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- All HBS Web (345)
- Faculty Publications (146)
Show Results For
- All HBS Web (345)
- Faculty Publications (146)
- June 2013 (Revised March 2014)
- Technical Note
Strategic Complements and Substitutes
The framework of strategic complements and substitutes can help companies anticipate competitors' responses. It is particularly helpful in deciding on price- or capacity-commitments (or pre-emption), but it can provide more general guidance for analyzing the potential... View Details
Keywords: Competition; Strategic Substitutes; Strategic Complements; Puppy Dog Strategy; Competitive Strategy; Game Theory; Strategy; Economics
Van den Steen, Eric. "Strategic Complements and Substitutes." Harvard Business School Technical Note 713-542, June 2013. (Revised March 2014.)
- September 2023
- Article
A Pull versus Push Framework for Reputation
Reputation is a powerful driver of human behavior. Reputation systems incentivize 'actors' to take reputation-enhancing actions, and 'evaluators' to reward actors with positive reputations by preferentially cooperating with them. This article proposes a reputation... View Details
Jordan, Jillian J. "A Pull versus Push Framework for Reputation." Trends in Cognitive Sciences 27, no. 9 (September 2023): 852–866.
- June 2012 (Revised July 2013)
- Exercise
Competition Simulator Exercise: Instructions
In the Competition Simulator Exercise, students explore through trial and error some important economic foundations of competitive strategy and managerial economics. In particular, the nine simulator exercises let students explore horizontal differentiation with and... View Details
Van den Steen, Eric. "Competition Simulator Exercise: Instructions." Harvard Business School Exercise 712-498, June 2012. (Revised July 2013.)
- 2024
- Dictionary Entry
Jerry R. Green (1946-)
By: Eddie Dekel, John Geanakoplos and Scott Duke Kominers
Jerry Green has a deep and long-standing connection to Harvard University, and in particular with its Economics Department. This paper begins by reviewing his intellectual background, and then turns to exploring how he has influenced scholars through his wide-ranging... View Details
- Article
Buyer-Initiated vs. Seller-Initiated Information Revelation
Sales presentations are the core of the selling process where salespeople provide information to prospects. One challenge is that the amount of information available to be potentially communicated may exceed salespeople's ability to communicate or customers' ability to... View Details
- 2008
- Working Paper
Stability and Nash Implementation in Matching Markets with Couples
By: Claus-Jochen Haake and Bettina-Elisabeth Klaus
We consider two-sided matching markets with couples. First, we extend a result by Klaus and Klijn (2005, Theorem 3.3) and show that for any weakly responsive couples market there always exists a "double stable" matching, i.e., a matching that is stable for the couples... View Details
Haake, Claus-Jochen, and Bettina-Elisabeth Klaus. "Stability and Nash Implementation in Matching Markets with Couples." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 09-017, August 2008.
- May 2000
- Article
Maxmin Expected Utility over Savage Acts with a Set of Priors
By: Ramon Casadesus-Masanell, Peter Klibanoff and Emre Ozdenoren
This paper provides an axiomatic foundation for a maxmin expected utility over a set of priors (MMEU) decision rule in an environment where the elements of choice are Savage acts. This characterization complements the original axiomatizations of MMEU developed in a... View Details
Keywords: Uncertainty Aversion; Ambiguity; Expected Utility; Set Of Priors; Knightian Uncertainty; Decision Making; Game Theory; Risk and Uncertainty; Mathematical Methods
Casadesus-Masanell, Ramon, Peter Klibanoff, and Emre Ozdenoren. "Maxmin Expected Utility over Savage Acts with a Set of Priors." Journal of Economic Theory 92, no. 1 (May 2000): 35–65.
- 08 Aug 2006
- First Look
First Look: August 8, 2006
case. This paper, in contrast, reports an experiment designed to meaningfully pose the question: "How good an approximation does a theory provide on average?" Even in the simplest class of two-person constant sum View Details
Keywords: Sean Silverthorne
- Article
Heuristics Guide the Implementation of Social Preferences in One-Shot Prisoner's Dilemma Experiments
By: Jillian J. Jordan, Valerio Capraro and David G. Rand
Cooperation in one-shot anonymous interactions is a widely documented aspect of human behavior. Here we shed light on the motivations behind this behavior by experimentally exploring cooperation in a one-shot continuous-strategy Prisoner’s Dilemma (i.e. one-shot... View Details
Jordan, Jillian J., Valerio Capraro, and David G. Rand. "Heuristics Guide the Implementation of Social Preferences in One-Shot Prisoner's Dilemma Experiments." Art. 6790. Scientific Reports 4 (2014).
