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- All HBS Web (385)
- Faculty Publications (166)
Show Results For
- All HBS Web (385)
- Faculty Publications (166)
- Article
The Stability of Edgeworth's Recontracting Process
By: Jerry R. Green
The core is the set of all unblocked allocations. Implicit in this definition is the idea that if an allocation is proposed which could be blocked, some coalition will form and issue a counterproposal which it can enforce. A process of successive counterproposals based... View Details
Green, Jerry R. "The Stability of Edgeworth's Recontracting Process." Econometrica 42, no. 1 (January 1974): 21–34.
- 1985
- Chapter
Differential Information, the Market and Incentive Compatibility
By: Jerry Green
Green, Jerry. "Differential Information, the Market and Incentive Compatibility." Chap. 3 in Frontiers of Economics, by Kenneth J. Arrow and Seppo Honkapohja, 178–226. Basil Blackwell, 1985.
- June 1986
- Article
A Supergame Theoretic Model of Price Wars During Booms
By: J. J. Rotemberg and Garth Saloner
Rotemberg, J. J., and Garth Saloner. "A Supergame Theoretic Model of Price Wars During Booms." American Economic Review 76, no. 3 (June 1986): 390–407.
- 08 Jan 2007
- What Do You Think?
Neuro Economics: Science or Science Fiction?
assess the impact of this work. Dick Meza said that "it will have to run the gauntlet of peer reviews and further research ." Lorenzo Ferlazzo observed that "the current lack of standardized insights into behavioral stimuli and View Details
Keywords: by Jim Heskett
- January 2014
- Article
Pareto Efficiency in Robust Optimization
By: Dan Iancu and Nikolaos Trichakis
This paper formalizes and adapts the well-known concept of Pareto efficiency in the context of the popular robust optimization (RO) methodology for linear optimization problems. We argue that the classical RO paradigm need not produce solutions that possess the... View Details
Iancu, Dan, and Nikolaos Trichakis. "Pareto Efficiency in Robust Optimization." Management Science 60, no. 1 (January 2014): 130–147.
- January 1982
- Background Note
Canadian Constitution Amendment Scheme
By: Elon Kohlberg
Kohlberg, Elon. "Canadian Constitution Amendment Scheme." Harvard Business School Background Note 182-110, January 1982.
- June 2013 (Revised March 2014)
- Technical Note
Strategic Complements and Substitutes
The framework of strategic complements and substitutes can help companies anticipate competitors' responses. It is particularly helpful in deciding on price- or capacity-commitments (or pre-emption), but it can provide more general guidance for analyzing the potential... View Details
Keywords: Competition; Strategic Substitutes; Strategic Complements; Puppy Dog Strategy; Competitive Strategy; Game Theory; Strategy; Economics
Van den Steen, Eric. "Strategic Complements and Substitutes." Harvard Business School Technical Note 713-542, June 2013. (Revised March 2014.)
- 2024
- Dictionary Entry
Jerry R. Green (1946-)
By: Eddie Dekel, John Geanakoplos and Scott Duke Kominers
Jerry Green has a deep and long-standing connection to Harvard University, and in particular with its Economics Department. This paper begins by reviewing his intellectual background, and then turns to exploring how he has influenced scholars through his wide-ranging... View Details
- 01 Feb 2002
- News
Driven
In Driven: How Human Nature Shapes Our Choices, HBS professor emeritus Paul Lawrence and professor Nitin Nohria explore one of the most basic questions of human behavior: What motivates us to act the way we do? Drawing on theories of... View Details
- May 2000
- Article
Maxmin Expected Utility over Savage Acts with a Set of Priors
By: Ramon Casadesus-Masanell, Peter Klibanoff and Emre Ozdenoren
This paper provides an axiomatic foundation for a maxmin expected utility over a set of priors (MMEU) decision rule in an environment where the elements of choice are Savage acts. This characterization complements the original axiomatizations of MMEU developed in a... View Details
Keywords: Uncertainty Aversion; Ambiguity; Expected Utility; Set Of Priors; Knightian Uncertainty; Decision Making; Game Theory; Risk and Uncertainty; Mathematical Methods
Casadesus-Masanell, Ramon, Peter Klibanoff, and Emre Ozdenoren. "Maxmin Expected Utility over Savage Acts with a Set of Priors." Journal of Economic Theory 92, no. 1 (May 2000): 35–65.
