Skip to Main Content
HBS Home
  • About
  • Academic Programs
  • Alumni
  • Faculty & Research
  • Baker Library
  • Giving
  • Harvard Business Review
  • Initiatives
  • News
  • Recruit
  • Map / Directions
Faculty & Research
  • Faculty
  • Research
  • Featured Topics
  • Academic Units
  • …→
  • Harvard Business School→
  • Faculty & Research→
  • Research
    • Research
    • Publications
    • Global Research Centers
    • Case Development
    • Initiatives & Projects
    • Research Services
    • Seminars & Conferences
    →
  • Publications→

Publications

Publications

Filter Results: (946) Arrow Down
Filter Results: (946) Arrow Down Arrow Up

Show Results For

  • All HBS Web  (946)
    • News  (197)
    • Research  (655)
    • Events  (7)
    • Multimedia  (5)
  • Faculty Publications  (309)

Show Results For

  • All HBS Web  (946)
    • News  (197)
    • Research  (655)
    • Events  (7)
    • Multimedia  (5)
  • Faculty Publications  (309)
Page 1 of 946 Results →
  • Article

Preference Signaling in Matching Markets

Many labor markets share three stylized facts: employers cannot give full attention to all candidates, candidates are ready to provide information about their preferences for particular employers, and employers value and are prepared to act on this information. In this... View Details
Keywords: Signaling; Matching; Cheap Talk; Congestion; Market Design; Marketplace Matching; Communication; Job Search
Citation
Find at Harvard
Read Now
Related
Coles, Peter A., Alexey Kushnir, and Muriel Niederle. "Preference Signaling in Matching Markets." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 5, no. 2 (May 2013): 99–134.
  • 2021
  • Working Paper

Investment as the Opportunity Cost of Dividend Signaling

By: Zach Kaplan and Gerardo Pérez Cavazos
We provide evidence that firms with weak investment opportunities (those whose current earnings justify a greater valuation than firms with strong investment opportunities) signal their permanent earnings level through their dividends. In the cross-section, we show... View Details
Keywords: Dividend Signaling; Investment; Opportunities
Citation
Related
Kaplan, Zach, and Gerardo Pérez Cavazos. "Investment as the Opportunity Cost of Dividend Signaling." Working Paper, May 2021. (Forthcoming in The Accounting Review.)
  • May 2022
  • Article

Investment as the Opportunity Cost of Dividend Signaling

By: Zach Kaplan and Gerardo Pérez Cavazos
We provide evidence that firms with weak investment opportunities (those whose current earnings justify a greater valuation than firms with strong investment opportunities) signal their permanent earnings level through their dividends. In the cross-section, we show... View Details
Keywords: Dividends; Earnings; Investment Opportunities; Payout Policy; Signaling; Capital Structure; Business Earnings; Investment; Opportunities
Citation
Find at Harvard
Related
Kaplan, Zach, and Gerardo Pérez Cavazos. "Investment as the Opportunity Cost of Dividend Signaling." Accounting Review 97, no. 3 (May 2022): 279–308.
  • March 1993 (Revised April 1995)
  • Case

Signalling Costs

NutraSweet's worldwide patent-protected monopoly on aspartame, the low-calorie high-intensity sweetener, ended with the 1987 entry of the Holland Sweetener Co. (HSC) into the European market. Following the arrival of a challenger, NutraSweet acted to reduce sharply the... View Details
Keywords: Patents; Competition; Price; Market Entry and Exit; Food and Beverage Industry; United States; Europe
Citation
Educators
Purchase
Related
Brandenburger, Adam M. "Signalling Costs." Harvard Business School Case 793-125, March 1993. (Revised April 1995.)
  • 05 Oct 2021
  • News

Launch Signals

Sara de Zárraga (left) and Quinn Fitzgerald When they met at HBS, Quinn Fitzgerald and Sara de Zárraga (both MBA 2017) shared their experiences as survivors of assault—and realized they wanted to create a tool to prevent future occurrences of violence against women.... View Details
Keywords: entrepreneurship; startup; safety; wearable tech; women; Computer and Electronic Product Manufacturing; Manufacturing
  • 23 Mar 2020
  • News

Signal Boost

In the early 1990s, Gloria Lara (MBA 1983) found herself in a debate with five male engineers on Chrysler’s development floor as they tossed around the idea of two sliding doors for the minivan, as opposed to only one on the right-hand side. The men in the Chrysler... View Details
  • Awards

Journal of Consumer Research Best Article Award

Finalist for the 2017 Journal of Consumer Research Best Article Award for “The Red Sneakers Effect: Inferring Status and Competence from Signals of Nonconformity” (June 2014) with Silvia Bellezza and Francesca Gino. View Details
  • Article

Signaling When Nobody Is Watching: A Reputation Heuristics Account of Outrage and Punishment in One-shot Anonymous Interactions

By: Jillian J. Jordan and David G. Rand
Moralistic punishment can confer reputation benefits by signaling trustworthiness to observers. However, why do people punish even when nobody is watching? We argue that people often rely on the heuristic that reputation is typically at stake, such that reputation... View Details
Keywords: Signaling; Morality; Trustworthiness; Anger; Third-party Punishment; Moral Sensibility; Behavior; Trust; Reputation
Citation
Find at Harvard
Purchase
Related
Jordan, Jillian J., and David G. Rand. "Signaling When Nobody Is Watching: A Reputation Heuristics Account of Outrage and Punishment in One-shot Anonymous Interactions." Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 118, no. 1 (January 2020).
  • 06 Nov 2020
  • News

Signal Boost

In her role as executive director of the Lakeshore Ethnic Diversity Alliance (LEDA), Gloria Lara (MBA 1983) focuses on a big question: Once a community, business, or organization becomes more diverse, what happens next? LEDA, a nonprofit that focuses on diversity and... View Details
  • March 2017
  • Article

