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- All HBS Web
(1,132)
- People (1)
- News (176)
- Research (735)
- Events (6)
- Multimedia (1)
- Faculty Publications (280)
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- November 2023
- Article
Algorithmic Mechanism Design with Investment
By: Mohammad Akbarpour, Scott Duke Kominers, Kevin Michael Li, Shengwu Li and Paul Milgrom
We study the investment incentives created by truthful mechanisms that allocate resources using approximation algorithms. Some approximation algorithms guarantee nearly 100% of the optimal welfare, but have only a zero guarantee when one bidder can invest before... View Details
Akbarpour, Mohammad, Scott Duke Kominers, Kevin Michael Li, Shengwu Li, and Paul Milgrom. "Algorithmic Mechanism Design with Investment." Econometrica 91, no. 6 (November 2023): 1969–2003.
Job Design Optimization Tool
The free, online Job Design Optimization Tool (JDOT) can be used to design, or test the design of, any job in any organization. Use the tool with the... View Details
- July 2021
- Article
Augmenting Markets with Mechanisms
By: Samuel Antill and Darrell Duffie
We explain how the common practice of size-discovery trade detracts from overall financial market efficiency. At each of a series of size-discovery sessions, traders report their desired trades, generating allocations of the asset and cash that rely on the most recent... View Details
Keywords: Mechanism Design; Price Impact; Size Discovery; Allocative Efficiency; Workup; Dark Pool; Financial Markets; Market Design; Performance Efficiency
Antill, Samuel, and Darrell Duffie. "Augmenting Markets with Mechanisms." Review of Economic Studies 88, no. 4 (July 2021): 1665–1719.
- Research Summary
The Design of Mechanisms and Institutions
Professor Coughlan's research also investigates the design of public policy and collective choice institutions. His research publications have applied game theory, mechanism design, and laboratory experiments to explore incentives and outcomes under alternative legal,... View Details
- 2016
- Working Paper
Designing Online Marketplaces: Trust and Reputation Mechanisms
By: Michael Luca
Online marketplaces have proliferated over the past decade, creating new markets where none existed. By reducing transaction costs, online marketplaces facilitate transactions that otherwise would not have occurred and enable easier entry of small sellers. One central... View Details
Luca, Michael. "Designing Online Marketplaces: Trust and Reputation Mechanisms." NBER Working Paper Series, No. 22616, September 2016.
- Apr 12 2019
- Interview
Understanding the Job Design Optimization Tool
- Article
Partially Verifiable Information and Mechanism Design
By: Jerry R. Green and Jean-Jacques Laffont
In a principal-agent model with adverse selection, we study the implementation of social choice functions when the agent's message space is a correspondence which depends on this true characteristic. We characterize such correspondence for which the Revelation... View Details
Green, Jerry R., and Jean-Jacques Laffont. "Partially Verifiable Information and Mechanism Design." Review of Economic Studies 53, no. 3 (July 1986): 447–456.
- December 2016
- Module Note
Strategy Execution Module 10: Using the Job Design Optimization Tool to Build Effective Organizations
By: Robert Simons
This module reading provides directions for using the online Job Design Optimization Tool (JDOT) which is available free of charge from Harvard Business School Publishing at https://cb.hbsp.harvard.edu/cbmp/resources/marketing/multimedia/JDOT/index.html. This tool can... View Details
Keywords: Management Control Systems; Implementing Strategy; Execution; Span Of Control; Span Of Accountability; Performance Measurement; Job Design; Organization Design; Strategy; Entrepreneurship
Simons, Robert. "Strategy Execution Module 10: Using the Job Design Optimization Tool to Build Effective Organizations." Harvard Business School Module Note 117-110, December 2016.
- 2020
- Working Paper
Designing, Not Checking, for Policy Robustness: An Example with Optimal Taxation
By: Benjami Lockwood, Afras Y. Sial and Matthew C. Weinzierl
Economists typically check the robustness of their results by comparing them across plausible ranges of parameter values and model structures. A preferable approach to robustness—for the purposes of policymaking and evaluation—is to design policy that takes these... View Details
Lockwood, Benjami, Afras Y. Sial, and Matthew C. Weinzierl. "Designing, Not Checking, for Policy Robustness: An Example with Optimal Taxation." NBER Working Paper Series, No. 28098, November 2020.
- Article
Optimal Capital-Gains Taxation under Limited Information
By: Jerry R. Green and Eytan Sheshinski
Taxation of capital gains at realization may distort individuals' decisions regarding holding or selling during an asset's lifetime. This creates the problem of designing a tax structure for capital gains so as to induce efficient patterns of holding and selling.... View Details
Green, Jerry R., and Eytan Sheshinski. "Optimal Capital-Gains Taxation under Limited Information." Journal of Political Economy 86, no. 6 (December 1978): 1143–1158.
- June 2024
- Article
Redistributive Allocation Mechanisms
By: Mohammad Akbarpour, Piotr Dworczak and Scott Duke Kominers
Many scarce public resources are allocated at below-market-clearing prices, and sometimes for free. Such "non-market" mechanisms sacrifice some surplus, yet they can potentially improve equity. We develop a model of mechanism design with redistributive concerns. Agents... View Details
Akbarpour, Mohammad, Piotr Dworczak, and Scott Duke Kominers. "Redistributive Allocation Mechanisms." Journal of Political Economy 132, no. 6 (June 2024): 1831–1875. (Authors' names are in certified random order.)
