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Show Results For
- All HBS Web
(947)
- News (197)
- Research (655)
- Events (7)
- Multimedia (5)
- Faculty Publications (309)
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- Article
Preference Signaling in Matching Markets
Many labor markets share three stylized facts: employers cannot give full attention to all candidates, candidates are ready to provide information about their preferences for particular employers, and employers value and are prepared to act on this information. In this... View Details
Keywords: Signaling; Matching; Cheap Talk; Congestion; Market Design; Marketplace Matching; Communication; Job Search
Coles, Peter A., Alexey Kushnir, and Muriel Niederle. "Preference Signaling in Matching Markets." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 5, no. 2 (May 2013): 99–134.
- 2021
- Working Paper
Investment as the Opportunity Cost of Dividend Signaling
By: Zach Kaplan and Gerardo Pérez Cavazos
We provide evidence that firms with weak investment opportunities (those whose current earnings justify a greater valuation than firms with strong investment opportunities) signal their permanent earnings level through their dividends. In the cross-section, we show... View Details
- May 2022
- Article
Investment as the Opportunity Cost of Dividend Signaling
By: Zach Kaplan and Gerardo Pérez Cavazos
We provide evidence that firms with weak investment opportunities (those whose current earnings justify a greater valuation than firms with strong investment opportunities) signal their permanent earnings level through their dividends. In the cross-section, we show... View Details
Keywords: Dividends; Earnings; Investment Opportunities; Payout Policy; Signaling; Capital Structure; Business Earnings; Investment; Opportunities
Kaplan, Zach, and Gerardo Pérez Cavazos. "Investment as the Opportunity Cost of Dividend Signaling." Accounting Review 97, no. 3 (May 2022): 279–308.
- March 1993 (Revised April 1995)
- Case
Signalling Costs
NutraSweet's worldwide patent-protected monopoly on aspartame, the low-calorie high-intensity sweetener, ended with the 1987 entry of the Holland Sweetener Co. (HSC) into the European market. Following the arrival of a challenger, NutraSweet acted to reduce sharply the... View Details
Keywords: Patents; Competition; Price; Market Entry and Exit; Food and Beverage Industry; United States; Europe
Brandenburger, Adam M. "Signalling Costs." Harvard Business School Case 793-125, March 1993. (Revised April 1995.)
- 05 Oct 2021
- News
Launch Signals
Sara de Zárraga (left) and Quinn Fitzgerald When they met at HBS, Quinn Fitzgerald and Sara de Zárraga (both MBA 2017) shared their experiences as survivors of assault—and realized they wanted to create a tool to prevent future occurrences of violence against women.... View Details
- 23 Mar 2020
- News
Signal Boost
In the early 1990s, Gloria Lara (MBA 1983) found herself in a debate with five male engineers on Chrysler’s development floor as they tossed around the idea of two sliding doors for the minivan, as opposed to only one on the right-hand side. The men in the Chrysler... View Details
- Article
Signaling When Nobody Is Watching: A Reputation Heuristics Account of Outrage and Punishment in One-shot Anonymous Interactions
By: Jillian J. Jordan and David G. Rand
Moralistic punishment can confer reputation benefits by signaling trustworthiness to observers. However, why do people punish even when nobody is watching? We argue that people often rely on the heuristic that reputation is typically at stake, such that reputation... View Details
Keywords: Signaling; Morality; Trustworthiness; Anger; Third-party Punishment; Moral Sensibility; Behavior; Trust; Reputation
Jordan, Jillian J., and David G. Rand. "Signaling When Nobody Is Watching: A Reputation Heuristics Account of Outrage and Punishment in One-shot Anonymous Interactions." Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 118, no. 1 (January 2020).