Why Do We Hate Hypocrites? Evidence for a Theory of False Signaling

By: Jillian J. Jordan, Roseanna Sommers, Paul Bloom and David G. Rand
Why do people judge hypocrites, who condemn immoral behaviors that they in fact engage in, so negatively? We propose that hypocrites are disliked because their condemnation sends a false signal about their personal conduct, deceptively suggesting that they behave... View Details
Keywords: Moral Psychology; Condemnation; Vignettes; Deception; Social Signaling; Open Data; Open Materials; Moral Sensibility; Behavior; Perception
Citation
Find at Harvard
Register to Read
Related
Jordan, Jillian J., Roseanna Sommers, Paul Bloom, and David G. Rand. "Why Do We Hate Hypocrites? Evidence for a Theory of False Signaling." Psychological Science 28, no. 3 (March 2017): 356–368.

    Signaling with Dividends

    We outline a dividend signaling model that features investors who are behaviorally averse to dividend cuts. Managers with strong unobservable cash earnings separate by paying high dividends but retain enough to be likely not to fall short next period. The model is... View Details

    • 27 Mar 2014
    • Video

    Signaling a Transition

    • March 1990 (Revised March 1993)
    • Case

    Signalling Quality Through Advertising

    Citation
    Find at Harvard
    Related
    Brandenburger, Adam M., and Vijay Krishna. "Signalling Quality Through Advertising." Harvard Business School Case 190-147, March 1990. (Revised March 1993.)
    • 24 Mar 2014
    • News

    Red Sneaker Effect Signals Authority And Accomplishment

    • Article

    Handshaking Promotes Deal-Making by Signaling Cooperative Intent

    By: Juliana Schroeder, Jane L. Risen, Francesca Gino and Michael I. Norton
    We examine how a simple handshake—a gesture that often occurs at the outset of social interactions—can influence deal-making. Because handshakes are social rituals, they are imbued with meaning beyond their physical features. We propose that during mixed-motive... View Details
    Keywords: Handshake; Cooperation; Affiliation; Competition; Negotiation; Nonverbal Communication; Negotiation Participants; Behavior; Communication Intention and Meaning; Negotiation Deal
    Citation
    Find at Harvard
    Read Now
    Purchase
    Related
    Schroeder, Juliana, Jane L. Risen, Francesca Gino, and Michael I. Norton. "Handshaking Promotes Deal-Making by Signaling Cooperative Intent." Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 116, no. 5 (May 2019): 743–768.
    • August 2, 2016
    • Article

    Uncalculating Cooperation Is Used to Signal Trustworthiness

    By: Jillian J. Jordan, Moshe Hoffman, Martin A. Nowak and David G. Rand
    Humans frequently cooperate without carefully weighing the costs and benefits. As a result, people may wind up cooperating when it is not worthwhile to do so. Why risk making costly mistakes? Here, we present experimental evidence that reputation concerns provide an... View Details
    Keywords: Social Evaluation; Experimental Economics; Moral Psychology; Cooperation; Reputation; Decision Making
    Citation
    Read Now
    Related
    Jordan, Jillian J., Moshe Hoffman, Martin A. Nowak, and David G. Rand. "Uncalculating Cooperation Is Used to Signal Trustworthiness." Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 113, no. 31 (August 2, 2016): 8658–8663.
    • 17 Aug 2012
    • Working Paper Summaries

    Dividends as Reference Points: A Behavioral Signaling Approach

    Keywords: by Malcolm Baker & Jeffrey Wurgler
    • 27 Aug 2019
    • News

    Buoyant economy sending positive signals to global investors

    • September 2023 (Revised December 2023)
    • Case

    TetraScience: Noise and Signal

    By: Thomas R. Eisenmann and Tom Quinn
    In 2019, TetraScience CEO “Spin” Wang needed advice. Five years earlier, he had cofounded a startup that saw early success with a hardware product designed to help laboratory scientists in the biotechnology and pharmaceutical spaces more easily collect data from... View Details
    Keywords: Entrepreneurship; Business Growth and Maturation; Business Organization; Restructuring; Forecasting and Prediction; Digital Platforms; Analytics and Data Science; AI and Machine Learning; Organizational Structure; Network Effects; Competitive Strategy; Biotechnology Industry; Pharmaceutical Industry; United States; Boston
    Citation
    Educators
    Purchase
    Related
    Eisenmann, Thomas R., and Tom Quinn. "TetraScience: Noise and Signal." Harvard Business School Case 824-024, September 2023. (Revised December 2023.)
    • Article

    Third-party Punishment as a Costly Signal of Trustworthiness

    By: Jillian J. Jordan, Moshe Hoffman, Paul Bloom and David G. Rand
    Third-party punishment (TPP), in which unaffected observers punish selfishness, promotes cooperation by deterring defection. But why should individuals choose to bear the costs of punishing? We present a game theoretic model of TPP as a costly signal of... View Details
    Keywords: Third-party Punishment; Trustworthiness; Behavior; Trust; Game Theory
    Citation
    Find at Harvard
    Read Now
    Related
    Jordan, Jillian J., Moshe Hoffman, Paul Bloom, and David G. Rand. "Third-party Punishment as a Costly Signal of Trustworthiness." Nature 530, no. 7591 (2016): 473–476.
    • 1
    • 2
    • …
    • 47
    • 48
    • →
    ǁ
    Campus Map
    Harvard Business School
    Soldiers Field
    Boston, MA 02163
    →Map & Directions
    →More Contact Information
    • Make a Gift
    • Site Map
    • Jobs
    • Harvard University
    • Trademarks
    • Policies
    • Accessibility
    • Digital Accessibility
    Copyright © President & Fellows of Harvard College.