- 2007
- Other Unpublished Work
When the Punishment Must Fit the Crime: Remarks on the Failure of Simple Penal Codes in Extensive-Form Games.
By: Lucy White, George J. Mailath and Volker Nocke
White, Lucy, George J. Mailath, and Volker Nocke. "When the Punishment Must Fit the Crime: Remarks on the Failure of Simple Penal Codes in Extensive-Form Games." October 2007.
- 04 Mar 2010
- Working Paper Summaries
The Determinants of Individual Performance and Collective Value in Private-Collective Software Innovation
- October 2017
- Article
Elevating Repositioning Costs: Strategy Dynamics and Competitive Interactions
By: Anoop R. Menon and Dennis Yao
This paper proposes an approach for modeling competitive interactions that incorporates the costs to firms of changing strategy. The costs associated with strategy modifications, which we term “repositioning costs,” are particularly relevant to competitive interactions... View Details
Keywords: ＂Repositioning Costs; Strategy Dynamics; Strategic Interaction; Capabilities; Cost; Strategy; Change; Game Theory; Organizational Change and Adaptation
Menon, Anoop R., and Dennis Yao. "Elevating Repositioning Costs: Strategy Dynamics and Competitive Interactions." Strategic Management Journal 38, no. 10 (October 2017): 1953–1963.
- 2006
- Conference Paper
Modeling Repeated Play of the Prisoners' Dilemma with Reinforcement Learning over an Enriched Strategy Set
By: A. E. Roth and Ido Erev
- Article
Raiffa Transformed the Field of Negotiation—and Me
By: Max Bazerman
Howard Raiffa was a role model, friend, and inspiration. He transformed the field of negotiation, and he transformed my career. This brief article provides a recollection of how Howard revolutionized the field of negotiation and how those insights are now affecting... View Details
Bazerman, Max. "Raiffa Transformed the Field of Negotiation—and Me." Negotiation and Conflict Management Research 11, no. 3 (August 2018): 259–261.
- July 2013
- Technical Note
Competition Simulator Exercise: Questions
In the Competition Simulator Exercise, students explore through trial and error some important economic foundations of competitive strategy and managerial economics. In particular, the simulator lets students explore horizontal differentiation with and without price... View Details
Keywords: Economics Of Strategy; Economics Of Competition; Competition; Economics; Game Theory; Competitive Strategy; Marketing Strategy
Van den Steen, Eric. "Competition Simulator Exercise: Questions." Harvard Business School Technical Note 714-406, July 2013.
- 2010
- Working Paper
Competing Complements
By: Ramon Casadesus-Masanell, Barry Nalebuff and David B. Yoffie
In Cournot's model of complements, the producers of A and B are both monopolists. This paper extends Cournot's model to allow for competition between complements on one side of the market. Consider two complements, A and B, where the A + B bundle is valuable only when... View Details
Casadesus-Masanell, Ramon, Barry Nalebuff, and David B. Yoffie. "Competing Complements." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 09-009, July 2008. (Revised March 2010.)
- 2010
- Working Paper
Overconfidence by Bayesian Rational Agents
This paper derives two mechanisms through which Bayesian-rational individuals with differing priors will tend to be relatively overconfident about their estimates and predictions, in the sense of overestimating the precision of these estimates. The intuition behind one... View Details
Van den Steen, Eric. "Overconfidence by Bayesian Rational Agents." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 11-049, November 2010.
- September 2007
- Article
Do Vertical Mergers Facilitate Upstream Collusion?
By: Volker Nocke and Lucy White
We investigate the impact of vertical mergers on upstream firms' ability to collude when selling to downstream firms in a repeated game. We show that vertical mergers give rise to an outlets effect: the deviation profits of cheating unintegrated firms are reduced as... View Details
Nocke, Volker, and Lucy White. "Do Vertical Mergers Facilitate Upstream Collusion?" American Economic Review 97, no. 4 (September 2007): 1321–1339.
- December 2010
- Article
Social Preferences and Strategic Uncertainty: An Experiment on Markets and Contracts
This paper reports a three-phase experiment on a stylized labor market. In the first two phases, agents face simple games, which we use to estimate subjects' social and reciprocity concerns. In the last phase, four principals compete by offering agents a contract from... View Details
Keywords: Strategy; Risk and Uncertainty; Markets; Contracts; Decisions; Distribution; Labor; Game Theory
Cabrales, Antonio, Raffaele Miniaci, Marco Piovesan, and Giovanni Ponti. "Social Preferences and Strategic Uncertainty: An Experiment on Markets and Contracts." American Economic Review 100, no. 5 (December 2010): 2261–2278.
- Research Summary
Overview
I study strategic interaction between organizations that operate different business models. View Details