994): 81–95.
- 29 May 2008
- Working Paper Summaries
Some Neglected Axioms in Fair Division
Keywords: by John W. Pratt
- 2008
- Working Paper
Some Neglected Axioms in Fair Division
By: John W. Pratt
Conditions one might impose on fair allocation procedures are introduced. Nondiscrimination requires that agents share an item in proportion to their entitlements if they receive nothing else. The "price" procedures of Pratt (2007), including the Nash... View Details
Pratt, John W. "Some Neglected Axioms in Fair Division." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 08-094, May 2008.
- Research Summary
Overview
By: Natalia Rigol
My research focuses primarily on how to design, target, and deliver financial products to the poor, and, in particular, how financial inclusion can improve the socio-economic position of women. My projects have analyzed how the design and delivery of microfinance... View Details
- Forthcoming
- Chapter
Intermediation and Diffusion of Responsibility in Negotiation: A Case of Bounded Ethicality
By: Neeru Paharia, Lucas Clayton Coffman and Max Bazerman
This article compares direct deception with deception via an intermediary in the bargaining context. It describes a growing experimental literature that suggests how perceived ethics surrounding transactions with multiple partners can encourage misbehavior. It is noted... View Details
Paharia, Neeru, Lucas Clayton Coffman, and Max Bazerman. "Intermediation and Diffusion of Responsibility in Negotiation: A Case of Bounded Ethicality." In The Oxford Handbook of Economic Conflict Resolution, edited by Gary E. Bolton and Rachel T.A. Croson, 37–46. New York: Oxford University Press, 2012.
- Forthcoming
- Article
Redemption Mechanisms in Poison Pills: Evidence on Pill Design and Law Firm Effects
By: Olivier Baum and Guhan Subramanian
We present the first evidence on the incidence of “trip wire” versus “last look” poison pills. Using a hand-collected data set of 130 poison pills implemented and/or amended between January 1, 2020 and March 31, 2023, we find that pills are almost evenly divided... View Details
- January 1999
- Exercise
Seneca Systems (B): General and Confidential Instructions for R. Thompson, Vice President, Marketing
Seneca is a three-party negotiation-mediation simulation. The context is a product failure crisis in a manufacturing company with highly autonomous units. The heads of two divisions are in a dispute over who has responsibility for failures in a key product. The head of... View Details
Watkins, Michael D. "Seneca Systems (B): General and Confidential Instructions for R. Thompson, Vice President, Marketing." Harvard Business School Exercise 899-172, January 1999.
- June 2020
- Article
In Generous Offers I Trust: The Effect of First-offer Value on Economically Vulnerable Behaviors
By: M. Jeong, J. Minson and F. Gino
Negotiation scholarship espouses the importance of opening a bargaining situation with an aggressive offer, given the power of first offers to shape concessionary behavior and outcomes. In our research, we identify a surprising consequence to this common prescription.... View Details
Keywords: Attribution; Interpersonal Interaction; Judgment; Social Interaction; Inference; Open Data; Open Materials; Preregistered; Negotiation Offer; Strategy; Behavior; Interpersonal Communication; Trust; Outcome or Result
Jeong, M., J. Minson, and F. Gino. "In Generous Offers I Trust: The Effect of First-offer Value on Economically Vulnerable Behaviors." Psychological Science 31, no. 6 (June 2020): 644–653.