- September 2023
- Article
A Pull versus Push Framework for Reputation
Reputation is a powerful driver of human behavior. Reputation systems incentivize 'actors' to take reputation-enhancing actions, and 'evaluators' to reward actors with positive reputations by preferentially cooperating with them. This article proposes a reputation... View Details
Jordan, Jillian J. "A Pull versus Push Framework for Reputation." Trends in Cognitive Sciences 27, no. 9 (September 2023): 852–866.
- June 2012 (Revised July 2013)
- Exercise
Competition Simulator Exercise: Instructions
In the Competition Simulator Exercise, students explore through trial and error some important economic foundations of competitive strategy and managerial economics. In particular, the nine simulator exercises let students explore horizontal differentiation with and... View Details
Van den Steen, Eric. "Competition Simulator Exercise: Instructions." Harvard Business School Exercise 712-498, June 2012. (Revised July 2013.)
- 2003
- Other Unpublished Work
Compensatory Transfers in Two-Player Decision Problems
By: Jerry R. Green
- Article
Heuristics Guide the Implementation of Social Preferences in One-Shot Prisoner's Dilemma Experiments
By: Jillian J. Jordan, Valerio Capraro and David G. Rand
Cooperation in one-shot anonymous interactions is a widely documented aspect of human behavior. Here we shed light on the motivations behind this behavior by experimentally exploring cooperation in a one-shot continuous-strategy Prisoner’s Dilemma (i.e. one-shot... View Details
Jordan, Jillian J., Valerio Capraro, and David G. Rand. "Heuristics Guide the Implementation of Social Preferences in One-Shot Prisoner's Dilemma Experiments." Art. 6790. Scientific Reports 4 (2014).
- 2007
- Other Unpublished Work
When the Punishment Must Fit the Crime: Remarks on the Failure of Simple Penal Codes in Extensive-Form Games.
By: Lucy White, George J. Mailath and Volker Nocke
White, Lucy, George J. Mailath, and Volker Nocke. "When the Punishment Must Fit the Crime: Remarks on the Failure of Simple Penal Codes in Extensive-Form Games." October 2007.
- Article
Buyer-Initiated vs. Seller-Initiated Information Revelation
Sales presentations are the core of the selling process where salespeople provide information to prospects. One challenge is that the amount of information available to be potentially communicated may exceed salespeople's ability to communicate or customers' ability to... View Details
- Article
Raiffa Transformed the Field of Negotiation—and Me
By: Max Bazerman
Howard Raiffa was a role model, friend, and inspiration. He transformed the field of negotiation, and he transformed my career. This brief article provides a recollection of how Howard revolutionized the field of negotiation and how those insights are now affecting... View Details
Bazerman, Max. "Raiffa Transformed the Field of Negotiation—and Me." Negotiation and Conflict Management Research 11, no. 3 (August 2018): 259–261.
- 2008
- Working Paper
Stability and Nash Implementation in Matching Markets with Couples
By: Claus-Jochen Haake and Bettina-Elisabeth Klaus
We consider two-sided matching markets with couples. First, we extend a result by Klaus and Klijn (2005, Theorem 3.3) and show that for any weakly responsive couples market there always exists a "double stable" matching, i.e., a matching that is stable for the couples... View Details
Haake, Claus-Jochen, and Bettina-Elisabeth Klaus. "Stability and Nash Implementation in Matching Markets with Couples." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 09-017, August 2008.
- 2010
- Working Paper
Competing Complements
By: Ramon Casadesus-Masanell, Barry Nalebuff and David B. Yoffie
In Cournot's model of complements, the producers of A and B are both monopolists. This paper extends Cournot's model to allow for competition between complements on one side of the market. Consider two complements, A and B, where the A + B bundle is valuable only when... View Details
Casadesus-Masanell, Ramon, Barry Nalebuff, and David B. Yoffie. "Competing Complements." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 09-009, July 2008. (Revised March 2010.)
- December 2010
- Article
Social Preferences and Strategic Uncertainty: An Experiment on Markets and Contracts
This paper reports a three-phase experiment on a stylized labor market. In the first two phases, agents face simple games, which we use to estimate subjects' social and reciprocity concerns. In the last phase, four principals compete by offering agents a contract from... View Details
Keywords: Strategy; Risk and Uncertainty; Markets; Contracts; Decisions; Distribution; Labor; Game Theory
Cabrales, Antonio, Raffaele Miniaci, Marco Piovesan, and Giovanni Ponti. "Social Preferences and Strategic Uncertainty: An Experiment on Markets and Contracts." American Economic Review 100, no. 5 (December 2010): 2261–2278.