- July 2021
- Article
Redistribution through Markets
By: Piotr Dworczak, Scott Duke Kominers and Mohammad Akbarpour
Policymakers frequently use price regulations as a response to inequality in the markets they control. In this paper, we examine the optimal structure of such policies from the perspective of mechanism design. We study a buyer-seller market in which agents have private... View Details
Keywords: Optimal Mechanism Design; Redistribution; Inequality; Welfare Theorems; Market Design; Equality and Inequality
Dworczak, Piotr, Scott Duke Kominers, and Mohammad Akbarpour. "Redistribution through Markets." Econometrica 89, no. 4 (July 2021): 1665–1698. (Authors' names are in certified random order.)
- 2015
- Working Paper
Stability, Strategy-Proofness, and Cumulative Offer Mechanisms
By: John William Hatfield, Scott Duke Kominers and Alexander Westkamp
We consider the setting of many-to-one matching with contracts, where firms may
demand multiple contracts but each worker desires at most one contract. We introduce
three novel conditions—observable substitutability, observable size monotonicity,... View Details
Keywords: Matching With Contracts; Stability; Strategy-proofness; Substitutability; Size Monotonicity; Cumulative Offer Mechanism; Contracts; Market Design; Marketplace Matching; Balance and Stability
Hatfield, John William, Scott Duke Kominers, and Alexander Westkamp. "Stability, Strategy-Proofness, and Cumulative Offer Mechanisms." Working Paper, July 2015.
- May 2010
- Article
Optimal Auction Design and Equilibrium Selection in Sponsored Search Auctions
By: Benjamin Edelman and Michael Schwarz
We characterize the optimal (revenue maximizing) auction for sponsored search advertising. We show that a search engine's optimal reserve price is independent of the number of bidders and independent of the rate at which click-through rate declines over positions. We... View Details
Edelman, Benjamin, and Michael Schwarz. "Optimal Auction Design and Equilibrium Selection in Sponsored Search Auctions." American Economic Review 100, no. 2 (May 2010): 597–602. (First circulated in 2006 as Optimal Auction Design in a Multi-unit Environment: The Case of Sponsored Search Auctions. Reprinted in The Economics of E-Commerce, Michael Baye and John Morgan, editors, 2016.)
- 03 Mar 2008
- Working Paper Summaries
Testing a Purportedly More Learnable Auction Mechanism
- 2021
- Article
Designing, Not Checking, for Policy Robustness: An Example with Optimal Taxation
By: Benjamin B. Lockwood, Afras Sial and Matthew C. Weinzierl
Economists typically check the robustness of their results by comparing them across plausible ranges of parameter values and model structures. A preferable approach to robustness—for the purposes of policymaking and evaluation—is to design policy that takes these... View Details
Lockwood, Benjamin B., Afras Sial, and Matthew C. Weinzierl. "Designing, Not Checking, for Policy Robustness: An Example with Optimal Taxation." Tax Policy and the Economy 35 (2021).
- 14 Jan 2010
- Working Paper Summaries
Optimal Auction Design and Equilibrium Selection in Sponsored Search Auctions
Keywords: by Benjamin G. Edelman & Michael Schwarz
- March 2022
- Article
Targeting High Ability Entrepreneurs Using Community Information: Mechanism Design in the Field
Identifying high-growth microentrepreneurs in low-income countries remains a challenge due to a scarcity of verifiable information. With a cash grant experiment in India we demonstrate that community knowledge can help target high-growth microentrepreneurs; while the... View Details
Keywords: Microentrepreneurs; Community Information; Field Experiment; Loans; Entrepreneurship; Developing Countries and Economies; Financing and Loans; Information; Mathematical Methods; India
Hussam, Reshmaan, Natalia Rigol, and Benjamin N. Roth. "Targeting High Ability Entrepreneurs Using Community Information: Mechanism Design in the Field." American Economic Review 112, no. 3 (March 2022): 861–898.
(Online Appendix with Corrigendum—Thanks to Isabella Masetto, Diego Ubfal, and The Institute for Replication for identifying a minor coding error in the production of Table 4.)
(Online Appendix with Corrigendum—Thanks to Isabella Masetto, Diego Ubfal, and The Institute for Replication for identifying a minor coding error in the production of Table 4.)
- Fall 2024
- Article
Redemption Mechanisms in Poison Pills: Evidence on Pill Design and Law Firm Effects
By: Olivier Baum and Guhan Subramanian
We present the first evidence on the incidence of “trip wire” versus “last look” poison pills. Using a hand-collected data set of 130 poison pills implemented and/or amended between January 1, 2020 and March 31, 2023, we find that pills are almost evenly divided... View Details
Baum, Olivier, and Guhan Subramanian. "Redemption Mechanisms in Poison Pills: Evidence on Pill Design and Law Firm Effects." Business Lawyer 79, no. 4 (Fall 2024): 1043–1069.