Publications
Publications
Show Results For
- All HBS Web
(118,360)
- Faculty Publications (2,221)
- September 12, 1990
- Editorial
Of Red Ink and the Greenhouse
- September 1990
- Article
Competition on Many Fronts: A Stackelberg Signaling Equilibrium
By: Jerry R. Green and Jean-Jacques Laffont
An economic agent, the incumbent, is operating in many environments at the same time. These may be locations, markets, or specific activities. He is informed of the particular conditions relevant to each situation. His action in each case is observable by another... View Details
- July 1990
- Article
A Perspective on Negotiation Research in Accounting and Auditing
By: J. K. Murnighan and M. H. Bazerman
- June 1990
- Article
The Role of Bargaining Zones and Agents: A Negotiation Simulation
By: Y. M. Kim, M. H. Bazerman and M. A. Neale
Keywords: Negotiation
- 1990
- Book
Research on Negotiation in Organizations: A Series of Analytical Essays and Critical Reviews
By: B. H. Sheppard, M. H. Bazerman and R. J. Lewicki
- Article
Novelty and Disclosure in Patent Law
By: Suzanne Scotchmer and Jerry R. Green
The stringency of the novelty requirement in patent law affects the pace of innovation because it affects the amount of technical information that is disclosed among firms. It also affects ex ante profitability of research. We compare weak and strong novelty... View Details
- 1990
- Article
Tactical Behavior and Negotiation Outcomes
By: L. R. Weingart, L. L. Thompson, J. S. Carroll and M. H. Bazerman
- 1990
- Article
The Role of Arbitration Costs and Risk Aversion on Dispute Outcomes
By: H. S. Farber, M. A. Neale and M. H. Bazerman
- 1989
- Chapter
Analytic Themes of the U.S. Program on the Processes of International Negotiation
By: James K. Sebenius and Howard Raiffa
- December 1988
- Article
Ordinal Independence in Non-Linear Utility Theory
By: Jerry R. Green and Bruno Jullien
Individual behavior under uncertainty is characterized using a new axiom, ordinal independence, which is a weakened form of the von Neumann-Morgcnslern independence axiom. It states that if two distributions share a tail in common, then this tail can be modified... View Details
Keywords: Preferences
- 1988
- Simulation
El-Tek Simulation and Teaching Note
By: M. Bazerman and J. Brett
Keywords: Conflict and Resolution
- Article
'Making Book Against Oneself,' the Independence Axiom, and Non-Linear Utility Theory
By: Jerry R. Green
An individual with known preferences over lotteries can be led to accept random wealth distributions different from his initial endowment by a sequential process in which some uncertainty is resolved and he is offered a new lottery in place of the remaining... View Details
- 1987
- Chapter
Limited Communication and Incentive Compatibility
By: Jerry R. Green and Jean-Jacques Laffont
- January 1987
- Article
Posterior Implementability in a Two-person Decision Problem
By: Jerry R. Green and Jean-Jacques Laffont
When a decision rule is implemented using a Bayesian incentive compatible mechanism in which the messages are publicly observable, the players' information is augmented by their observation of each others' strategies. In this paper we study the set of Bayesian... View Details
- 1986
- Working Paper
Price Competition with a Distribution of Switch Costs and Reservation Prices
By: Jerry R. Green and Suzanne Scotchmer
When there is a distribution of switch costs and of reservation prices for a good, and marginal cost of producing the good is zero, equilibrium in pure price strategies may (and sometimes must) exhibit price dispersion. Equilibrium may or may not exist, and there may... View Details
- Article
Partially Verifiable Information and Mechanism Design
By: Jerry R. Green and Jean-Jacques Laffont
In a principal-agent model with adverse selection, we study the implementation of social choice functions when the agent's message space is a correspondence which depends on this true characteristic. We characterize such correspondence for which the Revelation... View Details