- Awards
Journal of Consumer Research Best Article Award
Finalist for the 2017 Journal of Consumer Research Best Article Award for “The Red Sneakers Effect: Inferring Status and Competence from Signals of Nonconformity” (June 2014) with Silvia Bellezza and Francesca Gino. View Details
- 06 Nov 2020
- News
Signal Boost
In her role as executive director of the Lakeshore Ethnic Diversity Alliance (LEDA), Gloria Lara (MBA 1983) focuses on a big question: Once a community, business, or organization becomes more diverse, what happens next? LEDA, a nonprofit that focuses on diversity and... View Details
- March 2017
- Article
Why Do We Hate Hypocrites? Evidence for a Theory of False Signaling
By: Jillian J. Jordan, Roseanna Sommers, Paul Bloom and David G. Rand
Why do people judge hypocrites, who condemn immoral behaviors that they in fact engage in, so negatively? We propose that hypocrites are disliked because their condemnation sends a false signal about their personal conduct, deceptively suggesting that they behave... View Details
Keywords: Moral Psychology; Condemnation; Vignettes; Deception; Social Signaling; Open Data; Open Materials; Moral Sensibility; Behavior; Perception
Jordan, Jillian J., Roseanna Sommers, Paul Bloom, and David G. Rand. "Why Do We Hate Hypocrites? Evidence for a Theory of False Signaling." Psychological Science 28, no. 3 (March 2017): 356–368.
Signaling with Dividends
We outline a dividend signaling model that features investors who are behaviorally averse to dividend cuts. Managers with strong unobservable cash earnings separate by paying high dividends but retain enough to be likely not to fall short next period. The model is... View Details
- 27 Mar 2014
- Video
Signaling a Transition
- 24 Mar 2014
- News
Red Sneaker Effect Signals Authority And Accomplishment
- March 1990 (Revised March 1993)
- Case
Signalling Quality Through Advertising
Brandenburger, Adam M., and Vijay Krishna. "Signalling Quality Through Advertising." Harvard Business School Case 190-147, March 1990. (Revised March 1993.)
- August 2, 2016
- Article
Uncalculating Cooperation Is Used to Signal Trustworthiness
By: Jillian J. Jordan, Moshe Hoffman, Martin A. Nowak and David G. Rand
Humans frequently cooperate without carefully weighing the costs and benefits. As a result, people may wind up cooperating when it is not worthwhile to do so. Why risk making costly mistakes? Here, we present experimental evidence that reputation concerns provide an... View Details
Keywords: Social Evaluation; Experimental Economics; Moral Psychology; Cooperation; Reputation; Decision Making
Jordan, Jillian J., Moshe Hoffman, Martin A. Nowak, and David G. Rand. "Uncalculating Cooperation Is Used to Signal Trustworthiness." Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 113, no. 31 (August 2, 2016): 8658–8663.
- 17 Aug 2012
- Working Paper Summaries
Dividends as Reference Points: A Behavioral Signaling Approach
Keywords: by Malcolm Baker & Jeffrey Wurgler
- Article
Handshaking Promotes Deal-Making by Signaling Cooperative Intent
By: Juliana Schroeder, Jane L. Risen, Francesca Gino and Michael I. Norton
We examine how a simple handshake—a gesture that often occurs at the outset of social interactions—can influence deal-making. Because handshakes are social rituals, they are imbued with meaning beyond their physical features. We propose that during mixed-motive... View Details
Keywords: Handshake; Cooperation; Affiliation; Competition; Negotiation; Nonverbal Communication; Negotiation Participants; Behavior; Communication Intention and Meaning; Negotiation Deal
Schroeder, Juliana, Jane L. Risen, Francesca Gino, and Michael I. Norton. "Handshaking Promotes Deal-Making by Signaling Cooperative Intent." Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 116, no. 5 (May 2019): 743–768.
- 27 Aug 2019
- News
Buoyant economy sending positive signals to global investors
- Article
Third-party Punishment as a Costly Signal of Trustworthiness
By: Jillian J. Jordan, Moshe Hoffman, Paul Bloom and David G. Rand
Third-party punishment (TPP), in which unaffected observers punish selfishness, promotes cooperation by deterring defection. But why should individuals choose to bear the costs of punishing? We present a game theoretic model of TPP as a costly signal of... View Details
Jordan, Jillian J., Moshe Hoffman, Paul Bloom, and David G. Rand. "Third-party Punishment as a Costly Signal of Trustworthiness." Nature 530, no. 7591 (2016): 473–476.
- Article
A Collective Biological Processing Algorithm for EKG Signals
By: Mike Horia Teodorescu
We establish and explore an analogy between hunting by packs of agents and signal processing. We present a version of adaptive ‘Hunting Swarm’ algorithm (HSA), apply it to EKG signals, and investigate the influence of the model parameters on the filtering of stationary... View Details
Teodorescu, Mike Horia. "A Collective Biological Processing Algorithm for EKG Signals." Proceedings of the International Conference on Bio-inspired Systems and Signal Processing 4th (2011): 413–420. (IEEE BIOSIGNALS 2011.)